State of New Hampshire v. Paulson Papillon
New Hampshire Reports (Slip Opinion) (2020)
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Rule of Law:
Evidence of other bad acts is 'intrinsic' and not subject to Rule 404(b) only if it is inextricably intertwined with the charged offense, forming part of a single criminal episode or a necessary preliminary. Accomplice liability for an offense requiring a reckless result is established if the accomplice acts with the purpose to promote the underlying criminal conduct and the reckless result is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of that conduct.
Facts:
- During the latter half of 2015, Paulson Papillon and his associates Adrien Stillwell, Nathaniel Smith, and Michael Younge sold drugs in and around Manchester.
- On October 21, 2015, Paulson Papillon was arrested and jailed after a drug purchase at a hotel, leading him to believe M.P. was a police informant responsible for his arrest.
- After his release on bail on October 26, Paulson Papillon repeatedly urged Stillwell, Smith, and Younge to kill M.P., offering them money and drugs to do so, emphasizing it needed to happen before his court date.
- On October 31, Paulson Papillon provided Stillwell, Smith, and Younge with a .357 gun and Halloween costumes, intending them for a murder attempt on M.P. that night, while he went to a Connecticut casino for an alibi.
- Stillwell, Smith, and Younge found M.P. but decided against killing him that night; Paulson Papillon was upset upon discovering M.P. was still alive and reiterated his need for M.P.'s death, threatening to find others if they "couldn't do it."
- On November 3, Stillwell, armed with the .357 gun Paulson Papillon provided, along with Smith and Younge, located M.P. outside his apartment building and Stillwell shot M.P. twice, causing his death.
- After the murder, Paulson Papillon rewarded his associates with drugs and money, met with them to discuss the killing, helped them dispose of evidence (like cell phones and clothes), and took Stillwell and Younge on an expenses-paid trip to Connecticut to establish an alibi and avoid suspicion.
- While incarcerated on November 9, Paulson Papillon shared unpublicized details about M.P.'s death with a fellow inmate, L.M., stating he "had to have it done" because M.P. was going to inform on him "for some drugs," and later discussed plans to kill his co-conspirators to silence them.
Procedural Posture:
- Paulson Papillon was convicted of conspiracy to commit murder and as an accomplice to reckless second-degree murder by a jury in Superior Court (Brown, J.).
- Paulson Papillon, as the appellant, appealed his convictions to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, raising arguments related to the waiver of his right to counsel, the admission of evidence under New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 404(b), and the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions.
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Issue:
Did the trial court err by admitting evidence of Paulson Papillon's offer to facilitate the murder of an unrelated suspected police informant, where such evidence was not intrinsic to the charged offenses and thus should have been analyzed under New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 404(b); and was there sufficient evidence to support his convictions for conspiracy to commit murder and as an accomplice to reckless second-degree murder, particularly regarding the agreement for conspiracy and the mental state requirements for accomplice liability?
Opinions:
Majority - Hantz Marconi, J.
No, evidence of Paulson Papillon's offer to facilitate the murder of an unrelated suspected police informant does not qualify as 'intrinsic evidence' and should have been analyzed under New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 404(b), though its erroneous admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Yes, there was sufficient evidence to support his convictions for both conspiracy to commit murder and as an accomplice to reckless second-degree murder, as the former punishes the agreement to commit a crime with purposeful intent, which is distinct from accomplice liability for a reckless result that was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the promoted conduct. The court determined that Paulson Papillon's offer to orchestrate the murder of another, unrelated suspected police informant was not "intrinsic" evidence to the charged offenses of conspiracy to murder M.P. and accomplice to M.P.'s murder. For evidence of other acts to be considered intrinsic, it must be "inextricably intertwined" with the charged crime, part of a "single criminal episode," or "necessary preliminaries," demonstrating a causal, temporal, or spatial connection. The challenged statements were too attenuated, not essential to complete the story of M.P.'s murder, and did not form an integral part of the witness's testimony concerning the charged offenses. The purpose of Rule 404(b) is to prevent conviction based on criminal propensity, and the intrinsic evidence exception cannot be used as a "backdoor to circumvent" this purpose. Therefore, the trial court erred in concluding Rule 404(b) did not apply. However, the court found this error to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to the overwhelming evidence of Paulson Papillon's guilt for the conspiracy and accomplice charges. This evidence included detailed testimony from a co-conspirator (Younge), corroborating witnesses, Paulson Papillon's expressed motive (belief M.P. was an informant), his provision of money, drugs, and a gun, his attempts to establish alibis, his post-murder rewards to associates, his efforts to cover up the crime, and his own inculpatory statements made to an associate and a fellow inmate. This extensive evidence rendered the erroneously admitted testimony inconsequential. Regarding the sufficiency of evidence, the court found ample evidence for both convictions. For conspiracy, there was sufficient evidence of a "tacit understanding" between Paulson Papillon and his associates to cause M.P.'s death, despite arguments regarding the specific timing or method. Evidence included Paulson Papillon's persistent urging, offers of incentives, provision of the murder weapon, and subsequent actions indicating his involvement and desire for M.P.'s death. As to accomplice liability for reckless second-degree murder, the court rejected the argument of inconsistency between a purposeful conspiracy conviction and a reckless accomplice conviction, affirming that conspiring to commit a crime and actually committing it are separate offenses. The court clarified RSA 626:8, III and IV, stating that an accomplice must act with the purpose of promoting the underlying criminal conduct (actus reus), and when a prohibited result (like death) is an element, the accomplice only needs the mental state specified for that result (here, recklessness) if the result was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the promoted conduct. Paulson Papillon's extensive actions in soliciting, aiding, and facilitating the murder were sufficient to meet these requirements, and M.P.'s reckless death was a foreseeable consequence of his conduct.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the parameters of the "intrinsic evidence" exception to New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 404(b), reinforcing that for evidence of other bad acts to be admissible without Rule 404(b) analysis, it must be truly and inextricably intertwined with the charged offense, not merely providing context for an admission. It also provides a robust interpretation of New Hampshire's accomplice liability statute, RSA 626:8, especially regarding the dual mental state requirements when the underlying crime has a result element with a lower mens rea than the purpose to promote the conduct. Future cases will likely face a higher bar for admitting "other acts" evidence as intrinsic, and this ruling guides courts in correctly applying accomplice liability principles to ensure both the purpose to promote the conduct and the foreseeability of the result are established.
