State ex rel. Haskell v. Spokane County Dist. Court
Not available in text (2021)
Rule of Law:
For the necessity defense, a "reasonable legal alternative" to committing a crime must be an effective alternative, and a defendant's history of futile attempts to use lawful means can create a question of fact for the jury regarding the reasonableness of such alternatives. Granting an ex parte writ of review is a discretionary decision that triggers the timeliness requirement for judge disqualification under RCW 4.12.050.
Facts:
- Reverend George Taylor, a climate activist, engaged in numerous lawful activities over the years, including voting for "green candidates," sending letters to legislators, visiting government offices, calling, e-mailing, delivering petitions, testifying on environmental railroad issues, and working on the Safer Spokane Initiative, all aimed at addressing climate change and the dangers of coal and oil trains in Spokane.
- Despite these repeated efforts, Rev. Taylor believed his legal alternatives had been ineffective in mitigating the risks posed by coal and oil trains and climate change.
- On September 29, 2016, Rev. Taylor organized and participated in a peaceful protest on Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF Railway) railroad tracks, planning it when no trains were scheduled, aiming to minimize safety concerns, and notifying BNSF Railway.
- Law enforcement warned Rev. Taylor that he would face arrest if he did not leave the tracks, but he did not leave.
- Rev. Taylor was peacefully arrested and subsequently charged with criminal trespass in the second degree and unlawful obstruction of a train.
- Rev. Taylor intended to pursue a necessity defense at trial, believing his actions were necessary to avoid or minimize the imminent dangers of climate change and train derailment in downtown Spokane.
- Experts testified in district court regarding the direct threat of coal and oil consumption to the environment, the history and effectiveness of nonviolent civil disobedience when other means have failed, and the specific, imminent harms of train derailment, including those involving coal and oil products in the Spokane area.
Procedural Posture:
- The State charged Rev. Taylor with misdemeanors (criminal trespass and unlawful obstruction of a train) in district court.
- The district court judge held an extensive evidentiary hearing and subsequently granted Rev. Taylor’s motion to present the necessity defense.
- The State filed an ex parte petition for a writ of review of the district court's decision in the superior court, which was granted on March 30, 2018, without Rev. Taylor being given notice of the hearing or which judge would preside.
- On April 4, 2018, Rev. Taylor filed a notice to disqualify the superior court judge.
- The superior court judge ruled that the notice of disqualification was untimely under RCW 4.12.050 because he had already made a discretionary decision by granting the writ of review.
- On November 15, 2018, the superior court reversed the district court’s decision to allow the necessity defense, rejecting the argument that legal alternatives must be "effective" to be reasonable.
- Rev. Taylor moved for discretionary review in Division Three of the Court of Appeals.
- Division Three issued a split decision affirming the superior court (Rev. Taylor was the appellant, the State ex rel. Haskell was the appellee).
- The Washington Supreme Court granted discretionary review (Rev. Taylor was the petitioner).
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Issue:
1. Is granting an ex parte petition for a writ of review under RCW 7.16.040 a discretionary decision that makes a subsequent notice of disqualification untimely under RCW 4.12.050? 2. Does the "no reasonable legal alternative" element of the necessity defense require that a defendant's prior lawful efforts to address the harm be effective in producing change, thereby allowing a defendant to present evidence of a history of ineffective legal alternatives to a jury?
Opinions:
Majority - Owens, J.
Yes, granting an ex parte petition for a writ of review under RCW 7.16.040 is a discretionary decision, rendering Rev. Taylor's subsequent notice of disqualification untimely. This writ requires the court to exercise its judgment to determine if "no appeal, nor in the judgment of the court, any plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law" exists, and often involves the discretionary decision to stay lower court proceedings. These factors demonstrate the exercise of discretion, which is not among the statutory exceptions preserving the right to disqualify. Rev. Taylor's due process rights were not violated because the constitutional "appearance of fairness doctrine" remained available for judge disqualification, even if the statutory peremptory right was lost. Yes, the "no reasonable legal alternative" element of the necessity defense requires that a defendant's prior lawful efforts to address the harm be effective in producing change, and Rev. Taylor is entitled to present evidence of a history of ineffective legal alternatives to a jury. The court rejected the lower court's finding that "there are always reasonable legal alternatives to disobeying constitutional laws," stating that alternatives are not "reasonable" if they are ineffective or illusory. Prior Court of Appeals decisions support interpreting "reasonable" as requiring adequacy or effectiveness, noting that a history of futile attempts can create a question of fact for the jury. Rev. Taylor provided sufficient evidence of his extensive, but unsuccessful, lawful efforts to address climate change and train dangers, thus creating a question of fact for the jury regarding whether reasonable legal alternatives existed. Furthermore, Rev. Taylor proffered sufficient evidence for the other three elements of the necessity defense to be presented to a jury: he reasonably believed his actions were necessary to avoid or minimize imminent harm, the harm sought to be avoided (climate change and train derailments) was greater than the de minimis harm he caused, and he did not bring about the threatened harms.
Dissenting - Gordon McCloud, J.
No, Rev. Taylor should not have been precluded from disqualifying the superior court judge, despite the ex parte writ. The majority's application of the judge disqualification statute (RCW 4.12.050) leads to an absurd result by requiring a party to file a notice of disqualification before they even have notice of the proceedings or the assigned judge. Historically, the statute and prior case law (e.g., Marine Power & Equip. Co. v. Dep’t of Transp. and Public Utilities District No. 1 of Klickitat County v. Walbrook Insurance Co.) have consistently allowed parties to disqualify a judge when newly joined or after receiving notice, ensuring that the right to disqualify does not disappear before the litigant is aware of the proceeding or the judge. While the legislature amended RCW 4.12.050 in 2017, the legislative history indicates these changes were for clarity and terminology (replacing "prejudice" with "disqualification") and were explicitly stated to have "no effect on the rights of a party to seek a change of judge." Therefore, the earlier precedents emphasizing the importance of notice remain good law, and Rev. Taylor should have been entitled to disqualify the judge given he lacked notice of the ex parte discretionary decision.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the "no reasonable legal alternative" element of the necessity defense in Washington, particularly for civil disobedience cases rooted in broad societal harms like climate change. By requiring alternatives to be effective rather than merely available in the abstract, the ruling potentially broadens the availability of the necessity defense for activists who can demonstrate a history of unsuccessful lawful efforts. This could empower juries to consider the practical realities faced by defendants engaged in protest when other avenues for change have been exhausted. However, the ruling also upholds the strict application of judge disqualification timelines, emphasizing that even ex parte discretionary rulings can trigger these deadlines, despite concerns about due process and notice.
