State of Tennessee v. Ricky Lee Nelson
2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 59 (2014)
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Rule of Law:
A post-conviction petitioner is entitled to DNA testing of evidence if it remains in a condition suitable for analysis and if the most favorable, realistically possible exculpatory results would create a reasonable probability that the petitioner would not have been prosecuted or convicted.
Facts:
- On Saturday, February 18, 1989, Ricky Lee Nelson spoke with a woman's daughter about a job.
- On Sunday, February 19, 1989, Nelson entered the woman's home in Memphis, ostensibly to speak with her daughter.
- The daughter recognized Nelson's voice when she called her mother and realized he was in the home shortly before the crime.
- While the woman was dressing for church, Nelson raped and robbed her.
- During the commission of the crimes, Nelson brandished a butcher knife.
- Both the mother and daughter identified Nelson at trial as the man who came to the home on Saturday and later raped and robbed the mother on Sunday.
- At Nelson's original trial, there was no fingerprint or DNA evidence connecting him to the crime.
Procedural Posture:
- In 1990, Ricky Lee Nelson was convicted by a jury in the Criminal Court for Shelby County of aggravated rape, aggravated robbery, and second degree burglary, receiving a twenty-five year sentence.
- The Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee affirmed Nelson's convictions on direct appeal.
- In 1993, Nelson filed a petition for post-conviction relief and post-conviction DNA testing, which the post-conviction court denied.
- The Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee affirmed the denial of Nelson's post-conviction relief.
- In 2010, Nelson filed a Motion for Post-Conviction DNA Testing of a butcher knife in the post-conviction court.
- After a non-evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied Nelson's motion, finding the knife unsuitable for DNA analysis.
- Nelson appealed the denial to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee, which reversed the decision and remanded the case to the post-conviction court for reconsideration in light of Powers v. State.
- On remand, the post-conviction court conducted another hearing and again denied Nelson's motion for DNA testing, concluding the knife was not in a testable condition and that exculpatory results would not establish a reasonable probability of non-prosecution or conviction.
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Issue:
Did the post-conviction court err by finding that a butcher knife was not in a condition suitable for DNA testing and by concluding that even favorable exculpatory DNA results would not create a reasonable probability that Ricky Lee Nelson would not have been prosecuted or convicted?
Opinions:
Majority - John Everett Williams
Yes, the post-conviction court erred by finding that the butcher knife was not in a condition suitable for DNA testing and by concluding that exculpatory DNA results would not create a reasonable probability that Ricky Lee Nelson would not have been prosecuted or convicted. The court found that the post-conviction court applied incorrect legal standards and reached erroneous results. Regarding the knife's condition, the post-conviction court abused its discretion by discrediting the un-rebutted expert testimony of Gary Harmour. Harmour's affidavit, based on his review of case materials and years of experience, opined that it was 'possible' to obtain DNA from the knife, assuming reasonable storage. The State presented no evidence to refute this or establish that the assumptions were unreasonable. The post-conviction court's speculation about contamination without factual basis was insufficient to deny testing, as trial courts must have 'substantial facts' to determine that testable material is unavailable. Regarding the reasonable probability of non-prosecution or conviction, the post-conviction court failed to properly postulate the most realistically possible test results, as required by Powers v. State. Powers mandates considering the possibility that DNA testing could identify the profile of another known sex offender from the CODIS database and exclude the petitioner's DNA. The post-conviction court's concern about the 'when or how' such DNA transfer occurred was deemed 'far too thin a reed' to deny testing, stating that such 'nagging doubts' are insufficient, especially for cold cases where evidence storage predated modern DNA testing protocols. The court reiterated that if a DNA profile of a known sex offender is developed that does not match the petitioner, a 'reasonable probability exists that the petitioner would not have been convicted,' as such evidence would cast significant doubt on the eyewitness identification that primarily supported Nelson's conviction.
Concurring - Thomas T. Woodall
Justice Woodall filed a separate concurring opinion, but its content is not provided in this excerpt.
Analysis:
This case clarifies and strengthens the application of Tennessee's Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act, particularly concerning the standards for granting DNA testing in older cases. It reinforces the principle from Powers v. State that courts must adopt the most favorable and realistically possible exculpatory DNA results for the petitioner when assessing the 'reasonable probability' prong. The decision limits a post-conviction court's ability to deny a DNA testing request based on mere speculative concerns about evidence condition or potential contamination, especially when un-rebutted expert testimony supports the feasibility of testing. This ruling ensures broader access to DNA testing for petitioners, providing a crucial pathway for re-evaluating convictions where forensic science was not available or fully utilized at the time of trial.
