State of Or. v. City of Rajneeshpuram
53 U.S.L.W. 2226, 598 F.Supp. 1208, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22815 (1984)
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Rule of Law:
The state's recognition and support of a municipal corporation may violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution if the city's existence and operation are so pervasively controlled by a religious organization that it amounts to the establishment of a theocracy.
Facts:
- The City of Rajneeshpuram was incorporated on May 26, 1982, by a unanimous vote of 154 electors in Wasco County, Oregon.
- The City is located entirely within Rancho Rajneesh, a 64,229-acre parcel controlled by Rajneesh Foundation International (RFI).
- RFI, a nonprofit religious corporation organized to advance 'Rajneeshism,' is the sole owner of Rajneesh Investment Corporation (RIC), a for-profit entity that owns all real property within the City of Rajneeshpuram, except for a county road.
- The Rajneesh Neo-Sannyas International Commune (the Commune), incorporated in December 1981 to be a religious community guided by the teachings of Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh, holds a long-term leasehold on Rancho Rajneesh, including all real property within the City.
- Ma Anand Sheela, the personal secretary to Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh, holds multiple controlling positions within RFI, RIC, and the Commune, and possesses an unlimited general power of attorney from the Bhagwan.
- All residents of Rajneeshpuram are either members or invitees of the Commune, and no one may reside in the City without the consent of the Commune and Ma Anand Sheela, who has actual control over admission and expulsion.
- The primary purpose for establishing the City of Rajneeshpuram was to advance the religion of Rajneeshism, serving as a spiritual mecca, monument, and gathering place for followers worldwide.
Procedural Posture:
- The State of Oregon filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon, seeking a declaratory judgment that it was not required to recognize the municipal status of the City of Rajneeshpuram, nor pay public monies or provide public services to it, and that its Proclamation of Incorporation was null and void, alleging violations of the religion clauses of the Oregon and United States Constitutions.
- Defendants (excluding Wasco County and Sheriff Brown) subsequently moved the District Court to dismiss the State of Oregon’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
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Issue:
Does the State of Oregon's recognition and support of a municipal corporation, whose land ownership, residency, and primary purpose are pervasively controlled by an organized religion, violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution?
Opinions:
Majority - Frye, Judge
Yes, the State of Oregon's complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted because, assuming the alleged facts are true, the pervasive control of the City of Rajneeshpuram by religious organizations could constitute an unconstitutional establishment of religion. The court applied the three-part test from Lemon v. Kurtzman, which requires a governmental action to have a secular purpose, a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and must not foster excessive government entanglement with religion. The court adopted the State of Oregon's argument that the governmental acts in question are Wasco County's granting municipal status and the State of Oregon's bestowing governmental powers, which confer power on an entity subject to the actual and direct control of a religion and its leaders. The court distinguished this situation from a city populated solely by adherents of one faith with private land ownership, noting that here, religious organizations control all land and residency. Citing Larkin v. Grendel’s Den and State of New Jersey v. Celmer, the court emphasized that ceding actual legislative or municipal authority to a religious organization is unconstitutional. The potential for injury to the anti-establishment principle was found to clearly outweigh any potential harm to the defendants’ free exercise rights, as denying municipal status would not prevent them from practicing their religion or receiving public services from Wasco County. The court concluded that, given the alleged facts, recognizing the City could have the principal effect of advancing Rajneeshism and fostering excessive government entanglement, thus violating the Establishment Clause.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the reach of the Establishment Clause, demonstrating that it extends beyond direct governmental funding to prevent the state's recognition and support of a municipal entity that functions as a de facto theocracy. By applying the Lemon test to the unique situation of a city so thoroughly intertwined with and controlled by a religious organization, the court indicated that the separation of church and state principles must guard against both direct and indirect forms of religious establishment. The ruling underscores the judiciary's role in scrutinizing arrangements where private religious actions effectively merge with civil authority, prioritizing the anti-establishment principle over claims of free exercise when a compelling state interest in preventing a theocracy is at stake. This precedent serves as a cautionary tale against any governmental action that could be perceived as granting sovereign power to a religious entity.
