State v. Bean
582 So. 2d 947, 1991 WL 108415 (1991)
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Rule of Law:
A statement relating to a startling event is admissible under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, even if the declarant is a child who would otherwise be incompetent to testify as a witness, as long as the statement was made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event.
Facts:
- On April 17, 1989, John Wesley Bean, who was physically separated from his wife, Elgie Palmo Mack, went to the home where she was staying.
- Bean and Mack left the house in a car with their four-year-old daughter, Cherdaria, and her seven-year-old cousin, Barbara Peterson, in the back seat.
- Bean brought a .38 caliber semi-automatic pistol with him in the car.
- While in the car, Mack was shot, the passenger door opened, and she fell backwards onto the street.
- Witnesses reported hearing another shot fired after Mack had already fallen out of the car.
- After the shooting, the two children ran from the vehicle, and Bean drove away.
- Mack died shortly thereafter from the gunshot wounds.
- Bean disposed of the gun and fled, turning himself in to the police a week later.
Procedural Posture:
- John Wesley Bean was charged with second degree murder for the death of his wife.
- The case was tried before a twelve-member jury in a Louisiana state trial court.
- The jury found Bean guilty of second degree murder.
- The trial judge sentenced Bean to life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
- Bean's motions for a post-verdict judgment of acquittal and a new trial were denied by the trial court.
- Bean (appellant) appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit, arguing the trial court made several errors, including the improper admission of hearsay evidence.
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Issue:
Does a spontaneous statement made by a four-year-old child immediately after witnessing her mother's shooting qualify as an admissible excited utterance under the hearsay exception, even if the child is incompetent to testify as a witness?
Opinions:
Majority - Victory, J.
Yes, a spontaneous statement made by a four-year-old child immediately after witnessing a startling event qualifies as an admissible excited utterance, even if the child is incompetent to testify. The court found the statement met the two-part test for an excited utterance under LSA-C.E. Art. 803(2): (1) it related to a startling event, the shooting, and (2) it was made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by that event. The court reasoned that the shooting was a startling event that would render a four-year-old's reflective processes inoperative, and the child's immediate statement to a bystander left virtually no time for fabrication. Citing legal scholarship and precedent, the court concluded that the general competency requirements for an in-court witness do not apply to an out-of-court declarant whose statement falls under the excited utterance exception, as the reliability of such a statement comes from its spontaneity, not the declarant's understanding of an oath.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the strength and scope of the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule in Louisiana, particularly as it applies to child declarants. It clarifies that a child's statement can be admitted into evidence based on its spontaneity and connection to a startling event, completely separate from the child's competency to testify in court. This precedent is significant for prosecutors, especially in cases of domestic violence or child abuse, as it provides a pathway for admitting crucial evidence from very young witnesses who may be unable to withstand the rigors of formal testimony. The ruling emphasizes that the reliability of an excited utterance stems from the circumstances under which it was made, not the testimonial capacity of the person who made it.
