State v. Adamson
665 P.2d 972, 1983 Ariz. LEXIS 200, 136 Ariz. 250 (1983)
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Rule of Law:
While a victim's statements made under a sense of impending death are admissible as dying declarations, and statements relating to a startling event as excited utterances, any portion of such statements not based on the declarant's personal knowledge constitutes inadmissible hearsay. However, the erroneous admission of such evidence may be deemed harmless error if, beyond a reasonable doubt, the other properly admitted evidence is so overwhelming that it had no influence on the jury's verdict.
Facts:
- Donald Bolles, an investigative reporter, arranged to meet John Adamson at a Phoenix hotel to gather information for a news story.
- While waiting in the hotel lobby, Bolles received a telephone call from Adamson, who wanted to change the meeting place and asked for directions to Bolles’ office.
- As Bolles began backing his car out of a parking space to go to the new meeting location, a bomb exploded, critically injuring him and sending debris across the parking lot.
- Seriously injured but conscious, Bolles made statements to rescuers at the scene, implicating 'Adamson' and mentioning 'the mafia' or 'Emprise' as responsible.
- The day after the bombing, Bolles, while in grave condition in the intensive care unit, responded to police questions using finger and hand signals, again identifying a photograph of Adamson as the man he intended to meet.
- Adamson had previously visited the Arizona Republic parking lot asking about Bolles' car, told Robert Lettiere he was going to blow up a car for $10,000, and purchased remote control equipment.
- Police found bomb-making materials, including magnets, tape, and literature like 'The Anarchist Cookbook,' in Adamson's apartment.
- Bolles succumbed to his injuries and died 11 days after the bombing.
- Adamson was paid $10,000 to kill Bolles.
Procedural Posture:
- John Adamson was charged with the first-degree murder of Donald Bolles.
- Adamson initially pled guilty to second-degree murder as part of a plea bargain, agreeing to testify against co-defendants James Robison and Max Dunlap.
- The convictions of Robison and Dunlap were reversed and remanded for new trials by the Arizona Supreme Court.
- Adamson subsequently refused to testify at the retrials of Robison and Dunlap unless the state met new demands.
- The State brought a special action to the Arizona Supreme Court, which ruled that Adamson had breached his plea agreement and reinstated the original information charging open murder.
- A jury found Adamson guilty of first-degree murder.
- Following an aggravation-mitigation hearing, the trial court sentenced Adamson to death.
- Adamson appealed his conviction and sentence to the Arizona Supreme Court.
- Adamson filed a Rule 32 petition for post-conviction relief, which the trial court dismissed.
- Adamson's Petition for Review of the denial of his Rule 32 petition was consolidated with his direct appeal by the Arizona Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does the erroneous admission of a victim's statements lacking personal knowledge, particularly concerning the identity and motive of a killer, constitute reversible error when other substantial evidence supports the conviction?
Opinions:
Majority - Gordon, Vice Chief Justice
Yes, the erroneous admission of certain victim statements, despite lacking personal knowledge, does not constitute reversible error when overwhelming evidence supports the conviction. The trial court properly admitted Bolles' hospital statements as dying declarations because his critical condition and explicit statement, "You better hurry up, boys. I feel like I'm going," demonstrated a belief in imminent death, satisfying Ariz.R.Evid. 804(b)(2). Similarly, Bolles' statements at the scene about Adamson's direct involvement were admissible as excited utterances and dying declarations, as they related to the startling event and his impending death. However, statements made by Bolles regarding the "mafia" and "Emprise" as well as the general statement "Adamson did it" were not based on his personal knowledge but were mere suspicions and thus improperly admitted as hearsay under Ariz.R.Evid. 602. Despite this error, the conviction is affirmed because the admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court determined that without the improperly admitted on-the-scene statements, the jury would have found Adamson guilty given the substantial independent evidence, including Robert Lettiere's testimony about Adamson's intent and confession, the discovery of bomb-making materials and literature in Adamson's apartment, and Bolles' properly admitted hospital statements and notes. The trial court also correctly found probable cause for the search warrant, noting that evidence for probable cause need not meet trial admissibility standards and that statements from a child and a critically injured victim could contribute to probable cause. The scope of the nighttime search and the relevance of "The Anarchist Cookbook" were also upheld. The various motions for mistrial were deemed within the trial court's discretion and properly denied, and the supplementary jury instruction was found appropriate. Finally, the dismissal of Adamson's post-conviction relief petition was upheld, and the death sentence affirmed, finding two aggravating circumstances (pecuniary gain, heinous/cruel/depraved manner) outweighed mitigating factors.
Dissenting - Feldman, Justice
No, the erroneous admission of a victim's statements lacking personal knowledge, particularly concerning the identity and motive of a killer, constitutes fundamental constitutional error that necessitates reversal. The majority acknowledges that Bolles' statements about the "mafia" and "Emprise," and "Adamson did it," were improperly admitted because they were not based on his personal knowledge but on inference or suspicion, thereby lacking the reliability required for hearsay exceptions and violating the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. This is not merely a technical error but a fundamental constitutional violation. The majority's application of the "overwhelming evidence" test for harmless error is incorrect for constitutional errors. Instead, the court should apply the "contribution to the verdict" test from Chapman v. California, which requires the beneficiary of the error (the state) to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict obtained. The improperly admitted testimony, including the victim's direct identification of his killer and inflammatory references to the Mafia, was highly prejudicial and the only direct evidence of the killer's identity and motive. It is not possible to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that this evidence, which was of a type most likely to influence a jury, did not contribute to the jury's verdict, especially given the jury's extended deliberations. The appellate court should not usurp the jury's function by speculating on what the jury would have done without the constitutionally tainted evidence. Faithful adherence to constitutional principles, rather than expediency, requires reversal and remand for a new trial.
Analysis:
This case highlights the intricate balance between admitting critical evidence, especially from a dying victim, and safeguarding a defendant's constitutional rights. The majority's reliance on the "overwhelming evidence" test for harmless error, even for constitutional violations, stands in tension with the dissent's insistence on the stricter "contribution to the verdict" standard. This divergence underscores a significant point of contention in appellate review: how to assess the impact of admitted error on a jury's decision and the appropriate level of deference to the trial court versus the fundamental nature of certain rights. Future cases may grapple with whether specific categories of constitutional error demand a more rigorous harmless error review, particularly when the improperly admitted evidence is highly prejudicial or directly addresses core elements of the crime, such as identity or motive.
