State Ex Rel. Warren v. Nusbaum
1972 Wisc. LEXIS 998, 198 N.W.2d 650, 55 Wis. 2d 316 (1972)
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Rule of Law:
A state statute authorizing payments to a church-related university for secular services violates the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses if the funds are not restricted exclusively to the secular purpose and if the state imposes controls on the university's general operations beyond the secular program being funded.
Facts:
- The State of Wisconsin faced a shortage of dentists and had only one dental school, which was part of Marquette University, a church-related institution.
- The Wisconsin legislature enacted a statute authorizing the state to contract with a private institution to provide dental education for Wisconsin residents.
- Pursuant to the statute, the state entered into a contract with Marquette University.
- Under the contract, the state agreed to pay the university a certain amount for each Wisconsin resident enrolled in the dental school.
- The contract specified that the university would use all funds received 'in support of its operating costs,' without restricting the funds solely to the dental school.
- The contract also required the university to adhere to certain nondiscrimination hiring practices throughout the entire university, not just within the dental school.
- The by-laws of Marquette University required its president to be a member of the Society of Jesus, a Roman Catholic religious order, creating a potential conflict with the university-wide hiring provisions.
Procedural Posture:
- A legal challenge was brought in an original action before the Supreme Court of Wisconsin to determine the constitutionality of a state statute and a contract executed under it.
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Issue:
Does a state statute and resulting contract, which authorize payments to a church-related university for providing dental education, violate the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the U.S. and Wisconsin Constitutions when the funds are not strictly limited to the dental school's use and the contract imposes university-wide operational requirements?
Opinions:
Majority - Robert W. Hansen, J.
Yes, the statute and contract violate the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. A state program providing funds to a religious institution must have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion and must not cause excessive government entanglement. Here, the statute violates the Establishment Clause because it permits state funds to be used for the university's general operating costs, creating the possibility that public money could support the university's religious mission. Citing Tilton v. Richardson, the court found that even the possibility of funds being used for religious purposes is unconstitutional. The statute also violates the Free Exercise Clause by imposing university-wide controls, such as hiring policies, that are not limited to the secular dental school program, thereby interfering with the university's internal governance and religious character. Any controls must be narrowly tailored to the specific secular function being funded.
Dissenting - Hallows, C. J.
No, the statute and contract are constitutional. The majority incorrectly characterizes the arrangement as 'aid' when it is a 'purchase' of secular educational services needed for a valid public purpose. When the state purchases a service at a fair price, it is constitutionally irrelevant what the seller does with the money. Even if viewed as aid, the program is constitutional because its primary purpose and effect are to advance public health, not religion. The contract provisions should be reasonably interpreted to apply only to the dental school, thus avoiding any constitutional conflicts regarding fund usage or university-wide controls. The majority's strict requirements create unnecessary hurdles and fail to appreciate that the state is simply contracting to fulfill a critical public need.
Analysis:
This case establishes clear guardrails for state funding of secular programs at religious institutions. It solidifies the principle that for such arrangements to be constitutional, there must be strict firewalls ensuring that public funds are used exclusively for the specified secular purpose and cannot be commingled with the institution's general funds. The decision also limits the state's regulatory reach, holding that any conditions attached to the funding must be confined to the secular program itself, protecting the institution's autonomy under the Free Exercise Clause. This creates a blueprint for how states must structure contracts with religious entities to avoid constitutional challenges based on the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses.
