Staley v. Harris County
2006 WL 2349223, 461 F.3d 504, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 20916 (2006)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
The Establishment Clause prohibits government from maintaining a monument on public grounds if an objective observer, familiar with the monument's history and context, would conclude that its primary purpose or effect is to advance religion.
Facts:
- In 1910, the Harris County Civil Courthouse was built in Houston, Texas, and is owned and operated by Harris County.
- William S. Mosher, a prominent Houston businessman and philanthropist who actively supported the Star of Hope Mission, died in 1948.
- In 1953, the Star of Hope Mission decided to build a memorial to Mosher and secured permission from the Harris County Commissioners Court to erect it on Courthouse property for its permanence and prominence.
- In 1956, Star of Hope designed, paid for, and erected the Mosher monument in a plaza near the Courthouse entrance, including an open Bible in a glass display case to memorialize Mosher’s Christian faith, and dedicated it in a public ceremony with Christian prayers.
- From 1956 to 1988, Star of Hope maintained the monument, replacing the Bible multiple times after vandalism; the monument stood for 32 years without legal challenge.
- In 1988, atheists complained about the Bible to the Harris County Commissioners Court, and Star of Hope subsequently removed the Bible or ceased replacing it, leaving the display case open and empty, often used as a trash bin, until 1995.
- In 1995, John Devine, elected as a state district judge on a platform of 'putting Christianity back into government,' initiated a privately funded project with his court reporter, Karen Friend, to refurbish the monument, restore a Bible, and add red neon lighting around the Bible in the display case.
- In November 1995, a rededication ceremony was held on Courthouse grounds, which included Christian ministers leading prayers and participants singing 'The Battle Hymn of the Republic'; Harris County has since paid for the electricity to illuminate the neon lights.
Procedural Posture:
- Kay Staley filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, requesting a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and permanent injunction against Harris County to remove the Bible from the display case.
- The district court entered a final judgment in favor of Staley, ordering the Bible removed from the monument and Harris County to pay Staley $40,586 in attorney’s fees and expenses.
- Harris County (appellant) timely appealed the district court’s decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a monument containing an open Bible on public courthouse grounds violate the Establishment Clause when its history demonstrates an evolution from a primarily secular memorial to a predominantly religious symbol due to later refurbishments and rededication events?
Opinions:
Majority - E. Grady Jolly
Yes, the monument, in its current state, violates the Establishment Clause because its recent history would force an objective observer to conclude that it is a religious symbol. The court applied the 'objective observer' test, as refined by the Supreme Court in McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky and Justice Breyer's concurrence in Van Orden v. Perry, to determine the monument's predominant purpose. While the monument’s original erection in 1956, featuring the Bible, was seen as primarily honoring William S. Mosher and stood without challenge for 32 years, its character changed significantly during the 1995 refurbishment. Judge Devine, who had no prior connection to Mosher and campaigned on a platform of restoring Christianity in government, orchestrated the restoration. This refurbishment included the addition of a red neon light highlighting the Bible and a rededication ceremony with Christian prayers. An objective observer, aware of this context, would perceive that the monument had evolved into a predominantly religious symbol, commandeered for religious purposes rather than primarily honoring Mosher. The short time between the refurbishment and the lawsuit, in contrast to the long unchallenged history in Van Orden, further indicated a potentially divisive, contemporary governmental effort to promote a religious text.
Dissenting - Jerry E. Smith
No, the monument does not violate the Establishment Clause, as the majority misapplies Supreme Court precedent and shows undue hostility to religious references in public spaces. The dissenting opinion argues that McCreary County and Van Orden establish a presumption of constitutionality for longstanding secular monuments, even if they contain religious elements. The critical inquiry should be whether the government's predominant purpose is to advance religion, not whether any religious purpose arises during the monument's lifespan. The majority erred by partitioning the monument’s history and focusing only on the 'third phase' (post-1995 refurbishment) to find a predominant religious purpose, while McCreary requires considering all phases. Judge Devine's actions, even if religiously motivated, should not unilaterally change the long-standing, predominantly secular purpose of a memorial to Mosher. The original 1956 dedication also involved prayers, and the monument's status as a memorial justifies religious allusions, similar to other national monuments. Furthermore, the Star of Hope Mission resumed control and maintenance in 1997, and the light was installed for moisture prevention, not solely illumination, which further contradicts the finding of a predominantly religious purpose. Removing a long-standing memorial based on an 'outlier’s insistence' of religious promotion creates unnecessary religious divisiveness and reflects a misunderstanding of the balance between government neutrality and respect for religious traditions.
Analysis:
This case clarifies how the 'objective observer' test and the purpose prong of the Lemon test apply to public monuments with evolving histories. It establishes that even an initially constitutional monument can become unconstitutional through later government actions that shift its perceived primary purpose to religious endorsement. The ruling emphasizes the importance of the entire historical context, particularly recent actions and motivations, in determining whether a display crosses the line from acknowledging cultural heritage to promoting religion. This has significant implications for public spaces, suggesting that overt governmental involvement, especially when coupled with religious rhetoric or campaign promises, can quickly transform a passive religious reference into an unconstitutional establishment of religion, even if the monument originated from private donation.
