State v. Arnel
1993 Mo. App. LEXIS 150, 846 S.W.2d 245, 1993 WL 18452 (1993)
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Rule of Law:
A trial court is not required to instruct a jury on voluntary manslaughter where the evidence does not support a finding that the defendant caused the death under the influence of sudden passion arising from adequate cause, especially when there is a temporal gap between the alleged provocation and the lethal act, or when the provocation consists solely of words.
Facts:
- Defendant and the victim, who were lovers and shared a home for two to three years, had a tumultuous relationship, with the victim sometimes leaving due to fear of defendant's temper, and defendant having a history of alcohol abuse and physical abuse towards her and a previous girlfriend.
- On September 30, 1988, defendant's daughter Brenda, her son Michael, and her boyfriend Bernard visited defendant and victim at their home.
- Between 11:00 and 11:30 p.m. that night, Brenda, Michael, and Bernard were awakened by a loud argument between defendant and victim from their bedroom concerning defendant's fears of victim's infidelity.
- Brenda and Bernard observed defendant leave the bedroom, go to a closet, retrieve a shotgun shell from a box, drop it, pick it up, and then return to the bedroom.
- Approximately 15 seconds after defendant re-entered the bedroom, a loud 'pop' was heard, and defendant immediately emerged, yelling for Brenda to get help and call the police and ambulance.
- Brenda entered the bedroom and found the victim lying dead on the bed in a pool of blood, with defendant's shotgun leaning against an end table nearby, from what was later determined to be a shotgun blast at close range.
- Defendant told the first police officer on the scene, 'I didn’t mean to kill her, she didn’t deserve to die.'
- At the police station, defendant admitted he retrieved the shotgun to scare the victim, believed it should have been unloaded, pointed it at her while she was lying in bed, but did not remember pulling the trigger, speculating someone else must have reloaded the gun.
Procedural Posture:
- Defendant was indicted on charges of first degree murder and armed criminal action.
- A jury trial was held, where defendant presented a defense of lack of responsibility due to mental disease or defect.
- The jury received instructions on first degree murder, second degree murder, involuntary manslaughter, and armed criminal action; however, the trial court refused defendant’s requested instruction on voluntary manslaughter.
- The jury returned a verdict finding defendant guilty of second degree murder and armed criminal action.
- The trial court sentenced defendant, in accordance with the jury’s recommendation, to life imprisonment on the murder charge and 30 years’ imprisonment on the armed criminal action charge, ordered to run consecutively.
- Defendant filed a Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief, which the motion court denied without an evidentiary hearing.
- Defendant appealed his conviction to the Missouri Court of Appeals, and his Rule 29.15 motion appeal was consolidated for review.
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Issue:
Did the trial court plainly err by refusing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter, despite the defendant's claim that there was affirmative evidence he acted in sudden passion caused by adequate provocation?
Opinions:
Majority - Reinhard, Judge
No, the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter because there was no evidence presented to support a finding that defendant's actions in killing the victim were caused by the victim's adequate provocation. The court emphasized that 'adequate cause' requires provocation of a nature calculated to inflame the passions of an ordinary, reasonable, temperate person, involving a sudden, unexpected encounter tending to excite passion beyond control, and not merely words, which are generally insufficient. 'Sudden passion' must arise at the time of the offense, directly caused by the victim, and not be solely the result of former provocation, nor occur after there has been time for passion to cool. Here, the evidence showed defendant argued with the victim, left the bedroom, retrieved and loaded a shotgun shell, returned, and then pointed the gun at the victim to 'scare' her before the shot. This sequence, with a 15-second interlude, indicates actions consistent with second-degree murder and does not support the element of sudden passion arising from adequate cause necessary for a voluntary manslaughter instruction, as there was time for any passion to cool and no evidence of victim's threatening behavior. The court referenced State v. Williams, State v. Simmons, and State v. Fears to define these terms.
Analysis:
This case reinforces the strict interpretation of 'sudden passion' and 'adequate cause' required for a voluntary manslaughter instruction, particularly in domestic disputes. It clarifies that a brief delay or intervening act, such as leaving a room to retrieve a weapon, can negate the 'suddenness' required for the lesser offense. Furthermore, it reiterates the long-standing rule that mere words, no matter how insulting, are generally insufficient to constitute 'adequate provocation,' setting a high bar for what constitutes a legal defense or mitigation based on emotional disturbance.
