State Ex Rel. Williams v. Marsh
1982 Mo. LEXIS 517, 626 S.W.2d 223 (1982)
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Rule of Law:
A state statute authorizing temporary ex parte orders of protection in domestic abuse cases does not violate procedural due process when it serves a compelling state interest in preventing domestic violence, requires a showing of immediate danger, and provides for a prompt post-deprivation adversary hearing.
Facts:
- Denise Williams and Edward M. Williams were married and had one child together.
- The couple had been living separately for approximately five months, during which time Denise had custody of their child.
- During the separation, Edward Williams provided virtually no financial support for Denise or the child.
- Denise Williams individually leased or rented her own residence.
- On November 13, 1980, and on numerous previous occasions, Edward Williams, a 230-pound former Golden Gloves boxer, intentionally and willfully beat Denise Williams.
- The assault on November 13, 1980, caused serious physical injury that required Denise Williams to be hospitalized for 12 days.
Procedural Posture:
- Denise Williams filed a petition in the circuit court for an ex parte order of protection against her husband, Edward M. Williams, under Missouri's Adult Abuse Act.
- Following an ex parte hearing, the trial court found that Williams had established an unqualified right to the temporary relief available under the Act.
- Despite this finding, the trial court, acting sua sponte (on its own initiative), held that the Adult Abuse Act was unconstitutional on multiple grounds and dismissed Williams' petition.
- Williams filed an appeal of the dismissal and also petitioned the Missouri Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the trial judge to issue the order.
- The Missouri Supreme Court, the state's highest court, consolidated the appeal and the mandamus action for review.
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Issue:
Does Missouri's Adult Abuse Act, which authorizes courts to issue temporary ex parte orders of protection that can exclude a person from their home and award temporary child custody without prior notice or an adversary hearing, violate the Due Process Clause and other provisions of the U.S. and Missouri Constitutions?
Opinions:
Majority - Higgins, J.
No, the Missouri Adult Abuse Act is constitutional. The court held that the ex parte order provisions do not violate due process because they are a reasonable means to achieve the state's legitimate and compelling goal of preventing domestic violence, and they afford adequate procedural safeguards. Applying the three-part balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge, the court weighed the respondent's significant private interests in his home and child custody against the state's paramount interest in protecting victims from abuse. It found the risk of erroneous deprivation was minimized by procedural safeguards, including the requirement of a verified petition showing an 'immediate and present danger of abuse,' review by a judge, and the right to a prompt post-deprivation hearing within 15 days. The court also rejected challenges based on the single-subject rule, imprisonment for debt, vagueness, improper delegation of legislative power, and warrantless arrests, finding in each instance that the statute was either properly constructed or included sufficient safeguards to pass constitutional muster.
Dissenting - Welliver, J.
Yes, the Adult Abuse Act is unconstitutional. The Act renders a nullity due process of law by permitting orders affecting child custody and property to be entered without notice or hearing. It also violates the state constitutional prohibition against a bill containing more than one subject by mixing adult abuse provisions with matters of child custody and support. Furthermore, it improperly permits judges to define the elements of a crime on a case-by-case basis, which is a legislative function. The Act has the potential to create more problems than it solves.
Concurring - Bardgett, J.
No, the Act's civil relief provisions are constitutional, but the criminal penalty provision is constitutionally suspect. While concurring with the majority's overall result, this opinion expresses serious reservations about the provision making it a misdemeanor to violate a protective order. The statute does not make certain conduct, such as entering one's home, a crime generally; instead, the conduct only becomes criminal when a judge declares it so for a particular person in a specific order. This appears to be an unconstitutional delegation of the legislative power to define crimes to the judiciary on a personalized basis. However, because this is not a criminal case, a final decision on that specific issue should be reserved until it is decisively presented.
Analysis:
This case is a landmark decision affirming the constitutionality of modern domestic violence statutes that provide for ex parte protective orders. By applying the Mathews v. Eldridge due process balancing test, the court established a legal framework that justifies temporary, pre-hearing deprivations of liberty and property rights in light of the state's compelling interest in protecting citizens from immediate harm. This decision validated a critical tool for victim safety and influenced the adoption and judicial review of similar adult abuse acts across the nation. It highlights the principle that due process is flexible and that the requirement of a pre-deprivation hearing can be postponed in extraordinary situations where swift action is necessary to prevent serious injury.
