No. The owner does not lose their right to use the building as a fraternity house. To 'discontinue' a special use means you have to intentionally 'abandon' it, like deciding to give it up forever. Just pausing the use or doing something else temporarily because you have no other choice doesn't count as abandonment. The owner was just making a smart financial move during hard times and never intended to give up their right to have a frat house there.

Yes. The owner lost their right. The city's rule is simple: if you change your special 'grandfathered' building to a rule-following use (like a single-family house), you can't change it back. It doesn't matter what the owner was secretly thinking or hoping. What matters is what they did, and they officially rented the building out as a regular residence. That action triggered the rule, and now they're stuck with it.

Yes, the building can go back to being used by the student group. I think this because the owner didn't mean to stop using it that way forever. They only rented it out for a little while because times were tough and they needed money. The rules say you have to really mean to stop the old use, not just pause it for a bit. The owner was kind of forced to rent it out, they didn't choose to do it freely. Also, the special board that knows a lot about these rules said it was okay, and we should listen to them unless they made a big mistake, which they didn't.

No, I don't agree. I think the building can't go back to the old way of being used. When the owner rented it out for someone to live in, and wrote down that it was just for living in, they changed how the building was being used to follow the rules. It doesn't matter if they meant to do this forever or not. What matters is what they actually did, not what they were thinking. This isn't like when a building is just empty for a while - the owner actually used it in a new way that followed the rules.

No. A temporary change to a conforming use, prompted by circumstances beyond the owner's control and without an intent to abandon the pre-existing nonconforming use, does not constitute a legal "discontinuance" that forfeits the owner's rights. The term "discontinuance" in the ordinance is synonymous with abandonment, which requires a voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right. The board of appeals correctly found that the owner never intended to abandon the nonconforming use; the lease to a single family was merely a temporary stopgap measure to preserve the property until it could be sold or leased again as a fraternity house. The spirit of the ordinance, which protects vested property rights, prevails over a literal interpretation that would cause forfeiture due to a temporary suspension of use driven by economic necessity.

Yes. The owner's actions constituted a change to a conforming use, which, under the plain language of the ordinance, prevents a reversion to a less restricted nonconforming use. The ordinance explicitly states, 'Whenever a nonconforming use of a building has been changed to a ... conforming use, such use shall not thereafter be changed to a less restricted use.' The owner's subjective intent to someday resume the nonconforming use is irrelevant. By affirmatively leasing the property for 'residence purposes only,' the owner's objective actions triggered this specific provision, and the case is not about mere non-use or abandonment, but about a completed change of use.

Yes. The temporary use of the building for residential purposes did not constitute an abandonment of its nonconforming use as a fraternity house. I hold this because the intent of the owner is crucial in determining whether a nonconforming use has been abandoned. The evidence shows that the owner did not intend to abandon the nonconforming use, but rather leased the property temporarily due to economic circumstances. The term 'discontinuance' in the ordinance is synonymous with abandonment, which connotes a voluntary, affirmative, completed act. Here, the owner's actions do not demonstrate such abandonment. The change to residential use was practically forced upon the owner by circumstances beyond its control. Furthermore, the reasonable time allowed for resuming a nonconforming use is a matter for the zoning board to decide, and their decision should be upheld. The spirit of the ordinance, which aims to protect both conforming and nonconforming uses, should prevail over its strict letter.

No. I dissent because when the premises were leased by a written lease 'for residence purposes only,' and under circumstances which repel the inference that the tenant was a mere caretaker, the conclusion is inevitable that the owner has changed the use of the building to a conforming use. The question is not one of intention to abandon a nonconforming use but whether the acts of the owner have brought him within the provisions of the ordinance. Cases in which the property has remained idle for a time are not applicable here. In this situation, the owner has made a new, restricted use of the premises, which should preclude reverting to the nonconforming use under the terms of the ordinance.

State Ex Rel. Morehouse v. Hunt

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