STATE OF FLORIDA v. JEROD HARPER
254 So. 3d 479 (2018)
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Rule of Law:
A police reverse sting operation that provides a target with the opportunity and means to commit a crime does not constitute objective entrapment unless the government's conduct is so outrageous that it violates due process. When factual disputes exist regarding inducement and predisposition, the question of subjective entrapment must be decided by a jury, not dismissed by a judge as a matter of law.
Facts:
- Jerod Harper, who had a criminal history of burglary and was on probation, found a former middle school acquaintance, now a confidential informant (CI) for the Broward Sheriff's Office (BSO), on Facebook and initiated contact.
- The CI identified Harper to BSO as a potential target for a reverse sting operation, stating he was actively committing burglaries.
- The CI presented the BSO's "Hotel Scenario" to Harper via text, describing a hotel room safe containing drugs and money that could be stolen.
- As part of the scenario, the CI offered Harper a "half split" of the proceeds and to spend "an entire day 2 chill wit me;-)."
- Harper immediately agreed to the plan, confirmed details like the presence of cameras, and over the next two weeks repeatedly messaged the CI asking when they would commit the crime.
- The CI and an undercover officer picked Harper up, gave him a key to the hotel room staged by BSO.
- Harper entered the room, removed the safe, and also took currency, jewelry, and fake cocaine that had been placed inside by law enforcement.
Procedural Posture:
- The State of Florida charged Jerod Harper with trafficking in cocaine, burglary of a dwelling, and grand theft.
- Harper filed a motion to dismiss the charges in the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County (trial court), arguing both subjective and objective entrapment.
- The trial court granted Harper's motion to dismiss, finding that he had been entrapped.
- The State of Florida (Appellant) appealed the trial court's dismissal order to the District Court of Appeal of the State of Florida, Fourth District, with Harper as the Appellee.
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Issue:
Does a police reverse sting operation, where a confidential informant offers a target a share of criminal proceeds and an offer to spend time together, constitute entrapment as a matter of law when the target has a criminal history for similar offenses and readily agrees to participate?
Opinions:
Majority - Levine, J.
No. The police operation did not constitute entrapment as a matter of law, and the question of subjective entrapment is a matter for the jury to decide. First, there was no objective entrapment because the government's conduct was not outrageous. Law enforcement merely created an opportunity for Harper to commit a crime, which is permissible. Unlike cases involving explicit promises of sex, illegally manufactured contraband, or teaching a defendant how to commit a crime, BSO's conduct here did not offend decency or a sense of justice. The CI's offer to "chill" was not an explicit promise of a sexual relationship. Second, subjective entrapment could not be decided as a matter of law. The question of inducement was a factual dispute for the jury, as reasonable people could differ on whether the CI's offer improperly persuaded Harper. Furthermore, the State presented substantial evidence of Harper's predisposition, including his extensive criminal history for burglary, the fact that he initiated contact with the CI, and his ready acquiescence to the criminal plan without pressure. Given the disputed facts on inducement and strong evidence of predisposition, the issue must be resolved by the trier of fact.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the high threshold for a defendant to succeed on a claim of objective entrapment in Florida, distinguishing permissible reverse sting operations from truly 'outrageous' government conduct that violates due process. It also solidifies the principle that subjective entrapment is fundamentally a question of fact for the jury, particularly when the defendant has a prior criminal record and demonstrates eagerness to commit the offense. The ruling makes it more difficult for defendants to have entrapment cases dismissed by a judge pre-trial, preserving the jury's role in weighing evidence of inducement against evidence of predisposition.
