State Ethics Commission v. Evans
2004 Md. LEXIS 468, 855 A.2d 364, 382 Md. 370 (2004)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A statute is presumed to operate prospectively and will only be applied retroactively if the legislature clearly and explicitly expresses its intent for such an application. The failure to expressly exclude a particular person or event from a new law is insufficient to overcome the strong presumption against retroactivity.
Facts:
- Gerard Evans was a registered lobbyist in Maryland.
- On July 14, 2000, Evans was convicted in U.S. District Court of multiple counts of wire and mail fraud that arose directly from his lobbying activities.
- Evans's conviction became final on September 29, 2000, as he did not file an appeal.
- On November 1, 2001, a new Maryland law, SG § 15-405(e), took effect, granting the State Ethics Commission the authority to revoke a lobbyist's registration if they have been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude arising from lobbying activities.
- After serving his prison sentence, Evans filed new lobbying registration forms with the Commission on behalf of five clients on May 24, 2002.
Procedural Posture:
- On July 10, 2002, the State Ethics Commission initiated a complaint against Gerard Evans seeking to revoke his lobbyist registrations under the new statute, SG § 15-405(e).
- The Commission held a hearing and, on October 8, 2002, issued a Final Order revoking Evans's registrations.
- Evans filed a petition for judicial review in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County (a state trial court).
- The Circuit Court reversed the Commission's decision, holding that it constituted an impermissible retroactive application of the law.
- The State Ethics Commission, as appellant, appealed the trial court's judgment, and the Court of Appeals of Maryland (the state's highest court) granted certiorari on its own initiative before the case was heard by the intermediate appellate court.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does the application of a statute (SG § 15-405(e)), which permits the revocation of a lobbyist's registration based on a criminal conviction, to a lobbyist whose conviction became final before the statute's effective date, constitute an impermissible retroactive application of the law?
Opinions:
Majority - Wilner, J.
Yes, applying SG § 15-405(e) to a conviction that occurred before the statute's effective date is an impermissible retroactive application. A statute is applied retroactively when it determines the legal significance of acts or events that occurred prior to its effective date. There is a strong presumption that statutes operate prospectively, and this presumption can only be overcome by a clear, strong, and imperative expression of legislative intent to the contrary. Here, the statute and its legislative history contain no such clear expression. The fact that Evans's conduct may have inspired the legislation does not, by itself, indicate an intent for retroactive application. The dissent incorrectly conflates the definition of retroactivity with the constitutional impermissibility of retroactivity; a law can be retroactive without impairing a vested right, but it still cannot be applied as such without clear legislative intent.
Dissenting - Harrell, J.
No, the application of SG § 15-405(e) to Evans was a prospective, not retroactive, action. A statute operates retroactively only if it impairs vested rights, increases liability for past conduct, or imposes new duties on completed transactions. Evans had no vested right to a lobbying registration, which is a privilege, not a right. The statute did not increase his criminal liability. Most importantly, the final precipitating event for the law's application was not his past conviction, but his new application for registration, which occurred after the law's effective date. Therefore, the Commission was prospectively applying the current standards of qualification to a new request for a privilege.
Analysis:
This case strongly reinforces the presumption against statutory retroactivity in Maryland law, setting a high bar for finding legislative intent to apply a law to past events. The court's decision emphasizes that predictability in the law requires that new statutes imposing negative consequences will not be applied to past conduct unless the legislature's intent is unmistakable. It clarifies the analytical framework by separating the initial question of whether an application is retroactive from the subsequent constitutional question of whether a retroactive application impairs vested rights. This ruling serves as a caution to legislative bodies to be explicit if they intend for new regulatory or punitive measures to apply to conduct that occurred before a law's enactment.
