State v. Adams
225 Conn. 270, 1993 Conn. LEXIS 94, 623 A.2d 42 (1993)
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Rule of Law:
The affirmative defense of renunciation requires an accomplice to not only manifest a complete and voluntary renunciation of their criminal purpose but also to wholly deprive their prior complicity of its effectiveness. If the complicity consisted of supplying a weapon, the accomplice must take active steps to neutralize that aid, such as retrieving the weapon; merely fleeing the scene is insufficient.
Facts:
- On April 15, 1990, Shelton Adams, Jr. and Sherman Sims approached Nathan Roberts, who gave Adams a .38 caliber handgun.
- In the early morning of April 16, 1990, Adams and Sims took a taxicab driven by Allen Hansen.
- During the ride, Sims ordered Hansen to pull over, then placed the handgun to Hansen's neck and fired, killing him.
- Sims and Adams pulled Hansen from the vehicle, took both of his wallets, and then walked back to Adams' apartment.
- At the apartment, Adams' father observed Adams wrapping Sims' hand, which had been wounded by the gunshot.
- Later that morning, Adams asked his father to dispose of the handgun, and his father threw it into the Mill River.
- When confronted by Roberts about the gun, Adams first denied knowing its whereabouts and then, when asked if he shot the victim, pointed at Sims.
- Police later found a jacket belonging to Adams that had blood on the sleeve consistent with the victim's blood type.
Procedural Posture:
- The defendant, Shelton Adams, Jr., was charged in a substitute information with felony murder, conspiracy to commit robbery, first degree robbery, and carrying a pistol without a permit.
- Following a jury trial in a Connecticut trial court, Adams was convicted of felony murder, first degree robbery, and carrying a pistol without a permit, and was acquitted on the conspiracy count.
- The trial court sentenced Adams to a total effective term of fifty-five years imprisonment.
- Adams (appellant) appealed the judgment of conviction directly to the Supreme Court of Connecticut.
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Issue:
Does a defendant, whose alleged complicity in a felony murder involved providing the murder weapon, present sufficient evidence to warrant a jury instruction on the defense of renunciation by claiming he fled the scene immediately before the crime occurred without taking any action to retrieve the weapon?
Opinions:
Majority - Norcott, J.
No. To be entitled to a jury instruction on the defense of renunciation, a defendant whose complicity consisted of providing the means for the offense must demonstrate that they took active steps to wholly deprive their aid of its effectiveness. A mere change of heart or flight from the crime scene is insufficient to establish the defense. The defendant's complicity was supplying the gun to Sims. To effectively renounce this complicity under the statute, he would have had to take a further step, such as taking back the weapon or warning the police to thwart its use. The defendant's theory of defense was that he was never complicit to begin with, which is a claim of innocence, not a claim of renunciation under the statute. Therefore, there was no evidentiary basis to support a jury instruction on renunciation.
Dissenting - Berdon, J.
Yes. A defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on any theory of defense for which there is any foundation in the evidence, no matter how weak. The majority's analysis incorrectly assumes the jury was required to find that the defendant supplied the gun. The defendant claimed he never saw the gun before Sims pulled it out in the cab. If the jury believed the defendant was complicit only in a robbery but did not know about the gun, his act of fleeing could have been sufficient to deprive his participation of its effectiveness. Because the evidence regarding whether he supplied the gun was circumstantial and subject to interpretation by the jury, the question of whether he effectively renounced his complicity should have been submitted to the jury for determination.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies and narrows the application of the renunciation defense under Connecticut law, particularly for accomplice liability. It establishes a high bar for defendants whose participation involves providing tangible aid, such as a weapon, requiring an affirmative act to neutralize that aid rather than passive withdrawal. The ruling distinguishes between a claim of innocence (i.e., 'I was never involved') and a claim of renunciation (i.e., 'I was involved, but I backed out effectively'), holding that the latter requires proof of active countermeasures. This precedent makes it more difficult for accomplices who provide the instrumentalities of a crime to escape liability by simply claiming they left before the principal act was committed.
