Spurlock v. Townes
2016 NMSC 14 (2016)
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Rule of Law:
Under New Mexico law, a private prison is vicariously liable for all compensatory damages caused by the intentional sexual assaults of its corrections officer employee when those torts were facilitated by the authority provided to the employee by the prison, and this liability may not be reduced by any comparative fault attributed to the inmate victims.
Facts:
- Plaintiffs Heather Spurlock, Sophia Carrasco, and Nina Carrera were inmates at the Camino Nuevo Correctional Center, a private prison operated by Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) and directed by Warden Barbara Wagner.
- While incarcerated, Plaintiffs were sexually assaulted and falsely imprisoned by Anthony Townes, a corrections officer employed by CCA.
- Townes frequently approached Plaintiffs while they were on work detail or removed them from their cells in the middle of the night, ordering them to other locations within the prison where he sexually assaulted them.
- Townes utilized his authority and position, asking officers in 'master control' to remotely open doors or obtaining permission to open them himself, to move Plaintiffs around the facility, and also took advantage of surveillance camera 'blind spots'.
- CCA policies permitted male corrections officers to escort female inmates alone, and prison rules requiring male officers to announce their presence and maintain physical distance were not enforced, providing Townes with substantial access to female inmates.
- Anthony Townes pleaded guilty in New Mexico state court to four counts of second-degree criminal sexual penetration and four counts of false imprisonment, stipulating that he unlawfully restrained or confined Plaintiffs and caused them to engage in sexual intercourse while using his position of authority to coerce them.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiffs Heather Spurlock, Sophia Carrasco, and Nina Carrera filed suit in the United States District Court against Anthony Townes, Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), and Barbara Wagner, asserting Eighth Amendment civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and various state tort law claims.
- The federal district court granted judgment as a matter of law against Townes on Plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment claim and state tort claims for sexual assault and false imprisonment, finding him judicially estopped from contesting facts he admitted during his plea hearing.
- The district court declined to hold CCA and Wagner vicariously liable for Townes' intentional torts but ruled they could be liable for damages caused by negligent supervision of Townes.
- A jury found CCA and Wagner not liable under the Eighth Amendment but liable for negligent supervision of Townes as to Plaintiffs Spurlock and Carrasco.
- The jury awarded each Plaintiff compensatory and punitive damages.
- The federal district court ruled that while comparative negligence of Plaintiffs could not reduce damages against Townes, an award against CCA and Wagner based on negligent supervision was subject to reduction for fault on the part of Plaintiffs.
- The jury apportioned a percentage of fault to Plaintiffs Spurlock and Carrasco compared to CCA and Wagner, which reduced the final compensatory damages award against CCA and Wagner.
- The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, reviewing post-trial motions, certified a question of New Mexico law to the New Mexico Supreme Court regarding the availability of an affirmative defense of comparative fault in a negligent supervision claim for reducing a judgment against a correctional facility.
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Issue:
Does New Mexico law impose vicarious liability on a private correctional facility for the intentional sexual assaults committed by its corrections officer employee when the officer was aided in accomplishing the torts by the authority of his employment, and if so, can the facility's liability be reduced by an affirmative defense of comparative fault attributed to the inmate victims?
Opinions:
Majority - Daniels, Justice
Yes, New Mexico law imposes vicarious liability on a private correctional facility for the intentional sexual assaults committed by its corrections officer employee when the officer was aided in accomplishing the torts by the authority of his employment, and no, the facility's liability cannot be reduced by an affirmative defense of comparative fault attributed to the inmate victims. The Court holds that CCA and Wagner are vicariously liable for all compensatory damages under the "aided-in-agency" theory, which applies when an employee, even if acting outside the scope of employment, is aided in committing an intentional tort by the existence of their agency relationship. This theory is specifically applicable in cases where an employee holds "substantial power or authority to control important elements of a vulnerable tort victim’s life or livelihood," distinguishing it from mere opportunity presented by employment. Corrections officers, like Townes, are vested with extraordinary authority over inmates, controlling virtually every facet of their lives, far exceeding the authority a private-sector supervisor has over an employee. The New Mexico Legislature has acknowledged this power disparity in criminal statutes recognizing that meaningful consent is unrealistic between an inmate and an officer in a position of authority. Townes exploited his employer-vested authority—including the ability to move inmates around the facility, enter their residential areas unescorted, and the inmates' fear of retaliation—to coerce Plaintiffs into submitting to the assaults. Given that the liability of CCA and Wagner is vicarious, and not predicated on their own direct fault, an affirmative defense of comparative fault attributed to the intentional tortfeasor Townes or the inmate victims is not available. New Mexico law retains joint and several liability for intentional tortfeasors and for vicarious liability, and fault is not apportioned between an intentional tortfeasor and a merely negligent victim. The Court declined to address the availability of comparative fault for negligent supervision claims, as the finding of vicarious liability made such a determination unnecessary for the compensatory damages award.
Analysis:
This decision significantly broadens the scope of employer vicarious liability in New Mexico, establishing that employers can be held fully responsible for an employee's intentional torts if those torts were facilitated by the unique authority or control granted to the employee by their position, even if outside the traditional scope of employment. It emphasizes the unique vulnerability of inmates under the "extraordinary power" of corrections officers and reinforces that employers bear a high degree of accountability for abuses of such power. The ruling also clarifies that in cases of vicarious liability for intentional torts facilitated by employer-vested authority, comparative fault defenses cannot be used to reduce the compensatory damages awarded to victims, providing greater protection for those in vulnerable positions.
