State of Washington v. Spokane County Dist. Court
PUBLISHED OPINION (2020)
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Rule of Law:
The necessity defense is unavailable to individuals engaged in civil disobedience who intentionally violate constitutional laws, even if their prior legal alternatives for protest have proven unsuccessful in achieving legislative change.
Facts:
- Reverend George Taylor was part of a group of protestors who walked onto BNSF Railway property and stood on mainline tracks where 'No Trespassing' signs were posted.
- Taylor knew the property was private and he had no permission to enter it, but he and other protestors held signs and banners protesting the transport of coal and oil.
- For the safety of the protestors, trains in the general vicinity were held idling, and BNSF and law enforcement officers responded to the scene.
- Protestors, including Taylor, were told they would be arrested if they refused to leave; Taylor and two others politely refused to comply and were peacefully arrested.
- Taylor testified that he protested on the tracks to draw local legislative attention to the imminent danger posed by coal and oil trains and to minimize danger from climate change.
- Taylor engaged in various environmental education efforts, joined groups like the Sierra Club, voted for 'green' candidates, and brought his concerns to numerous local, state, and federal officials, but believed nothing in the environmental community was working and no other reasonable alternative existed.
- Taylor believed his actions were necessary to avoid the imminent danger to Spokane citizens from train derailment and to minimize the danger to Earth due to climate change, believing the public danger from rail transport of coal and oil through Spokane was far greater than his act of trespassing.
Procedural Posture:
- The State charged George Taylor in Spokane County District Court with criminal trespass in the second degree and unlawful obstruction of a train.
- Taylor filed a motion requesting to assert the defense of necessity, which the district court granted, finding he had presented sufficient evidence for all four elements, including his belief that no reasonable legal alternative existed.
- The State filed an application for statutory writ of review with the Spokane County Superior Court, which granted the writ without notice to Taylor and stayed district court proceedings.
- Taylor moved to disqualify the superior court judge, which was denied on grounds that the issuance of the writ was a discretionary ruling and Taylor’s motion was untimely.
- The superior court reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision, concluding that Taylor had reasonable legal alternatives and could not assert the necessity defense.
- Taylor timely petitioned the Court of Appeals for discretionary review, which was initially denied by a commissioner but granted by a panel of the court upon Taylor's motion to modify.
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Issue:
Does the necessity defense, specifically the 'no reasonable legal alternative' element, apply to a defendant who engaged in civil disobedience by trespassing on private property and obstructing a train to protest climate change and the dangers of rail transport, despite having pursued and exhausted various legal avenues without achieving legislative or policy changes?
Opinions:
Majority - Lawrence-Berrey, J.
No, the necessity defense is not available to George Taylor because individuals engaged in civil disobedience who intentionally violate constitutional laws cannot assert this defense when reasonable legal alternatives exist. The court emphasized that persuasive authority rejects the notion that civil disobedients may assert a necessity defense, especially when challenging government policy rather than the constitutionality of the law itself. Such actions are characterized as 'indirect civil disobedience,' for which the defense is never available, citing United States v. Schoon. The court reasoned that there are always reasonable legal alternatives to disobeying constitutional laws, such as protesting on public property, educating the public, and petitioning elected officials. The mere fact that these legal alternatives do not produce timely legislative changes does not permit criminal conduct. The necessity defense was not intended to excuse criminal activity by those who disagree with government policies or to allow judges or juries to make negative political judgments, which would infringe upon the separation of powers. The court explicitly disagreed with State v. Ward to the extent it authorized people to intentionally violate constitutional laws when protests are unsuccessful. The court also declined to resolve Taylor's challenge to the superior court judge's refusal to disqualify himself, invoking judicial economy to decide the substantive issue given full briefing by the parties.
Dissenting - Fearing, J.
Yes, George Taylor presented sufficient facts to support the defense of necessity, and the district court correctly allowed him to present this defense to a jury. Denying this right violates Taylor’s constitutional rights to a jury trial and to present a complete defense. The dissent argued that Washington courts have adopted the common law necessity defense, which includes the element that 'no reasonable legal alternative existed,' and that this element should consider whether other steps would be 'futile.' Taylor's testimony, supported by expert witnesses, indicated a long history of unsuccessful legal attempts to address climate change and train dangers, thus creating a question of fact for the jury regarding the futility of such alternatives. The dissent criticized the majority for effectively negating the necessity defense in all civil disobedience cases by holding that legal avenues of protest always exist, regardless of their effectiveness, and for ignoring political realities where money and influence often drown out individual voices. The dissent also argued that the superior court judge should have honored Taylor’s notice of disqualification, as Taylor was not a party when the ex parte writ was issued and the ruling was preliminary. Furthermore, the dissent contended that juries, not judges, are the proper arbiters of 'reasonableness' in such contexts and that the majority’s ruling stifles a rich American tradition of honorable lawbreaking that has historically driven necessary social and political change.
Analysis:
This case significantly narrows the applicability of the necessity defense in Washington, particularly for civil disobedience actions. By rejecting the idea that ineffective legal avenues make criminal alternatives 'reasonable,' the court limits the defense to situations where there are truly no legal alternatives, rather than merely ineffective ones. This ruling may deter future environmental or social justice protestors from employing civil disobedience as a last resort, as it reinforces the principle that individuals cannot justify criminal acts by merely disagreeing with government policy or finding legal channels insufficient. The explicit disagreement with State v. Ward highlights a jurisdictional split on this interpretation, suggesting potential for further clarification by the Washington Supreme Court on the boundaries of the necessity defense.
