Stagner v. State
842 P.2d 520, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 173, 1992 WL 341390 (1992)
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Rule of Law:
A criminal defendant has a due process right to a jury instruction on their theory of defense, such as mistake of fact, if there is any competent evidence to support it. For the purpose of determining whether the evidence is competent, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant and accept the defendant's testimony as entirely true.
Facts:
- A 1973 Lincoln Continental Mark IV was stolen from a locked garage in Huntley, Montana.
- Les Kilwein, who had possession of the stolen car, met Cheryl Marie Stagner at a bar in Morton, Wyoming.
- Kilwein testified that he told Stagner the Lincoln was stolen.
- Stagner testified that Kilwein told her he had purchased the car by trading a Camaro plus $150.
- Stagner drove the Lincoln, with Kilwein as a passenger, to a field behind a trailer house where she parked it.
- Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) agents later responded to a call and found the Lincoln at that location.
- The agents found Stagner and Hal Alcorn hiding in a nearby pickup truck.
- A search of Stagner upon her arrest revealed the keys to the stolen Lincoln in her coat pocket.
Procedural Posture:
- Cheryl Marie Stagner was charged in a Wyoming trial court with receiving or concealing stolen property.
- At the conclusion of her trial, Stagner's defense attorney requested a specific 'Mistake of Fact' jury instruction.
- The trial court judge refused to give the requested instruction to the jury.
- The jury returned a verdict convicting Stagner of the crime charged.
- Stagner (appellant) appealed her conviction to the Wyoming Supreme Court, asserting that the trial court's refusal to give the instruction constituted reversible error.
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Issue:
Does a trial court's refusal to give a defendant's requested 'Mistake of Fact' jury instruction violate the defendant's due process rights when the defendant's own testimony provides competent evidence to support that theory of defense?
Opinions:
Majority - Urbigkit, J.
Yes, the trial court's refusal to give the requested instruction violated Stagner's due process rights. A defendant is entitled to an instruction on any recognized defense for which there exists evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in their favor. To determine if such evidence exists, the court must view the evidence in a light favorable to the accused and take the accused's testimony as entirely true. Stagner's testimony that Kilwein told her he bought the car was competent evidence to support a 'Mistake of Fact' defense. It is the jury's role, not the judge's, to weigh the credibility of conflicting testimony, and refusing the instruction deprived the jury of its function.
Dissenting - Macy, C.J.
No, the trial court's refusal did not violate Stagner's rights. While an accused has a right to a theory-of-defense instruction, it must be supported by competent evidence. Given the overwhelming evidence against Stagner, it is inconceivable a jury would find her testimony credible. The jury was already properly instructed that it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that Stagner knew or had reasonable cause to believe the car was stolen, which was sufficient to protect her rights.
Dissenting - Thomas, J.
No, the trial court's refusal to give the instruction was not an error. Stagner's defense was not a true 'mistake of fact' but simply a denial of a required element of the crime—knowledge. The existing jury instructions, which required the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Stagner knew, believed, or had reasonable cause to believe the property was stolen, already encompassed her defense theory. Providing a separate, superfluous 'mistake of fact' instruction would make the trial judge an advocate for the defendant by essentially restating her argument in the court's own instructions.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the fundamental principle that the jury, not the judge, is the ultimate arbiter of witness credibility and factual disputes. It establishes a low threshold for what constitutes 'competent evidence' sufficient to trigger a defendant's right to a theory-of-defense instruction, holding that the defendant's own testimony is enough. The ruling limits a trial court's discretion to refuse such instructions, even when the defendant's version of events seems improbable or is heavily contradicted by the prosecution's evidence. This places a greater emphasis on the jury's role in considering all possible defenses supported by any evidence presented.
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