State v. Bellamy
172 N.C. App. 649, 617 S.E.2d 81, 2005 N.C. App. LEXIS 1793 (2005)
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Rule of Law:
An accomplice is not criminally liable for a secondary crime committed by a co-conspirator if that crime was not a natural or probable consequence of the primary, planned offense. The determination of whether a consequence is natural or probable is an objective inquiry made on a case-by-case basis, considering the specific facts and circumstances of the planned crime.
Facts:
- Leon McCoy, an employee at a McDonald's restaurant, was experiencing financial problems and planned to rob his employer.
- McCoy enlisted his friend, Keith Lamar Bellamy, to help him commit the robbery.
- On September 23, 2002, while McCoy was working, another employee, Andre Randall, propped a locked door open after taking out the trash.
- Bellamy, wearing a green ski mask and carrying a gun, entered through the propped door.
- Bellamy pointed the gun at the assistant manager, C.B., and took both the restaurant's deposit money and C.B.'s personal cash.
- McCoy, who was present, retrieved a bag for Bellamy to put the money in but did not activate any of the nearby silent alarms.
- After taking the money, Bellamy ordered C.B. to drop her pants and underwear, then used the barrel of his gun to spread her labia apart to inspect her genitals.
- After Bellamy fled with the money, McCoy went to the front of the store and activated a silent alarm.
Procedural Posture:
- Keith Lamar Bellamy and Leon McCoy were tried jointly before a jury in the New Hanover County Superior Court, which is the trial court of first instance.
- The jury found both defendants guilty of two counts of robbery with a dangerous weapon and one count of first-degree sexual offense.
- The trial court entered judgments against both defendants and imposed sentences.
- Both Bellamy and McCoy, as appellants, appealed their convictions and sentences to the North Carolina Court of Appeals, an intermediate appellate court.
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Issue:
Does a sexual offense committed by one co-conspirator during the armed robbery of a public business constitute a natural or probable consequence of the robbery, thereby making another co-conspirator criminally liable for the sexual offense under a theory of acting in concert?
Opinions:
Majority - Steelman, Judge
No. A sexual offense committed during the armed robbery of a public business is not, under these circumstances, a natural or probable consequence of the robbery, and therefore the accomplice, McCoy, is not criminally liable for that offense. The doctrine of acting in concert holds a person liable for a crime committed by another if it was in pursuance of their common purpose or a natural or probable consequence of it. The court rejected a per se rule that sexual assault is always a foreseeable consequence of robbery, opting for a case-by-case analysis based on an objective standard of foreseeability. The court distinguished robberies in isolated locations like homes, where sexual assaults are more common, from those in public businesses like a McDonald's, where a reasonable person would expect the perpetrator to enter and exit quickly to avoid capture. Given the public nature of the restaurant, the presence of security cameras, and the risk of being seen, it was not foreseeable that Bellamy would deviate from the robbery to commit a 'bizarre sexual assault.' Therefore, McCoy's conviction for the first-degree sexual offense is reversed. The court also held that robbing an employee of her own property and her employer's property in a single act constitutes only one robbery, and that using a gun barrel to spread the victim's labia constitutes 'penetration' for a first-degree sexual offense charge against the principal, Bellamy.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies and places a significant limit on the 'acting in concert' doctrine and accomplice liability in North Carolina. It establishes that criminal liability for an unplanned secondary crime hinges on objective foreseeability, not mere possibility. The court's distinction between crimes committed in public versus private settings provides a crucial analytical framework for future cases, requiring prosecutors to prove that a secondary crime was a reasonably foreseeable outcome given the specific context of the original plan. This precedent protects accomplices from liability for aberrant and unforeseeable acts of their co-conspirators that fall outside the scope of their shared criminal intent.
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