Lexplug logoLexplug

State Ex Rel. Stuart v. Dickinson Cheese Co.

North Dakota Supreme Court
200 N.W.2d 59, 1972 N.D. LEXIS 127 (1972)
ELI5:

Rule of Law:

The State's interest in wild animals (ferae naturae) is that of a sovereign regulator rather than a proprietary owner; therefore, the State cannot maintain a civil action for damages for the destruction of wildlife that has not been reduced to possession.


Facts:

  • The Dickinson Cheese Company operated a facility near the Heart River in Dickinson, Stark County.
  • The company discharged whey (a byproduct of cheese production) directly into the river.
  • This discharge caused significant pollution in the waterway.
  • The pollution resulted in the death of approximately 36,000 pounds of fish.
  • The environmental damage and fish kill extended for a distance of approximately twelve miles along the river.

Procedural Posture:

  • The State Game and Fish Commissioner sued Dickinson Cheese Company and its manager in the state trial court for damages.
  • The manager filed a third-party complaint against the City of Dickinson.
  • The trial court dismissed the State's complaint and the third-party complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
  • The State appealed the dismissal to the Supreme Court of North Dakota.

Locked

Premium Content

Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief

You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture

Issue:

Does the State possess a proprietary interest in wild fish swimming free in public waters sufficient to support a civil action for monetary damages against a polluter who destroys them?


Opinions:

Majority - Strutz

No, the State's authority over wild fish is sovereign rather than proprietary, preventing it from suing for damages as an owner would. The court reasoned that fish swimming freely in streams are ferae naturae (wild by nature). While statutes declare that title to such fish rests with the State, this ownership is solely for the purpose of regulating their use, possession, and conservation for the public benefit. The State holds these resources as a sovereign trustee, not as a private property owner. Consequently, the State lacks the specific property interest required to claim monetary damages for the destruction of fish that have not yet been caught or reduced to possession. Furthermore, while the State's 'Antipollution Act' authorizes the government to regulate water quality and impose penalties for violations, it does not explicitly grant the State the right to bring a civil lawsuit for the value of wildlife killed by pollution.



Analysis:

This case clarifies the limits of the Public Trust Doctrine regarding wildlife. It establishes that while the state has the power to regulate and protect wildlife (sovereign power), it does not 'own' wild animals in a commercial sense (proprietary power) until they are physically possessed. This distinction is significant because it limits the state's remedies against polluters to statutory fines and injunctive relief, rather than allowing common law tort damages for the value of the destroyed resources. To recover monetary damages for killed wildlife, the state legislature would need to pass specific statutes altering the common law rule regarding property rights in wild animals.

G

Gunnerbot

AI-powered case assistant

Loaded: State Ex Rel. Stuart v. Dickinson Cheese Co. (1972)

Try: "What was the holding?" or "Explain the dissent"