State v. Acevedo
1994 WL 59949, 633 So. 2d 828 (1994)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
For a conviction of aggravated kidnapping based on demands for sexual gratification, the prosecution must prove that the defendant's words and actions clearly manifested an intent to extort sexual compliance by playing upon the victim's hope of release, such that a reasonable person would believe compliance was necessary for safe release.
Facts:
- On April 30, 1982, between 1:15 and 1:30 A.M., Kathleen Plemer left her employer's apartment in the French Quarter and encountered trouble starting her Blazer vehicle.
- Wilson Acevedo approached Ms. Plemer, offered assistance, and after starting the truck, pulled out what appeared to be a gun, stuck it into her side, and forced her into the truck, stating, 'now, lets go for a ride... just get in the truck and don't give me any trouble.'
- Acevedo initially stated he wanted to go to a bus station to retrieve his baggage, but Ms. Plemer convinced him they needed gas and drove to an Exxon station, where she pumped gas and paid the attendant while Acevedo remained in the truck.
- After circling Armstrong Park, Acevedo ordered Ms. Plemer to keep driving towards her home in St. Bernard, repeatedly stating he wanted her to go to a motel with him and to go out with him, and requesting she pull off onto 'different little roads,' which she refused.
- Ms. Plemer parked near a subdivision entrance in St. Bernard, where her brother-in-law, a police officer, lived, informing Acevedo that she was getting tired and 'needed to pull over for awhile.'
- Acevedo then made Ms. Plemer get in the back of the truck, remove her shoes, pantyhose, and clothes (except for her blouse and underclothes), and lay on top of her on a mattress in the back.
- At approximately 3:32 A.M., Deputy Dominick McGuire observed Ms. Plemer's vehicle parked on the side of the road; Acevedo warned Ms. Plemer to stay down and said he would tell the police they were sleeping.
- When police approached, Ms. Plemer started screaming, and Acevedo pointed his gun (later discovered to be a toy) out the window, yelled at the police, and drove off at a high rate of speed, leading to a high-speed chase that ended when the truck crashed and flipped over.
Procedural Posture:
- Wilson Acevedo was convicted by a jury of aggravated kidnapping and sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment at hard labor on November 23, 1982.
- Acevedo's counsel appealed to the Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit, requesting only a review of the record for errors patent.
- The Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit, affirmed the conviction and sentence (State v. Acevedo, 439 So.2d 1130 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1983)).
- Acevedo filed an application for post-conviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal.
- The Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit, found the claim meritorious and ordered that Acevedo be granted a new appeal.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, rationally support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Wilson Acevedo committed aggravated kidnapping by clearly manifesting an intent to force Kathleen Plemer to comply with his sexual demands in hopes of obtaining her release?
Opinions:
Majority - Landrieu
No, the evidence does not rationally support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Wilson Acevedo committed aggravated kidnapping, because his actions did not clearly manifest an intent to force Kathleen Plemer to comply with sexual demands in hopes of obtaining her release. The court distinguished this case from `State v. Arnold`, where there was clear intent to rape, brutalization, and threats that plainly manifested an intent to force compliance for release. In Acevedo's case, the facts were deemed ambiguous: he used a toy gun, initially wanted to go to a bus station, allowed Ms. Plemer some autonomy (pumping gas, refusing to pull off desolate roads), and there was no evidence of him removing his own clothes or attempting anything explicitly sexual beyond lying on top of her. The court found that these actions did not 'clearly manifest an intent to force the victim to comply with his sexual demands in hopes of obtaining her release' as required by the aggravated kidnapping statute. The court declined to extend `Arnold` to such circumstances, concluding that a rational juror could not have found every element of aggravated kidnapping proven beyond a reasonable doubt under the `Jackson v. Virginia` standard. The conviction for aggravated kidnapping was reversed, and Acevedo was found guilty of the lesser included offense of simple kidnapping; however, due to having served more than twice the maximum sentence for simple kidnapping, Acevedo was ordered released.
Dissenting - Byrnes
Yes, there is sufficient evidence for a rational juror to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Acevedo committed aggravated kidnapping, as his actions, viewed in their totality, manifested an intent to extort sexual gratification by playing upon Kathleen Plemer's fear and hope of eventual release. Judge Byrnes argued that the majority misconstrued `State v. Arnold` by overly emphasizing a 'clear intent to rape,' whereas `Arnold` focused on whether the kidnapper intended to obtain 'something of value, be it sex or money or loss of simple human dignity, by playing upon the victim's fear and hope of eventual release in order to gain compliance.' The dissent highlighted Ms. Plemer's testimony that she felt her life was threatened, complied with demands to disrobe, that Acevedo was on top of her, and that he 'pulled up his pants' when police approached, suggesting sexual activity. Acevedo's unfamiliarity with the area could explain why he allowed Ms. Plemer to drive to a gas station or past desolate roads. The deputies' corroborating testimony, including seeing Ms. Plemer partially disrobed and Acevedo's aggressive actions during the high-speed chase (pointing the 'gun' at officers, cursing), further supported the coercive nature of the situation and the victim's fear. The dissent concluded that a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of aggravated kidnapping proven beyond a reasonable doubt, aligning with the `Jackson v. Virginia` standard and the prior affirmation of Acevedo's conviction.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the specific intent required for aggravated kidnapping under Louisiana law, particularly when sexual demands are involved, by distinguishing ambiguous sexual advances from a clearly manifested intent to extort sexual gratification in exchange for release. The majority opinion sets a higher bar for proving the 'intent to extort... in order to secure a release' element, requiring explicit or clearly inferable communication that compliance will lead to release, rather than merely demonstrating sexual intent during a kidnapping. This decision reinforces that the crime of aggravated kidnapping targets severe forms of extortion, preventing its over-application to cases that, while serious, may fall under lesser kidnapping statutes due to less clear extortive intent for release.
