State ex rel. G.B.
985 So. 2d 828, 2008 La. App. LEXIS 707, 2007 La.App. 4 Cir. 1577 (2008)
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Rule of Law:
To convict a defendant of attempted second degree murder as a principal, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant personally possessed the specific intent to kill the victim. Mere presence at the crime scene and subsequent flight are insufficient to establish this requisite mental state.
Facts:
- G.B. was with his friend C.L. and C.L.'s cousin, Ronald.
- The group met C.L.'s younger brother, A.L., and A.L.'s friend, who told them he was about to have a fist fight with a minor named T.H.
- G.B. and the group of four other boys went to find T.H. to engage in a fist fight.
- The group approached T.H., who was walking with another minor, R.R.
- A fist fight began between one of the boys in G.B.'s group and R.R.
- As T.H. began to walk away and call for help, one of the boys in G.B.'s group, who was not G.B., pulled out a gun.
- The shooter shot T.H. multiple times in the back of the head and then shot R.R. twice.
- Following the shooting, G.B. and the other boys fled the scene together.
Procedural Posture:
- G.B. was arrested and charged in juvenile court with two counts of attempted first degree murder.
- At a probable cause hearing, the juvenile court found no probable cause for attempted first degree murder, but found probable cause for one count of simple battery.
- G.B. pled not guilty.
- Following a trial, the juvenile court found G.B. guilty of attempted second degree murder.
- The juvenile court sentenced G.B. to a term of juvenile life.
- G.B. (appellant) appealed his conviction and sentence to the Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit (the current court).
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Issue:
Does a defendant's mere presence at the scene of a shooting and subsequent flight, without any evidence of participation in planning or execution, provide sufficient evidence to prove the specific intent to kill required for a conviction of attempted second degree murder as a principal?
Opinions:
Majority - Jones, J.
No. A defendant's mere presence at the scene of a shooting and subsequent flight are insufficient to prove the specific intent to kill required for a conviction of attempted second degree murder as a principal. To sustain such a conviction, the state must prove that the defendant personally intended to kill the victim and committed an overt act towards that goal. Under Louisiana law, a person can only be convicted as a principal for crimes for which they personally have the requisite mental state; the intent of an accomplice cannot be inferred to the accused. The court noted that attempted second degree murder requires a specific intent to kill, not merely an intent to inflict great bodily harm. In this case, there was no testimony that G.B. participated in the altercation, possessed a weapon, or did anything to further the crime beyond being present. Citing State v. Wright, the court affirmed that more than mere presence and flight is required to find someone guilty as a principal in murder cases. Therefore, no rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Analysis:
This case reinforces the principle that criminal liability, especially for specific intent crimes, is individual. It clarifies that accomplice liability (being a 'principal') requires proof of the accomplice's own culpable mental state, not just their association with the primary offender. The decision serves as a crucial check on prosecutorial overreach, preventing convictions based on 'guilt by association.' It also highlights the critical distinction between the intent required for an attempted crime (specific intent to complete the act) versus a completed crime, a distinction that is fundamental in criminal law and frequently tested.
