Spreeuw v. Barker
682 S.E.2d 843, 385 S.C. 45, 2009 S.C. App. LEXIS 366 (2009)
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Rule of Law:
A court may modify a child custody order if the moving party demonstrates that a substantial change in circumstances has occurred since the initial order and that a modification is in the best interests of the child, considering the totality of the circumstances.
Facts:
- Diana Spreeuw (Mother) and Douglas Barker (Father) divorced, and Mother, the primary breadwinner, agreed to give Father primary custody of their two children because her specialized job required a move to Nashville, Tennessee.
- Mother agreed to pay $1,000 per month in child support and moved to Nashville for work, while Father and the children remained in Charleston.
- Following the divorce, Father married Daphne Burns, who moved into the family home but then moved out and back in multiple times over the next year due to household "tension, anger, and ugliness," before permanently departing.
- During a summer visit, the parties' oldest child begged Mother to return to Charleston.
- In response to her child's plea and concerns about the instability in Father's home, Mother quit her $74,000/year job in Nashville.
- Mother moved back to Charleston, initially taking a job at a fabric store for $6.50/hour and later finding a position earning $26,000/year, while actively searching for more comparable employment.
- After Mother's return, Father refused to amend the visitation schedule, which was designed for an out-of-state parent.
- Father began a new romantic relationship with Jennifer Helm and allowed her to spend significant time at his home, including overnight, which made the oldest child feel uncomfortable.
Procedural Posture:
- Diana Spreeuw (Mother) and Douglas Barker (Father) reached a custody agreement that was approved by a family court order on December 17, 2001, granting Father primary custody.
- On October 31, 2001, Mother filed a complaint in family court seeking to modify custody and child support.
- The family court issued a temporary order granting Mother increased overnight visitation and reducing her child support obligation.
- On August 6, 2002, Father obtained an emergency ex parte order from the family court to prevent the children from being left home alone.
- Following a five-day trial, the family court issued a final order awarding the parties joint physical custody, designating Mother as the primary custodian with final decision-making authority, and ordering Father to pay child support and attorney's fees.
- Both parties filed post-trial motions to alter or amend the judgment, which the family court denied.
- Father also filed a motion for relief from judgment based on newly discovered evidence, which the family court denied.
- Father filed a notice of appeal from the family court's final order and the denial of his post-trial motions; Mother filed a notice of a cross-appeal.
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Issue:
Does a parent's relocation back to the children's city, significant personal and financial sacrifice to be present for the children, and instability in the other parent's home constitute a substantial change in circumstances sufficient to warrant modifying custody in the best interests of the children?
Opinions:
Majority - Hearn, C.J.
Yes. A parent's significant personal and financial sacrifice to return to the children's city, coupled with instability in the custodial parent's home and the custodial parent's failure to co-parent, constitutes a substantial change in circumstances justifying a custody modification in the children's best interests. The court found that Mother's return to Charleston, prompted by the children's needs, was a significant change. It also determined that the family court properly considered the totality of the circumstances, including the oldest child's preference, Father's introduction of a new girlfriend against the child's wishes, and his unwillingness to co-parent. The court affirmed the refusal to impute a higher income to Mother, finding she was not voluntarily underemployed because her motivation for leaving her higher-paying job was a good-faith effort to act in her children's best interests. However, the court also affirmed the award of joint physical custody, despite the general rule against it, because the seven-year delay in the appeal had created a new status quo that the court was reluctant to disrupt based on a 'cold record'.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces that the 'substantial change in circumstances' standard for custody modification is a highly fact-specific inquiry focused on the children's welfare. The case establishes that a parent's good-faith, child-centric reasons for a career change that results in lower income can shield them from having their previous, higher income imputed for child support purposes. Significantly, the court's treatment of the joint physical custody award demonstrates how extreme procedural delays can create a de facto 'exceptional circumstance,' making appellate courts unwilling to alter a long-standing arrangement, even if it was not properly justified by the trial court initially. This sets a pragmatic precedent where the passage of time itself can become a decisive factor in maintaining the status quo for the sake of the children's stability.
