State of Missouri v. Jason R. Shell
2016 Mo. App. LEXIS 546, 501 S.W.3d 22 (2016)
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Rule of Law:
Merely providing a controlled substance to a person who subsequently dies from an overdose is insufficient to prove the recklessness required for an involuntary manslaughter conviction; the state must prove the defendant consciously disregarded a probable, not merely possible, risk of death. However, a person who purchases drugs alone on behalf of another and then delivers them acts as a link in the chain of distribution and is guilty of distribution.
Facts:
- Jason Shell and James Eyman planned to buy heroin together, with Eyman contributing $40 to the purchase.
- Shell contacted his dealer and purchased seven doses of heroin for $70, using his own money with the plan for Eyman to pay him back later.
- After purchasing the heroin alone, Shell picked up Eyman and took him to Shell's house.
- At Shell's house, Eyman injected four doses of heroin and Shell injected three.
- Shell observed that Eyman was 'nodding out' and lethargic, and became concerned about his physical condition.
- Shell offered to let Eyman spend the night so he could watch over him, but Eyman declined due to his curfew.
- Shell drove Eyman home around 11:00 p.m., where Eyman spoke with his mother before going to his room.
- The following afternoon, Eyman's mother discovered he had died from an overdose.
Procedural Posture:
- Jason Shell was charged by indictment with distribution of a controlled substance and first-degree involuntary manslaughter in the Circuit Court of St. Charles County.
- The trial court denied Shell's pre-trial motion to suppress his statements to police.
- The trial court also denied Shell's motion for a trial continuance to obtain new counsel.
- Following a trial, a jury found Shell guilty of both counts.
- The trial court sentenced Shell to concurrent prison terms of eighteen years for distribution and fifteen years for involuntary manslaughter.
- Shell appealed the judgment to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District.
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Issue:
Is evidence that a defendant provided heroin to another person who subsequently died from an overdose sufficient to prove the defendant acted 'recklessly' by consciously disregarding a probable risk of death, as required for a first-degree involuntary manslaughter conviction?
Opinions:
Majority - Philip M. Hess
No, evidence that a defendant provided heroin to a person who later died from an overdose is not, by itself, sufficient to prove the defendant acted recklessly for an involuntary manslaughter conviction. To prove recklessness, the State must show the defendant consciously disregarded a risk of death that was a 'probability less than a substantial certainty.' Here, the State failed to prove that Defendant had a duty to seek medical care for Decedent, as he did not create or increase the risk of harm to the level required to form a special relationship, nor did he seclude Decedent from others who could render aid. Regarding Defendant's affirmative act of providing the heroin, the State presented no evidence that the specific dose ingested by Decedent created a probable risk of death, relying only on general testimony about the dangers of heroin. Holding that providing a fatal dose is per se reckless would improperly create a strict-liability crime, a decision that must be left to the legislature. However, Defendant’s conviction for distribution of a controlled substance is affirmed because he did not 'simultaneously and jointly acquire' the heroin with Decedent; rather, he acted as a 'go-between' for Decedent and the dealer, thereby serving as a link in the chain of distribution.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the mens rea requirement for involuntary manslaughter in drug-induced homicide cases in Missouri. By requiring proof that the defendant consciously disregarded a 'probable' risk of death, the court sets a high evidentiary bar for prosecutors, distinguishing between a mere possibility and a likelihood of death. This decision forces the prosecution to present specific toxicological or other evidence linking the particular dose and circumstances to a probable outcome of death, rather than relying on the general dangerousness of the drug. The ruling also draws a sharp line between merely supplying drugs and more active participation in their administration, which affects prosecutorial charging decisions and signals to the legislature that any per se or strict liability rule for such deaths must be created by statute.
