Standard v. Shine
278 S.C. 337, 295 S.E.2d 786, 1982 S.C. LEXIS 432 (1982)
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Rule of Law:
A minor's conduct in both primary and contributory negligence cases is judged by the standard of behavior expected of a child of like age, intelligence, and experience under like circumstances; additionally, minors of any age can commit intentional and malicious torts, making parents liable under parental responsibility statutes.
Facts:
- Larry Shine, Jr. was six years old and lived with his parents in an apartment operated by the respondent.
- Larry Shine, Jr. negligently set fire to the leased premises.
- The fire resulted in actual damages to the leased premises.
- The respondent sought to recover damages from Larry Shine, Jr. for his alleged negligence.
- The respondent also sought to recover damages from Larry Shine, Jr.'s parents under the South Carolina Parental Responsibility Act (Section 20-7-340).
Procedural Posture:
- The respondent filed a complaint against Larry Shine, Jr. for negligence and against his parents under the South Carolina Parental Responsibility Act.
- Appellants (Larry Shine, Jr. and his parents) filed demurrers to the complaint, arguing that Larry Shine, Jr., being under seven years old, was legally incapable of either negligence or an intentional and malicious tort.
- The trial court overruled the appellants' demurrers, rejecting their arguments.
- Appellants appealed the trial court's decision to the Supreme Court of South Carolina.
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Issue:
Does the common law conclusive presumption of incapacity for negligence apply to minors under seven years of age in claims of primary negligence, and can minors of any age commit intentional torts subjecting their parents to liability under statutory parental responsibility acts?
Opinions:
Majority - Harwell, Justice
No, a child under seven years old is not conclusively presumed incapable of primary negligence; rather, their capacity is determined by a standard of care considering their individual age, intelligence, and experience. Yes, minors of any age can commit intentional and malicious torts, making parents liable under parental responsibility statutes. The court historically applied a conclusive presumption of incapacity for contributory negligence for minors under seven and rebuttable presumptions for those between seven and fourteen. However, the court had not previously addressed primary negligence. Recognizing that children's capacities vary greatly, the court adopted the standard from Restatement (Second) of Torts § 283A: a minor’s conduct should be judged by the standard of behavior to be expected of a child of like age, intelligence, and experience under like circumstances. This new standard applies to both primary and contributory negligence, explicitly overruling prior inconsistent holdings regarding contributory negligence. Regarding the Parental Responsibility Act, the court acknowledged that such statutes create liability in derogation of common law and are strictly construed. However, the court found no conflict with common law regarding the ability of minors to commit intentional torts, and affirmed the legislative policy goals of such acts, which aim to reduce juvenile delinquency by encouraging parental supervision. The court concluded that the statute's plain language indicates that minors of any age can commit intentional and malicious torts, specifically property destruction, thereby subjecting their parents to liability up to the statutory limit. Therefore, the trial court properly overruled the demurrers.
Analysis:
This case significantly alters South Carolina's approach to minor negligence by abandoning the rigid age-based presumptions (specifically the 'rule of sevens' for those under seven) in favor of a more flexible, individualized standard consistent with the Restatement (Second) of Torts. This decision aligns South Carolina with modern jurisprudence, increasing the potential for minors to be found negligent in civil actions, even at young ages. Furthermore, the decision clarifies that parental responsibility statutes, while strictly construed, allow for parental liability for intentional torts committed by minors of any age, underscoring the legislative policy goals of deterring juvenile delinquency and encouraging parental supervision. This case sets a uniform, fact-specific standard of care for minors in negligence cases and affirms broad parental liability under specific statutes.
