State of Missouri v. Sylvester R. Sisco II
458 S.W.3d 304, 2015 Mo. LEXIS 22 (2015)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is not violated by a lengthy pretrial delay if a balancing of four factors—length of delay, reason for delay, defendant's assertion of the right, and prejudice—weighs against the defendant, even if the state deliberately caused a portion of the delay for a tactical advantage.
Facts:
- On October 16, 2006, Sylvester R. Sisco and his brother, Anthony Sisco, were involved in a shooting at a Kansas City bar that killed Jacob Higgs and seriously wounded Reno Dillard.
- Still photographs from the bar's surveillance video were released to the media.
- Two women who had been at the bar, Erin Bridges and Lucretia Neal, contacted police and identified Mr. Sisco and his brother from the photographs.
- The state intended to use Ms. Neal as a key witness to place Mr. Sisco at the scene of the crime.
- On June 30, 2008, the day a trial was scheduled, Ms. Neal appeared with an attorney and indicated she would invoke her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination if called to testify.
- Shortly before a subsequent trial date in April 2009, the state disclosed a report from a new fingerprint expert who, for the first time, identified a latent print from the crime scene as belonging to Mr. Sisco.
- This new fingerprint analysis contradicted a previous report from a different expert, who had retired, which stated that none of the fingerprints found at the scene matched Mr. Sisco.
Procedural Posture:
- A felony complaint was filed against Sylvester Sisco on October 19, 2006, and he was arrested the next day.
- On October 27, 2006, Sisco was charged by indictment in the Jackson County circuit court (trial court) with first-degree murder, first-degree assault, and two counts of armed criminal action.
- The initial trial date was continued at the state's request due to the prosecutor's health, and again by the court due to docket constraints.
- On June 30, 2008, Sisco filed his first motion for a speedy trial; on the same day, the court granted the state another continuance over Sisco's objection.
- A new trial was set for April 27, 2009. Just before trial, Sisco filed a motion in limine to exclude late-disclosed fingerprint evidence, which the trial court granted.
- After the trial court denied the state's request for another continuance, the state entered a nolle prosequi, voluntarily dismissing the charges on April 27, 2009.
- Later the same day, the state filed a new complaint with the identical charges against Sisco.
- Sisco filed a motion to dismiss the new case with prejudice, arguing a violation of his right to a speedy trial, which the trial court overruled.
- A jury convicted Sisco on all counts, and the trial court entered a judgment of conviction and sentence.
- Sisco appealed to the Missouri Court of Appeals, which issued an opinion before the case was transferred to the Supreme Court of Missouri for a final decision.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a nearly three-year delay between a defendant's arrest and trial violate the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial when the delay resulted from a combination of neutral reasons, strategic state actions, and the defendant's own motions, and where the defendant waited 20 months to assert the right and suffered minimal prejudice?
Opinions:
Majority - Patricia Breckenridge, Judge
No, the nearly three-year delay between Sisco's arrest and trial did not violate his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The court applied the four-factor balancing test from Barker v. Wingo. First, the three-year delay was presumptively prejudicial, triggering a full analysis. Second, the reasons for the delay were mixed: some delays were neutral (prosecutor illness, court dockets) and weighed slightly against the state; a 70-day delay caused by the state dismissing and refiling charges to circumvent an unfavorable evidentiary ruling weighed heavily against the state; but significant portions of the delay were attributable to Sisco's own litigation tactics, including opposing DNA collection and filing numerous motions. Third, Sisco did not assert his right to a speedy trial until 20 months after his arrest, weakening this factor. Finally, Sisco failed to show significant prejudice, as he was only incarcerated for three months, was able to work while on house arrest, and his defense was not impaired by lost witnesses or evidence. Balancing all factors, the court concluded that the delays attributable to Sisco, his late assertion of the right, and the lack of prejudice outweighed the presumptively prejudicial length of the delay and the state's misconduct.
Analysis:
This case reinforces the highly flexible and fact-intensive nature of the Barker v. Wingo speedy trial analysis. It demonstrates that even a lengthy delay, partially caused by the state's deliberate and tactical actions to circumvent an adverse ruling, will not automatically result in a constitutional violation. The decision emphasizes that courts will carefully parse the timeline of a case to attribute responsibility for each period of delay, and a defendant's acquiescence or contribution to the delay can significantly undermine a speedy trial claim. This ruling provides prosecutors with a degree of latitude in managing their cases, while also serving as a caution to defense attorneys that they cannot passively allow delays to accumulate and then successfully claim a constitutional violation without showing tangible prejudice.
