State Ex Rel. Cunningham v. Feezell
400 S.W.2d 716, 22 McCanless 17, 218 Tenn. 17 (1966)
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Rule of Law:
To enjoin an anticipated nuisance before it begins operation, a plaintiff must show that the proposed establishment is a nuisance per se or that the injury it would cause is imminent and certain to occur, not merely a possibility or speculative fear.
Facts:
- Donald C. Feezell planned to establish and operate a crematory in a 'rural or rural residential' area of Blount County.
- Feezell's proposed crematory was to be in a small building, converted from a garage, with a 'large and gruesome smokestack' on Glover Hill Road, a narrow, secondary road.
- Charles Cunningham and other residents feared the crematory's operation would cause them horror, uproar, turmoil, inconvenience, discomfort, annoyance, anguish, mental and physical sickness, and depression.
- Residents believed the crematory would deprive them of the quiet, peaceful comfort, repose, and enjoyment of their property and homes, and would depreciate their property values.
- Residents worried the facility was inadequate, could only handle one body at a time, and potential equipment disrepair could lead to noxious odors, pollution, and bodies being stored in open view.
- Residents were concerned that ambulance traffic on the narrow roads would be hazardous, adversely affect school buses and children, and disturb people going to and from church.
- Residents alleged that Feezell was not authorized or licensed by the State of Tennessee to conduct such business.
Procedural Posture:
- Charles Cunningham and others (petitioners) brought suit in the name of the State of Tennessee against Donald C. Feezell (defendant) in the Fourth Judicial Circuit court (trial court/court of first instance) to enjoin the establishment of a crematory.
- Feezell filed a demurrer to the petition, arguing that it sought an injunction for anticipated injury, which constituted no basis for injunctive relief.
- The Chancellor (trial judge) sustained the demurrer and dismissed the petition, ruling the suit was premature.
- Petitioners' motion for a new trial was overruled.
- Petitioners perfected an appeal to the Supreme Court of Tennessee.
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Issue:
Does a cause of action exist to enjoin, as a nuisance, a proposed cremation establishment in a rural or rural residential area based on averments from residents that it will cause mental anguish, depressed feelings, physical discomfort, and lower property values?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice White
No, a cause of action does not exist to enjoin a proposed cremation establishment as a nuisance based solely on allegations of anticipated mental anguish, depressed feelings, physical discomfort, and lowered property values, unless the proposed establishment is a nuisance per se or injury is imminent and certain to occur. The Court held that for an injunction suit to be sustained prior to the alleged nuisance coming into being, the petition must sufficiently show that the proposed establishment is a nuisance per se (a nuisance at all times and under any circumstances, regardless of location or surroundings), or that injury is 'imminent and certain to occur.' A 'mere possibility or fear of future injury' is not grounds for an injunction, and equity will not interfere where the apprehended injury is doubtful or speculative; instead, a 'reasonable probability, or even reasonable certainty, of injury' is required. The Court distinguished between a nuisance per se (where injury is certain) and a nuisance per accidens (where injury is uncertain or contingent). Reviewing analogous cases, particularly those concerning funeral parlors, the Court acknowledged a majority rule enjoining funeral parlors in residential areas due to 'depressing feelings' and depreciated property values. However, the Court found the allegations in this petition insufficient to foretell 'certain injury'—either emotional or physical—given the crematory's proposed location in an 'entirely rural area' where 'residences...are sparsely situated' and 'no residence is in close proximity.' Furthermore, the Court stated that statutes regarding licensing and noxious odors would only become relevant once the operation had commenced and specific violations or harms were proven.
Analysis:
This case establishes a stringent standard for obtaining injunctive relief against an anticipatory nuisance, requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate an 'imminent and certain' injury rather than merely speculative fears or possibilities. It highlights the importance of context, particularly the distinction between residential and rural areas, in assessing the likelihood and certainty of alleged harms like mental anguish or property devaluation. The ruling reinforces that courts are generally reluctant to enjoin lawful enterprises before they have even begun operation, placing a high evidentiary burden on those seeking to do so. This decision makes it more difficult for communities to prevent the establishment of unpopular facilities based on subjective concerns unless objective harm is virtually guaranteed, potentially impacting land use disputes and environmental justice claims.
