State v. Alan M. Johnson
2021 WI 61 (2021)
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Rule of Law:
A defendant is entitled to jury instructions on perfect self-defense and a lesser-included offense if there is some evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, from which a reasonable jury could find in their favor; however, a circuit court retains discretion to exclude other-acts evidence where its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
Facts:
- When Alan M. Johnson was a child, his oldest sister married K.M., and Johnson's relationship with K.M. was strained due to K.M.'s verbal, physical, and on one occasion, sexual abuse of Johnson and physical abuse of other family members.
- Years prior to K.M.'s death, Johnson discovered what he believed was child pornography on K.M.'s computer and reported it to authorities, who deemed the evidence "stale."
- Around 11:45 p.m. on October 24, 2016, Johnson entered K.M.'s home through an unlocked back door, bringing a gun for protection, with the intent to find "fresh pictures" of child pornography on K.M.'s computer to deliver to the police.
- Johnson searched K.M.'s computer for over two hours and, as a result of his search, intended to turn over what he discovered to the police because he "found what they needed."
- Around 2:00 a.m. on October 25, Johnson heard a "scuff," closed the computer programs, grabbed his gun, and as he was leaving, K.M. appeared in the doorway without a shirt, saw Johnson, and then closed the door.
- Johnson was afraid, felt trapped with no means of escape other than the door K.M. had just shut, and believed K.M. knew precisely why he was there.
- K.M. then "flew open" the door and "attacked," lunging at Johnson.
- During the ensuing altercation, K.M. sustained five gunshot wounds and died, though Johnson did not recall seeing or hearing his gun fire or how he left the house.
Procedural Posture:
- Alan M. Johnson was charged in Walworth County Circuit Court with first-degree intentional homicide, use of a dangerous weapon, and armed burglary.
- Johnson moved pretrial to admit "other-acts" and McMorris evidence regarding K.M.'s past actions and what Johnson found on K.M.'s computer.
- The circuit court (Judge Kristine E. Drettwan) permitted Johnson to introduce evidence of K.M.'s past abusive conduct and Johnson's belief he previously found child pornography, but prohibited specific details of what he found on K.M.'s computer the night of K.M.'s death.
- At the close of evidence, Johnson requested jury instructions on perfect self-defense, second-degree reckless homicide, and homicide by negligent use of a firearm, which the circuit court refused.
- The circuit court instructed the jury on burglary, first-degree intentional homicide, second-degree intentional homicide, first-degree reckless homicide, and imperfect self-defense.
- A jury found Johnson guilty of first-degree reckless homicide while armed with a dangerous weapon and not guilty of burglary.
- Johnson was sentenced to 25 years of confinement and 10 years of extended supervision.
- Johnson appealed his conviction to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals.
- The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court's decision and remanded for a new trial, concluding the circuit court erred in denying instructions for perfect self-defense and second-degree reckless homicide, and in failing to allow into evidence that child pornography was found on K.M.'s computer.
- The State of Wisconsin (plaintiff-respondent-petitioner) petitioned the Wisconsin Supreme Court for review.
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Issue:
1. Did the circuit court err by failing to instruct the jury on perfect self-defense where the defendant testified that the victim lunged at him after he was discovered inside the victim's home? 2. Did the circuit court err by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of second-degree reckless homicide where there was evidence from which a jury could conclude the defendant's actions did not show utter disregard for human life? 3. Did the circuit court err by precluding the defendant from offering specific evidence regarding child pornography he claimed to have found on the victim's computer?
Opinions:
Majority - Brian Hagedorn, J.
Yes, the circuit court erred in failing to instruct the jury on perfect self-defense and second-degree reckless homicide. No, the circuit court did not err in precluding specific evidence about the contents of child pornography found on the victim's computer. The court affirmed that a defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on perfect self-defense if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, there is "some evidence" from which a reasonable jury could find that a prudent person in the defendant's position reasonably believed they were preventing an unlawful interference with their person and used only necessary force to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm. Johnson's testimony regarding K.M.'s past abuse, K.M.'s unprovoked attack by lunging, Johnson's fear, and his belief of no escape, met this low evidentiary bar. The court also held that a second-degree reckless homicide instruction was required because a jury could reasonably conclude Johnson acted in fear for his own life, rather than with "utter disregard for human life," given his testimony about bringing the gun for protection and K.M.'s instigation of a surprise attack. However, the court found that the circuit court properly exercised its discretion in excluding specific evidence about the content Johnson found on K.M.'s computer. The circuit court reasonably concluded that the probative value of this detailed evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, and the risk of a "trial within a trial" on whether specific images constituted child pornography. Johnson was permitted to testify about his purpose and that he "found what they needed," providing sufficient context without the prejudicial details.
Dissenting - Annette Kingsland Ziegler, C.J.
No, Johnson was not entitled to jury instructions on perfect self-defense or second-degree reckless homicide. Chief Justice Ziegler argued that the majority's decision creates a "limitless loophole" for criminal home invaders to claim perfect self-defense, undermining public safety and a homeowner's presumptive right to defend their home. The dissent contended that Johnson, as an armed criminal home invader, cannot claim self-defense because he created the dangerous situation by unlawfully breaking into K.M.'s home, making his use of force legally unnecessary. Furthermore, K.M.'s actions, including lunging at Johnson, were lawful under Wisconsin's Castle Doctrine (Wis. Stat. § 939.48(1m)(ar)), which presumes a homeowner may use deadly force against an unlawful entry. Since K.M.'s actions were lawful, Johnson could not reasonably believe there was an unlawful interference. The dissent also stated that Johnson provided no objective evidence that K.M.'s lunge was likely to cause imminent death or great bodily harm, nor did he provide evidence that shooting K.M. five times was necessary, especially given Johnson's inability to recall the details of the shooting. Regarding second-degree reckless homicide, the dissent argued that Johnson's actions—breaking in armed, shooting K.M. five times (including in the back and head), failing to call for help or render aid, and fleeing the scene—objectively demonstrated "utter disregard for human life," precluding a lesser-included instruction.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the "low evidentiary bar" for criminal defendants seeking jury instructions on self-defense and lesser-included offenses in Wisconsin. It reaffirms that courts must view evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant and avoid weighing credibility when deciding whether to give such instructions. The ruling also underscores the broad discretion afforded to circuit courts in evidentiary matters under Wis. Stat. § 904.03, particularly concerning the balance between probative value and unfair prejudice when "other-acts" evidence is presented. Future cases will likely scrutinize the interplay between a defendant's subjective belief of fear and the objective "prudent person" standard, particularly when the defendant is the initial aggressor or unlawfully present, and may also further clarify the limits of the Castle Doctrine.
