State v. Billie
497 So. 2d 889 (1986)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A state's criminal-prohibitory statute that outlaws the killing of an endangered species applies to Native Americans on their reservation, as such a law is not preempted by federal law or other state statutes generally preserving Indian hunting rights, which are subject to conservation needs.
Facts:
- On December 1, 1983, James E. Billie killed one Florida Panther in Hendry County.
- The incident occurred on the Big Cypress Reservation.
- James E. Billie was an enrolled member of the Seminole Indian Tribe.
- There was no evidence that the panther was killed or used for commercial purposes.
- President Taft issued Executive Order No. 1379 in 1911, creating the Big Cypress Indian Reservation for the Seminole Indians, which implicitly included traditional hunting rights.
- The Seminole Tribe adopted a constitution and by-laws, ratified by the Secretary of the Interior, pursuant to the Indian Reorganization Acts.
Procedural Posture:
- The State of Florida filed an amended information charging James E. Billie with unlawfully killing a Florida Panther in violation of Florida Statutes 372.671 in Hendry County.
- Billie moved to dismiss the information pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190.
- Judge James R. Adams, initially assigned to the case, denied Billie's motion to dismiss.
- The case was then reassigned to Judge Hugh D. Hayes.
- Billie filed a motion for rehearing, challenging the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction, citing United States v. Dion.
- The State stipulated that Billie was an enrolled Seminole member, the incident occurred on the reservation, and the panther was not killed or used for commercial purposes.
- On July 9, 1985, the trial judge (Judge Hayes) dismissed the information, reasoning that 18 U.S.C.A. § 1162 contained a savings clause preserving Seminole hunting rights, federal law did not grant jurisdiction to protect endangered species on reservations, and section 372.671 was civil-regulatory.
- The State of Florida, as appellant, appealed the trial court's dismissal of the information to the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does Florida have jurisdiction to prosecute a Seminole Indian for killing an endangered Florida panther on a reservation, in violation of a state criminal-prohibitory statute, despite traditional hunting rights preserved by federal and state laws?
Opinions:
Majority - Scheb, Judge
Yes, Florida has jurisdiction to prosecute James E. Billie for unlawfully killing a Florida panther on the reservation because the state statute prohibiting the killing of an endangered species is criminal-prohibitory, and neither federal law nor other state statutes preempt or exempt Indians from its application. First, Section 372.671, Florida Statutes, which makes killing a Florida panther a third-degree felony punishable by up to five years imprisonment, is a criminal-prohibitory statute, not merely civil-regulatory. Unlike statutes that regulate an activity (e.g., bingo), this statute completely outlaws the killing of an endangered species, demonstrating a clear legislative intent to prevent its disappearance, as supported by the creation of the Florida Panther Research and Management Trust Fund. Second, while 18 U.S.C.A. § 1162(b) preserves Indian hunting rights, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that such rights can be regulated by the need to conserve a species, as established in Washington Game Department v. Puyallup Tribe. Third, the trial court's reliance on the Eighth Circuit's United States v. Dion and United States v. White decisions was misplaced, as the U.S. Supreme Court reversed Dion, clarifying that Congress could abrogate treaty rights for conservation purposes, even if not explicitly stated, by creating a permit system. Fourth, the federal Endangered Species Act (ESA) does not preempt state law; rather, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1535(f) explicitly permits state laws to be more restrictive than federal law regarding endangered species. Congress’s express exemption of only Alaskan Native Indians from the ESA implies no intent to exempt other tribes. Finally, general state statutes, Sections 285.09(1) and 380.055(8), which allow Indians to hunt wild game for food, are regulatory and general in nature. Section 372.671, being a specific criminal-prohibitory statute concerning an endangered species, controls over these general provisions based on statutory construction principles. The court also declined to address religious use of the panther, deeming it an affirmative defense for trial.
Concurring - Danahy, C.J., and Hall, J.
We concur.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the boundaries of state criminal jurisdiction on Indian reservations, particularly regarding endangered species protection. It reaffirms the critical distinction between 'civil-regulatory' and 'criminal-prohibitory' statutes, holding that state criminal bans on activities, even those historically associated with tribal rights, are generally enforceable on reservations. The decision underscores that traditional hunting rights, while significant, are not absolute and can be curtailed by compelling governmental interests in conservation, especially for critically endangered species. It further reinforces the principle that federal conservation laws often allow for, rather than preempt, more restrictive state legislation in this area.
