Stanley Duplantis and His Wife, Melissa Duplantis v. Shell Offshore, Inc.
948 F.2d 187, 21 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 519, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 28569 (1991)
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Rule of Law:
A principal is generally not liable for the torts of an independent contractor's employees under Louisiana law unless the principal exercises operational control over the contractor's actions or the activity is ultra-hazardous. To avoid summary judgment, the non-moving party must present specific facts supported by admissible evidence demonstrating a genuine issue for trial.
Facts:
- Stanley Duplantis was employed as a roustabout by Grace Offshore Company (formerly Booker Drilling Company, referred to as Grace/Booker).
- Grace/Booker's Rig 950 was situated atop an oil platform owned by Shell Offshore, Inc. (Shell) on the Outer Continental Shelf off the Louisiana coast.
- On March 28, 1990, Stanley Duplantis's supervisor, Roland Boudoin (a Grace/Booker crane operator), instructed him to pick up and carry a piece of wood.
- While following these instructions, Stanley Duplantis stepped on a two-by-four covered with grease and slipped.
- Stanley Duplantis fell on the padeye of the cover of a pedestal crane belonging to Shell.
- Affidavits and deposition testimony from Grace/Booker personnel indicated that the grease-covered board belonged to Grace/Booker or its ownership was unknown, and that Grace/Booker employees were responsible for housekeeping duties.
- The Master Drilling Agreement between Shell and Grace/Booker stipulated that Grace/Booker was an independent contractor and Shell had no direction or control over Grace/Booker employees except in the 'results to be obtained.'
- Shell maintained a 'company man,' Mark Duplantis, on the rig, who held safety meetings with Grace/Booker personnel and initiated discussions, but had to communicate suggestions or advice through Grace/Booker's chief employee (toolpusher Ronald Melancon) rather than giving direct orders.
Procedural Posture:
- Stanley and Melissa Duplantis (plaintiffs) filed a suit against Shell Offshore, Inc. (defendant) in a federal district court on June 21, 1990, seeking damages for personal injuries.
- Shell answered on August 1, 1990, denying all allegations of negligence.
- Shell moved for summary judgment on January 8, 1991.
- Plaintiffs moved to extend the discovery cutoff date, which the district court granted.
- Plaintiffs moved to continue the hearing date on Shell's summary judgment motion, which the district court granted.
- On February 7, 1991, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Shell, dismissing all claims asserted by plaintiffs with prejudice.
- The district court entered judgment in accordance with its decision on February 15, 1991.
- Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal four days later, appealing the district court's judgment to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals (plaintiffs are appellants, Shell is appellee).
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Issue:
Does a principal owe a duty of care to an independent contractor's employee for injuries sustained on the principal's property when the independent contractor had operational control over the work area, and when the plaintiff fails to present admissible evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact regarding the principal's negligence or operational control?
Opinions:
Majority - Reynaldo G. Garza
No, a principal is not liable, and the district court correctly granted summary judgment because no genuine issue of material fact existed regarding Shell's responsibility for the greased board or negligent placement of the crane cover, and Shell did not maintain operational control over Grace/Booker's operations. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the summary judgment grant de novo, applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) which dictates that summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court first addressed the absence of a genuine issue of material fact regarding the board and crane cover. Shell, as the moving party not bearing the burden of proof at trial, adequately pointed out the absence of evidence supporting the plaintiffs' case by submitting affidavits and deposition testimony indicating Grace/Booker's responsibility for housekeeping and uncertainty regarding the board's ownership. The plaintiffs failed to meet their burden under Rule 56(e) to 'set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial' with admissible evidence. Their expert's letter was unsworn, not in affidavit form, and did not establish the expert's competency, thus being inadmissible. The court emphasized that while Celotex v. Catrett indicated evidence need not be in strictly admissible form to avoid summary judgment, it did not allow for evidence inadmissible in form if not already listed in Rule 56(c). Second, the court determined that Shell did not maintain operational control over Grace/Booker's operation. Under Louisiana law, a principal is generally not liable for an independent contractor's torts unless the principal exercises operational control or the activity is ultra-hazardous. The Master Drilling Agreement explicitly stated Grace/Booker was an independent contractor and Shell only controlled 'results to be obtained.' The presence of Shell's 'company man' who held safety meetings and made suggestions to Grace/Booker management did not rise to the level of operational control required, as established in precedent like Landry v. Huthnance Drilling Co., which requires a retention of supervision such that the contractor is not entirely free to do the work in his own way. Shell's active interest in safety did not, by itself, constitute direct operational control. Therefore, the district court's judgment was affirmed.
Analysis:
This case is significant for clarifying the evidentiary standards required to defeat a motion for summary judgment, emphasizing that the non-moving party must present specific facts supported by admissible evidence, not merely unauthenticated documents or allegations. It also reinforces the standard for determining a principal's liability for the torts of an independent contractor under Louisiana law, particularly concerning 'operational control.' The decision highlights that general safety oversight and contractual control over results, without direct control over the independent contractor's methods and operative detail, are insufficient to establish liability, thereby protecting principals from vicarious liability in such arrangements.
