Starr v. Hill
2011 Tenn. LEXIS 767, 2011 WL 3835405, 353 S.W.3d 478 (2011)
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Rule of Law:
Under the family purpose doctrine, a non-custodial parent who furnishes a vehicle for their minor child can be deemed a 'head of household' based on the family relationship and duty of support, but vicarious liability only attaches if the parent also retains the right to control the vehicle's use.
Facts:
- Paul B. Hill, Sr. ('Father') and Suzanne Hill ('Mother') divorced in October 2002.
- Following the divorce, their sixteen-year-old son, Paul B. Hill, Jr. ('Son'), resided with his Mother.
- As required by the divorce decree, Father purchased a vehicle for Son when Son turned sixteen.
- Father was the owner of the vehicle and maintained its insurance, while Son was its primary driver.
- On Christmas Eve 2002, Son was driving the vehicle, returning from a holiday shopping trip with his sister and her friend.
- The vehicle driven by Son collided with another car, injuring Arlene R. Starr ('Plaintiff'), a passenger in the other vehicle.
Procedural Posture:
- Arlene R. Starr sued Paul B. Hill, Sr. (Father) and Paul B. Hill, Jr. (Son) in a Tennessee trial court.
- Starr later voluntarily dismissed her claim against Son.
- Father filed a motion for summary judgment, and Starr filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the applicability of the family purpose doctrine.
- The trial court granted Father's motion for summary judgment, finding the doctrine did not apply.
- Starr, as appellant, appealed to the Tennessee Court of Appeals.
- The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, ruling that the family purpose doctrine applied to Father as a matter of law.
- Father, as appellant, was granted permission to appeal to the Supreme Court of Tennessee.
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Issue:
Does the family purpose doctrine impose vicarious liability on a divorced, non-custodial father who, pursuant to a divorce decree, provides a vehicle for his minor son's use?
Opinions:
Majority - Sharon G. Lee, J.
No, not as a matter of law, because a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding the father's right of control over the vehicle's use. The family purpose doctrine can apply to a non-custodial parent, but all of its elements must be met. The court found that two elements were satisfied as a matter of law: 1) Father was a 'head of the household' because co-residency is not required, and the determination rests on the existence of a family relationship and a legal duty of support, both of which were present here; and 2) the vehicle was maintained for the 'pleasure or comfort of the family' because providing transportation to a child benefits the family unit, even if intended for the child’s sole use. However, a question of fact remained as to the third element: whether Father had sufficient control over the vehicle. The parenting plan was ambiguous as to whether driving was a 'day-to-day activity' controlled by the mother or an 'extracurricular activity' subject to joint control. Because the critical element of control was in dispute, summary judgment was inappropriate and the issue must be decided by a jury.
Analysis:
This decision adapts the early 20th-century family purpose doctrine to the modern reality of divorced families and non-custodial parenting. By detaching the 'head of household' element from physical residency and linking it instead to the duty of support, the court expands the doctrine's potential reach. This creates a stronger incentive for non-custodial parents who provide vehicles to remain involved in supervising their children's driving. However, the ruling also establishes a crucial limit by emphasizing that the right of control remains the 'critical element,' making the specific terms of divorce decrees and parenting plans central to determining liability in future cases.
