Stallman v. Youngquist
78 A.L.R. 4th 1071, 531 N.E.2d 355, 125 Ill. 2d 267 (1988)
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Rule of Law:
A child, after being born, does not have a legally recognized cause of action against their mother for the unintentional infliction of prenatal injuries due to public policy considerations, including the mother's right to privacy and the unique biological relationship between a mother and her fetus.
Facts:
- Bari Stallman was approximately five months pregnant with her daughter, Lindsay Stallman.
- While driving her automobile to a restaurant, Bari Stallman was involved in a collision with a car driven by Clarence Youngquist.
- As a result of the collision, the fetus (Lindsay Stallman) was allegedly thrown about inside the womb.
- After Lindsay Stallman was born, she was alleged to have suffered serious and permanent injuries as a result of the collision.
Procedural Posture:
- Lindsay Stallman, by her father and next friend, filed a negligence suit against her mother, Bari Stallman, in the circuit court of Cook County.
- The circuit court granted Bari Stallman's motion to dismiss.
- Lindsay Stallman, as appellant, appealed to the appellate court (in a decision known as Stallman I), which reversed the dismissal and remanded the case.
- On remand, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Bari Stallman.
- Lindsay Stallman, as appellant, appealed again to the appellate court (in a decision known as Stallman II), which reversed the summary judgment and remanded for trial.
- Bari Stallman, as petitioner, was granted leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Illinois.
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Issue:
Does a child, after being born alive, have a cause of action against their mother for the unintentional infliction of prenatal injuries sustained while the child was a fetus?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Cunningham
No. A child, after being born alive, does not have a cause of action against their mother for the unintentional infliction of prenatal injuries. While Illinois law permits a child to sue a third party for prenatal injuries, extending this liability to the child's mother raises profound public policy concerns. The court reasoned that the relationship between a pregnant woman and her fetus is unique and cannot be compared to the relationship between a fetus and a third party. Recognizing such a cause of action would create a new tort, imposing a legal duty on a pregnant woman to provide an optimal fetal environment and making her a guarantor of her child's health. This would result in an unprecedented intrusion into the woman's privacy and bodily autonomy, subjecting her daily choices to judicial scrutiny and placing her in an adversarial position with her fetus from conception. The court concluded that creating such a duty is a complex legislative matter, not a judicial one, and refused to create a legal fiction that treats a mother as a stranger to her fetus for tort liability purposes.
Analysis:
This decision carves out a significant exception to the general trend of allowing tort recovery for prenatal injuries. By distinguishing between maternal liability and third-party liability, the court establishes a strong public policy shield for pregnant women against negligence claims brought by their children post-birth. The ruling emphasizes judicial deference to the legislature on sensitive issues involving reproductive autonomy and family relationships. It solidifies the principle that the unique biological bond between mother and fetus places their relationship outside the traditional tort framework, thereby preventing the judiciary from imposing a legal standard of care on a pregnant woman's conduct.
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