State of Washington v. Trump
FOR PUBLICATION (2025)
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Rule of Law:
The Fourteenth Amendment's Citizenship Clause, granting citizenship to "all persons born in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof," establishes birthright citizenship for children born in the U.S. regardless of their parents' temporary or unlawful immigration status, and the President lacks the power to modify this constitutional guarantee via executive order.
Facts:
- The Fourteenth Amendment was adopted after the Civil War to establish that "all persons born in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State in which they reside."
- In 1898, the Supreme Court, in United States v. Wong Kim Ark, interpreted the Citizenship Clause to mean that children born in the United States acquire U.S. citizenship by birth, "notwithstanding alienage of the parents."
- For over 125 years, the Judiciary, Congress, and the Executive Branch have consistently and uniformly protected the explicit guarantee of birthright citizenship, regardless of an individual's parents' immigration status.
- On January 20, 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order No. 14,160, titled 'Protecting the Meaning and Value of American Citizenship,' which stated that U.S. citizenship would not automatically extend to persons born in the U.S. if their mother was unlawfully present or lawfully but temporarily present, and the father was not a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident.
- Section 2 of the Executive Order stated that federal departments and agencies shall not issue documents recognizing such persons as U.S. citizens or accept state-issued documents purporting to recognize such citizenship.
- The Executive Order would render more than 1,100 infants born each month in the Plaintiff States ineligible for federally-backed state-run programs such as Medicaid, the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), and Title IV-E foster care, and would affect their eligibility for Social Security Numbers.
Procedural Posture:
- The States of Washington, Arizona, Illinois, and Oregon (State Plaintiffs) filed a complaint and motion for a temporary restraining order in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington the day after President Trump issued Executive Order No. 14,160.
- The district court granted the temporary restraining order.
- Individual expectant mothers (Individual Plaintiffs) filed a putative class action, and the district court consolidated their case with the State Plaintiffs' case.
- Both groups of plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction.
- On February 6, 2025, the district court granted a universal preliminary injunction, enjoining the Defendants (President Trump and various federal agencies/officials) from enforcing or implementing the Executive Order.
- The district court found that both State and Individual Plaintiffs had standing, concluded the Executive Order likely violated the Constitution and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and determined that the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable economic and constitutional harm.
- The district court granted a universal injunction after determining that a geographically limited injunction would be ineffective to relieve the States’ financial and administrative burdens.
- Other federal courts across the country also enjoined implementation and enforcement of the Executive Order, some universally and some with limited scope.
- The Supreme Court accepted review on the scope of injunctions in Trump v. CASA, Inc., holding that universal injunctions based on individual and associational plaintiff standing were impermissible, but leaving open whether a universal injunction could be justified to provide complete relief to state plaintiffs.
- The District Court of New Hampshire provisionally certified a nationwide class of plaintiffs in Barbara, et al. v. Trump and issued a classwide preliminary injunction, which it stayed pending appeal in the First Circuit.
- Defendants (Donald J. Trump, et al.) appealed the district court's universal preliminary injunction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
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Issue:
Does an Executive Order that purports to deny U.S. citizenship to children born in the United States whose parents are temporarily or unlawfully present violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Citizenship Clause and the Immigration and Nationality Act?
Opinions:
Majority - Judge Gould
Yes, the Executive Order is invalid because it contradicts the plain language of the Fourteenth Amendment’s grant of citizenship to "all persons born in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof" and violates the Immigration and Nationality Act. The court determined that the phrase "subject to the jurisdiction thereof" should be interpreted according to its ordinary meaning at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment's adoption, which refers to being subject to the laws and authority of the United States. This interpretation, reinforced by United States v. Wong Kim Ark, excludes only a limited number of individuals (e.g., children of foreign diplomats, invading armies, and certain Native American tribal members) who are not fully subject to U.S. law, but not children born to parents temporarily or unlawfully present. The court rejected the Defendants' novel interpretation requiring "primary allegiance" or "permanent domicile," finding no support in the text, Supreme Court precedent, historical background, or drafting history. Numerous Supreme Court decisions since Wong Kim Ark have consistently recognized children born in the U.S. to undocumented parents as citizens. Furthermore, the overwhelming majority of Executive Branch practice, including 1995 and 1997 OLC opinions, has concluded that legislation denying such citizenship would be unconstitutional. For the same reasons, the Executive Order also violates the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a), which uses the identical language from the Fourteenth Amendment, whose meaning was settled at the time of the INA's enactment. The State Plaintiffs demonstrated irreparable economic harm, including loss of federal reimbursements for state-run programs and substantial administrative costs to comply with the Executive Order, for which monetary damages are unavailable against federal defendants. The balance of equities and public interest strongly favored an injunction, as there is no legitimate governmental interest in enforcing an unconstitutional order and the public has a strong interest in upholding the Constitution. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing a universal preliminary injunction because it was necessary to provide complete relief to the States, as a narrower injunction would still result in the States incurring unrecoverable administrative costs and eligibility overhauls due to the nationwide mobility of affected individuals and the Executive Order's denial of federal recognition of citizenship.
Partial concurrence and partial dissent - Judge Bumatay
Judge Bumatay declined to reach the merits of the citizenship question or the scope of the injunction, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction because the State Plaintiffs had no standing. He concurred with the majority's decision to dismiss the Individual Plaintiffs' claims due to mootness concerns and their coverage by a certified class action in another federal court. For the State Plaintiffs, he argued that they lacked standing on several grounds: (1) They could not assert "sovereign interests" in defending against federal regulation of "state citizenship" (which the Executive Order did not implicate), nor could they assert third-party standing (parens patriae) against the federal government on behalf of their citizens, as this is forbidden and individuals are capable of protecting their own rights. (2) The States' alleged pecuniary injuries (reduced federal reimbursements, administrative expenses, lost SSA fees) were too speculative and contingent to constitute an injury-in-fact because they relied on predictions of how the Executive Order might be implemented and assumptions about how independent third parties (federal agencies, individuals) might react, all of which were uncertain as the Executive Order was enjoined immediately. (3) Any alleged loss of federal reimbursements for state assistance programs would be a "self-inflicted injury," as States voluntarily choose to extend benefits to individuals who do not qualify for federal reimbursement, making the financial harm traceable to the States' own decisions, not the Executive Order. (4) He distinguished Biden v. Nebraska, arguing that the injuries in that case were direct and certain losses of federal funding to a state entity due to a "straightforward" federal plan, unlike the indirect and speculative harms alleged here. He emphasized that rigorous enforcement of Article III standing is crucial to prevent judicial overreach and transforming courts into monitors of executive action.
Analysis:
This case profoundly reinforces the long-established principle of birthright citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment, decisively rejecting an executive attempt to unilaterally redefine it. It serves as a significant check on presidential power, affirming that executive orders cannot modify or override settled constitutional provisions or statutory interpretations that have been uniformly upheld by judicial precedent and executive practice for over a century. The decision also provides critical guidance on the limits of state standing in federal challenges, distinguishing between direct and merely speculative economic harms, and clarifies the narrow circumstances under which a universal injunction may be justified to provide complete relief to a state plaintiff.
