State v. Bishop
1982 Mo. LEXIS 452, 632 S.W.2d 255 (1982)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A drugged condition resulting from a drug addict's self-administered drugs is not considered "involuntarily produced" for the purpose of an intoxication defense under § 562.076.1(2), RSMo, even if the addiction creates a compulsion to use drugs.
Facts:
- During the early hours of July 25, 1980, Defendant entered the Skaggs Drug Center at 75th and Wornall in Kansas City by creating a hole in the roof.
- Defendant carried a briefcase containing burglary tools, a gun, and a police scanner into the store.
- Upon their arrival, Skaggs employees Edwin Ladd and Kerry Berten discovered Defendant inside the store.
- Defendant held Ladd and Berten hostage for some time, at one point holding his gun pointed against the back of Ladd’s head, and forced Ladd to open the store safe and hand over money and drugs.
- Kerry Berten managed to escape from the store after about an hour, and police were subsequently alerted.
- Police officers entered the store, but Defendant ordered them to leave, threatening to kill Ladd if they did not.
- Ladd succeeded in escaping from the store while Defendant was exploring potential escape avenues.
- Defendant then returned to the roof, descended upon police orders, and was captured.
- Prior to entering the Skaggs store, Defendant obtained and self-administered certain drugs by injection, stating he was addicted to them and took them out of necessity to maintain his condition.
Procedural Posture:
- Defendant was charged by amended information with burglary in the first degree, robbery in the first degree, kidnapping, and attempted robbery.
- Defendant gave notice of his intent to rely on the defense, authorized by § 562.076, RSMo, that he was in a drugged condition involuntarily produced which deprived him of the capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform it to the requirements of the law.
- Defendant waived his right to a trial by a jury, and the cause was heard by the trial court.
- The trial court (court of first instance) found Defendant guilty of burglary in the first degree, robbery in the first degree, and kidnapping, but not guilty of attempted robbery.
- The trial court found that the evidence did not establish that Defendant’s use of drugs was involuntary as required by the statute and that Defendant formed an intent to commit the offenses.
- The trial court assessed concurrent punishments: fifteen years for first-degree burglary, fifteen years for first-degree robbery, and life imprisonment for kidnapping.
- Defendant appealed the trial court’s finding that § 562.076 was inapplicable to the facts of his case and did not excuse him.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Is the drugged condition of a defendant "involuntarily produced" within the meaning of § 562.076.1(2) merely because the defendant taking the drugs is a drug addict?
Opinions:
Majority - Finch, Senior Judge
No, the drugged condition of a defendant is not "involuntarily produced" within the meaning of § 562.076.1(2) merely because the defendant taking the drugs is a drug addict. The court interpreted "involuntarily produced" by examining the legislative intent behind § 562.076, which is based on Model Penal Code § 2.08 and similar statutes from other states (New York, Michigan, Illinois, Kansas). Comments to Model Penal Code § 2.08 and legal texts such as LaFave & Scott, Criminal Law, indicate that drug addicts resorting to crime to obtain drugs are still held accountable, implying their drug use is not considered "not self-induced" or "involuntary." An examination of other state statutes reinforced this interpretation; for example, Michigan explicitly defines voluntary intoxication as including drug use by an addict, Illinois defines involuntary intoxication as only being caused by trick, artifice, or force, and Kansas defines "irresistible force" as external physical compulsion, trickery, or deception. The court concluded that self-administered drugs by an addict do not constitute an involuntarily drugged condition under the statute, even if the addiction creates a compulsion. Therefore, the trial court was justified in holding that the evidence did not establish a defense under § 562.076 and in finding that Defendant formed the intent to commit the offenses.
Analysis:
This case provides a narrow interpretation of "involuntary intoxication" under Missouri law, limiting the defense to situations where drugs are ingested without the defendant's knowledge or consent (e.g., by force or trick). It clarifies that internal compulsions, such as drug addiction, do not render drug use "involuntary" for the purpose of excusing criminal responsibility. This decision solidifies the principle that individuals, even those suffering from addiction, are generally held accountable for crimes committed while voluntarily intoxicated, preventing a broad "addiction defense" for drug-related offenses. Future cases will likely rely on this interpretation to reject similar arguments based on addiction as a form of involuntary drug use.
