State ex rel. Shevin v. Morgan
289 So. 2d 782, 1974 Fla. App. LEXIS 8144 (1974)
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Rule of Law:
A state's attorney general has standing to sue to abate a public nuisance under a general nuisance statute, even if the specific activity causing the annoyance is not explicitly listed in the statute, as the determination of what constitutes a nuisance is a fact-specific inquiry into the activities conducted on a property.
Facts:
- Travis Morgan operates a 40-acre strawberry field in Ruskin, Florida, adjacent to a residential subdivision.
- In the course of his farming, Morgan uses at least two 'automatic scarecrow' devices powered by a gas compression mechanism.
- These devices emit a loud, shotgun-like sound at intervals of less than 55 seconds.
- The sounds occur from dawn to dark, seven days a week, during the strawberry growing season.
- Residents of the adjacent neighborhood allege the excessive and unreasonable noise prevents them from peacefully enjoying their property and causes physical, mental, and emotional strain.
Procedural Posture:
- The Florida Attorney General filed a complaint in a state trial court seeking an injunction to abate a public nuisance against Travis Morgan.
- Morgan filed a motion to dismiss the complaint.
- The trial court judge granted Morgan's motion, dismissing the complaint with prejudice on the grounds that the Attorney General lacked standing because the scarecrow devices were not a nuisance as defined by statute.
- The Attorney General, as the appellant, appealed the trial court's order of dismissal to the Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District.
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Issue:
Does the Attorney General have standing to bring a public nuisance action against a landowner for using loud scarecrow devices when the nuisance statute does not explicitly list such devices as a nuisance?
Opinions:
Majority - Boardman, Judge
Yes. The Attorney General has standing to bring the action because the determination of what constitutes a public nuisance is not limited to a list of explicitly prohibited items but is a flexible, fact-based inquiry into the activities occurring on a property. The court reasoned that nuisance statutes should be read broadly. Citing Orlando Sports Stadium, Inc. v. State ex rel. Powell, the court noted that it is impossible to enumerate all potential nuisances and that each case must be judicially determined on its own facts. The nuisance can stem from the activities conducted on a property, not just the physical condition of the property itself. Therefore, the complaint, which alleged that the noise from the scarecrows annoyed the community, stated a valid cause of action for public nuisance sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies that Florida's public nuisance statutes must be interpreted broadly, focusing on the effect of an activity on the community rather than on a rigid, enumerated list of prohibited acts. It solidifies the principle that a nuisance claim can target the injurious use of a property, not merely a physical defect in the land or buildings. This precedent empowers the state to address new and unforeseen types of public disturbances, ensuring that the law can adapt to evolving ways in which one person's use of property may harm the public's right to peace and quiet enjoyment.
