Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins
578 U. S. ____ (2016) (2016)
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Rule of Law:
To establish injury in fact for Article III standing, a plaintiff must allege an injury that is both concrete and particularized. A bare procedural violation of a statute, divorced from any concrete harm or material risk of such harm, is insufficient to satisfy the concreteness requirement.
Facts:
- Spokeo, Inc. operates a 'people search engine' that aggregates and publishes personal information about individuals from various databases.
- Spokeo's services are marketed to users for various purposes, including employers evaluating prospective employees.
- At some point, an unspecified person used Spokeo to search for information about Thomas Robins.
- Spokeo generated a public profile for Robins containing multiple pieces of inaccurate information.
- The profile falsely stated that Robins was married, had children, was in his 50s, was employed in a professional field, held a graduate degree, and was relatively affluent.
- Robins alleged that this information was incorrect and that at the time it was published, he was out of work and actively seeking employment.
Procedural Posture:
- Thomas Robins filed a class-action complaint against Spokeo, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California.
- The District Court dismissed Robins' complaint with prejudice, ruling that he had failed to plead an injury in fact sufficient for Article III standing.
- Robins, as appellant, appealed the dismissal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
- The Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court, holding that the alleged violation of Robins' statutory rights under the FCRA constituted a sufficient injury in fact.
- Spokeo, Inc., as petitioner, filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which the U.S. Supreme Court granted.
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Issue:
Does a plaintiff who alleges a bare procedural violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), without alleging any actual harm, have Article III standing to sue in federal court?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Alito
No, a plaintiff alleging a bare procedural violation of the FCRA does not automatically have Article III standing. To have standing, a plaintiff must allege an injury in fact that is both 'concrete' and 'particularized.' While Robins's alleged injury was particularized to him, the lower court failed to conduct a separate analysis for concreteness. A concrete injury must be 'de facto,' meaning it must actually exist; it must be real and not abstract. While intangible injuries can be concrete, a bare procedural violation of a statute, such as the dissemination of an incorrect zip code, might not cause any harm or risk of harm. Congress's judgment in creating a statutory right is important, but it cannot erase Article III's core requirement of a concrete injury. The case must be remanded for the lower court to determine whether the specific procedural violations alleged by Robins entail a degree of risk sufficient to meet the concreteness requirement.
Concurring - Justice Thomas
Yes, I agree that the case should be remanded. The concreteness of an injury depends on the nature of the right being violated. Historically, a violation of a 'private right' (e.g., trespass, rights personal to an individual) was itself considered an injury sufficient for a lawsuit. In contrast, to sue for a violation of a 'public right' (a duty owed to the community at large), a plaintiff had to demonstrate a distinct, individual harm. Congress can create new private rights, and a violation of such a right may be a sufficient injury in itself. On remand, the court should consider whether the FCRA's requirement for accuracy creates a private right personal to Robins or a public right that would require him to plead additional, individualized harm.
Dissenting - Justice Ginsburg
Yes, Robins has alleged a sufficiently concrete injury for Article III standing. A remand is unnecessary because the harm alleged by Robins is not a 'bare procedural violation' akin to an incorrect zip code. Spokeo published significant, damaging misinformation about Robins's education, family status, wealth, and age while he was unemployed and seeking a job. This is precisely the type of substantive harm the FCRA was enacted to prevent. Congress created procedural requirements to guard against this concrete harm, and Spokeo's alleged violation of those procedures caused Robins to suffer an injury that is real and not abstract. Therefore, he has adequately pleaded a concrete injury.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarified and arguably heightened the 'injury in fact' requirement for Article III standing, particularly in cases involving statutory violations. The Court's distinction between 'particularization' and 'concreteness' requires plaintiffs to do more than simply point to a defendant's violation of a federal law. This 'Spokeo standing' doctrine has had a major impact on consumer class actions, especially in data privacy and consumer protection litigation, often requiring plaintiffs to plead specific, tangible harm or a material risk of such harm, thereby making it more difficult to bring claims based on purely procedural or technical violations of a statute.
