State v. Austin
2005 WL 474814, 900 So. 2d 867 (2005)
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Rule of Law:
A defendant's act of accelerating a vehicle directly at police officers, who are ordering the defendant to stop, is sufficient circumstantial evidence for a rational jury to infer the specific intent to kill required for a conviction of attempted murder, particularly when alternative avenues of escape are available.
Facts:
- Police, with a confidential informant and an undercover agent, arranged a sting operation to purchase one kilogram of cocaine from Noel Austin in the parking lot of a Chevy's restaurant.
- Officers observed Austin arrive in a Yukon, meet with his brother in another vehicle, and receive a package from him.
- The confidential informant approached Austin's vehicle, confirmed Austin possessed the cocaine, and relayed this information to other officers, prompting them to initiate an arrest.
- As clearly identified police officers moved in and ordered Austin to surrender, he first backed his Yukon, colliding with an undercover police vehicle.
- Austin then put the vehicle in drive, revved the engine, and accelerated forward directly toward Detectives Jewell and Pizzolato, who were on foot in front of the Yukon.
- Detectives Jewell and Pizzolato, testifying that they would have been struck had they not moved, fired their weapons at the Yukon in self-defense.
- After narrowly missing Jewell and Pizzolato, Austin's vehicle swerved and accelerated toward Detective Davis, who also had to move to avoid being hit.
- Austin's vehicle ultimately crashed into a light pole, and a kilogram of cocaine was discovered in his pants leg by paramedics providing medical aid.
Procedural Posture:
- The Jefferson Parish District Attorney charged Noel J. Austin via a bill of information with six counts of attempted first degree murder of police officers and related drug offenses in the trial court.
- Austin pleaded not guilty at his arraignment.
- The trial court denied Austin's pre-trial motions to suppress evidence and to disclose the identity of the confidential informant.
- A twelve-member jury found Austin guilty of attempted first degree murder of Detective Jewell and Detective Pizzolato, guilty of the responsive verdict of aggravated battery as to Detective Davis, and guilty of possession with intent to distribute cocaine.
- The jury acquitted Austin on three other attempted murder charges.
- The trial court denied Austin's motion for a new trial and imposed a sentence.
- Following a habitual offender hearing where Austin was found to be a third felony offender, the court vacated a prior sentence and imposed a sentence of life imprisonment.
- Austin filed a motion for an appeal to the Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fifth Circuit, challenging his convictions.
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Issue:
Does a defendant's act of accelerating a vehicle directly toward police officers who are attempting to make an arrest constitute sufficient evidence to prove the specific intent to kill required for a conviction of attempted first degree murder?
Opinions:
Majority - Chehardy, Judge
Yes. A defendant's act of accelerating a vehicle directly toward police officers during an attempted arrest provides sufficient evidence for a jury to infer the specific intent to kill. Specific intent is a state of mind that may be inferred from the circumstances and actions of the accused. In this case, Austin looked at Detectives Jewell and Pizzolato, who were clearly identifiable as police, and drove right at them, causing them to fire in self-defense. The court distinguished this case from others where a driver might accidentally swerve toward an officer, likening it instead to State v. Jones, where the defendant's direct acceleration at an officer supported an inference of intent to kill. Although Austin's escape was partially blocked, the evidence suggested alternative routes were available, meaning he was not forced to drive at the officers. Therefore, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational jury could reject Austin's claim that he was merely trying to escape and conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed the specific intent to kill.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the legal principle that a vehicle can be considered a deadly weapon, and its deliberate use against individuals can serve as powerful circumstantial evidence of specific intent to kill. The court's analysis solidifies a crucial factual distinction: a defendant who drives directly at officers, as opposed to merely maneuvering to drive around them, demonstrates an intent that elevates the crime from resisting arrest to attempted murder. This precedent provides a clear framework for prosecutors in similar cases, highlighting the importance of officer testimony regarding the defendant's line of travel and the availability of alternative escape routes. The ruling effectively puts defendants on notice that using a vehicle to threaten officers' lives during a flight attempt can support the most serious charges.
