Stanford v. Kentucky
492 U.S. 361 (1989)
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Rule of Law:
The imposition of capital punishment on an individual for a crime committed at 16 or 17 years of age does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
Facts:
- In one case, Kevin Stanford, then 17 years and 4 months old, and an accomplice robbed a gas station in Kentucky.
- During and after the robbery, Stanford and his accomplice repeatedly raped and sodomized the attendant, Barbel Poore.
- They then drove Poore to a secluded area, where Stanford shot her in the face and the back of the head, later laughing about the killing.
- In a separate case, Heath Wilkins, then 16 years and 6 months old, planned to rob a convenience store in Missouri and murder the attendant.
- Inside the store, Wilkins brutally stabbed the owner, Nancy Allen, multiple times in the chest and neck, killing her.
- Wilkins and his accomplice then stole liquor, cigarettes, and approximately $450 in cash and checks.
Procedural Posture:
- In Kentucky, a juvenile court waived jurisdiction over Kevin Stanford, permitting him to be tried as an adult.
- Stanford was convicted of murder and other felonies in a Kentucky trial court and was sentenced to death.
- The Supreme Court of Kentucky, the state's highest court, affirmed the conviction and sentence.
- In Missouri, a juvenile court certified Heath Wilkins to be tried as an adult.
- Wilkins pleaded guilty to first-degree murder in a Missouri trial court and was sentenced to death after a punishment hearing.
- On mandatory review, the Supreme Court of Missouri, the state's highest court, affirmed the death sentence.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases and consolidated them for review.
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Issue:
Does the imposition of capital punishment on an individual for a crime committed at 16 or 17 years of age constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Scalia
No. The imposition of capital punishment on individuals for crimes committed at 16 or 17 years of age does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. The primary measure of 'evolving standards of decency' under the Eighth Amendment is objective evidence of a national consensus, as reflected in the statutes passed by state legislatures. A majority of the states that permit capital punishment authorize it for offenders aged 16 or older, which demonstrates that no national consensus against the practice exists. The Court rejected arguments that relied on the infrequent application of the death penalty to juveniles, the views of professional organizations, international practices, or age-based restrictions in other areas of law like voting or drinking, stating these are not reliable indicators of a societal consensus against this specific punishment. Instead, the individualized consideration of a defendant's age and maturity during juvenile transfer hearings and at the sentencing phase is the appropriate constitutional mechanism.
Dissenting - Justice Brennan
Yes. The imposition of capital punishment on individuals for crimes committed when they were under the age of 18 is cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. The majority's analysis of societal consensus is flawed; when states that prohibit capital punishment entirely are included, a majority of states reject the death penalty for juveniles. Beyond legislative counts, the Eighth Amendment requires the Court to make its own judgment about whether a punishment is unconstitutionally excessive. Because juveniles as a class lack the maturity, judgment, and moral culpability of adults, the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for them. Furthermore, executing juveniles serves no legitimate penological goal, as it is neither a credible deterrent for impulsive adolescents nor a just form of retribution for those with diminished culpability.
Concurring - Justice O'Connor
No. The death sentences should not be set aside because it is sufficiently clear that no national consensus forbids the imposition of capital punishment on 16- or 17-year-old murderers. Unlike the situation for 15-year-olds, a significant number of state legislatures have explicitly or implicitly authorized the death penalty for this age group. However, the plurality is wrong to reject proportionality analysis as a component of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. The Court has a constitutional obligation to assess whether a punishment is proportional to the defendant's blameworthiness, and age-based classifications are relevant to that inquiry, even if they do not resolve these specific cases.
Analysis:
This decision established that the primary test for 'evolving standards of decency' under the Eighth Amendment is a headcount of state legislation, thereby limiting the Court's independent proportionality review. By rejecting arguments based on international norms, expert opinions, and sociological evidence, the Court solidified a more formalist and deferential approach to legislative judgments in this area. The ruling set a high bar for constitutional challenges to punishments, requiring clear evidence of a widespread legislative consensus against a practice. This precedent was a significant victory for originalist and textualist interpretive methods but was ultimately overturned by Roper v. Simmons (2005), which banned the death penalty for all juvenile offenders.
