State of West Virginia v. Joe Roger Lane
826 S.E.2d 657, 241 W. Va. 532 (2019)
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Rule of Law:
Under the West Virginia Constitution's proportionality clause, a mandatory life sentence imposed under the recidivist statute must be reversed if the final triggering offense, in conjunction with the prior felonies, does not involve actual or threatened violence to a person, especially when the prior convictions are remote or non-violent.
Facts:
- On October 10, 2015, Joe Roger Lane sold Oxycodone to Ina New, a confidential informant, on two separate occasions at a residence.
- During the first encounter, Ashley Lambert and her young daughter answered the door, and Lambert, appearing high, tried to deter New from speaking with Lane.
- New insisted on speaking with Lane, who then stepped onto the porch to conduct the sale of two Oxycodone pills for $45.
- Later the same day, New purchased two more Oxycodone pills from Lane for $45.
- Joe Roger Lane was convicted of unlawful wounding on March 20, 1997.
- Joe Roger Lane was convicted of conspiracy to commit the felony of transferring stolen property on June 13, 2009.
Procedural Posture:
- Joe Roger Lane was indicted on May 25, 2016, on three counts of delivery of a controlled substance.
- One of the three counts was dismissed prior to trial due to unprovided lab results.
- On November 29, 2016, a jury found Joe Roger Lane guilty of two counts of delivery of a controlled substance.
- On January 27, 2017, the State of West Virginia filed a recidivist information, alleging Joe Roger Lane had prior felony convictions for unlawful wounding (1997) and conspiracy to commit transferring stolen property (2009).
- Joe Roger Lane's first recidivist trial commenced on February 1, 2017, and resulted in a hung jury.
- Joe Roger Lane's second recidivist trial commenced on November 1, 2017, and the jury found that he was the same person previously convicted of the two prior felonies identified in the information.
- On November 6, 2017, the circuit court sentenced Joe Roger Lane to life in prison with mercy pursuant to West Virginia Code § 61-11-18.
- Joe Roger Lane appealed the November 6, 2017, sentencing order to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
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Issue:
Does a life sentence with mercy, imposed under West Virginia's recidivist statute for a third felony conviction of delivering controlled substances, violate the proportionality clause of the West Virginia Constitution when the triggering offense involved no actual or threatened violence and the prior felonies were largely non-violent or remote in time?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Workman
Yes, a life sentence with mercy, imposed under West Virginia's recidivist statute for a third felony conviction of delivering controlled substances, violates the proportionality clause of the West Virginia Constitution when the triggering offense involved no actual or threatened violence and the prior felonies were largely non-violent or remote in time. The Court affirmed Lane's conviction for delivery of controlled substances, finding sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict. However, it reversed the life sentence, holding it disproportionate under Article III, Section 5 of the West Virginia Constitution. The Court reiterated its long-standing restrictive view of the recidivist statute to mitigate its harshness, as established in Wanstreet v. Bordenkircher and State v. Beck. The primary analysis for proportionality, especially for a life recidivist sentence, focuses on whether the offenses, particularly the triggering third felony, involved 'actual or threatened violence to the person.' Here, the delivery of four Oxycodone pills involved no actual or threatened violence; there was no testimony or evidence of violence surrounding the controlled buys. While Lane had a prior conviction for the violent felony of unlawful wounding, it occurred twenty years prior, and his second felony for conspiracy to transfer stolen property was non-violent. The Court cited State ex rel. Boso v. Hedrick and State v. Deal as analogous cases where similar non-violent triggering offenses, even with some prior violent felonies, led to reversals of life sentences. The Court distinguished State ex rel. Daye v. McBride, noting that Daye did not involve a constitutional proportionality challenge and focused on statutory interpretation regarding the Controlled Substances Act, rather than the specific violence inquiry. Therefore, the circuit court's imposition of a life sentence was unwarranted and an abuse of discretion.
Dissenting - Justice Armstead
No, a life sentence with mercy, imposed under West Virginia's recidivist statute for a third felony conviction of delivering controlled substances, does not violate the proportionality clause of the West Virginia Constitution in this case. Justice Armstead argued that the Court has incorrectly strayed from the plain meaning of the recidivist statute, which clearly mandates a life sentence for three felony convictions, regardless of the 'actual or threatened violence' test introduced by Wanstreet and Beck. The dissent believes the Legislature should reevaluate the statute if it deems it constitutionally deficient. However, even applying the Wanstreet/Beck test, the dissent argued that the life sentence was appropriate. The prior offenses included a charge of unlawful wounding (violent) and conspiracy to transfer stolen property. The triggering offense, selling Oxycodone, especially with a toddler present or in the immediate vicinity, presented a substantial risk of violence. The dissent cited several examples of violence associated with the illegal drug trade, including the murder of a confidential informant, to support the argument that such situations are 'inherently dangerous and fraught with a serious risk of violence.' The dissent criticized the majority's distinction of Daye, emphasizing that Daye upheld a recidivist life sentence for a defendant with three drug trafficking convictions, indicating that drug felonies can indeed warrant such a sentence. Therefore, Justice Armstead believed there was sufficient evidence to support a finding of a risk of violence in this case, upholding the life sentence as consistent with the statute's intent and constitutional requirements.
Analysis:
This case significantly reinforces the West Virginia Supreme Court's commitment to a narrow interpretation of the recidivist statute, particularly regarding the proportionality clause. It clarifies that drug delivery offenses, even in the context of the opioid crisis, do not automatically qualify as crimes involving 'actual or threatened violence' necessary to uphold a life sentence under the recidivist statute, absent specific evidence of such violence in the actual commission of the crime. This decision will likely make it more challenging for the State to secure life recidivist sentences for drug-related triggering offenses, requiring prosecutors to demonstrate specific violent elements beyond the general societal risks associated with drug trade. It highlights the tension between legislative mandates for habitual offender sentencing and judicial oversight via constitutional proportionality principles, prompting a call for legislative review by the dissent.
