Spiegel v. Schulmann
23 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 129, 604 F.3d 72, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 9274 (2010)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
The anti-retaliation provision of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12203, does not provide for individual liability because its enforcement mechanism incorporates the remedies of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which does not permit individual liability in the employment context.
Facts:
- Elliot Spiegel was employed as an instructor at a Tiger Schulmann Karate School in Stamford, Connecticut.
- In June 2002, Spiegel was terminated from his position.
- In the fall of 2002, Spiegel informed his former employer, Daniel Schulmann, and UAK Management Company, that he intended to file an employment discrimination charge alleging his termination was based on his weight.
- Jonathan Schatzberg, Spiegel's friend and roommate, was employed as an instructor at a different Tiger Schulmann Karate School in Rego Park, Queens.
- In November 2002, shortly after Spiegel announced his intent to file a discrimination charge, Schatzberg was terminated from his position.
- Following the initiation of the federal lawsuit, the corporation operating the Stamford karate school filed a separate lawsuit against Spiegel in Connecticut state court, alleging he interfered with an employee contract.
Procedural Posture:
- Elliot Spiegel and Jonathan Schatzberg (Plaintiffs) sued Daniel Schulmann and UAK Management Company (Defendants) in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York.
- Plaintiffs' second amended complaint alleged ADA retaliation claims against Schulmann individually, as well as state and city human rights law claims for weight discrimination.
- Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on all claims.
- The district court granted summary judgment for the Defendants in its entirety, dismissing all of Plaintiffs' claims.
- The district court held, among other things, that the ADA's anti-retaliation provision does not allow for individual liability.
- The Plaintiffs (Appellants) appealed the district court's judgment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does the anti-retaliation provision of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12203, permit a cause of action against an individual supervisor in the employment context?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
No. The anti-retaliation provision of the Americans with Disabilities Act does not provide for individual liability in the employment context. While the Second Circuit has not previously addressed this specific question, its precedent under Title VII is controlling. The ADA's retaliation provision, § 12203(c), expressly adopts the remedies and procedures available under Title VII, specifically 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. This court held in Tomka v. Seiler Corp. that Title VII's remedial scheme does not permit individual liability against supervisors. Therefore, because the ADA incorporates Title VII's remedies, the ADA's anti-retaliation provision similarly cannot be used to hold individuals liable. The court acknowledged that the statutory text "[n]o person shall" could suggest individual liability, but it determined this is a rare case where the broader statutory structure and congressional intent to create parallel remedial schemes between the ADA and Title VII override a literal reading of the text.
Analysis:
This decision establishes binding precedent in the Second Circuit that there is no individual liability for retaliation under the ADA, aligning the statute with the court's existing interpretation of Title VII. By doing so, the court created a uniform rule across major federal employment discrimination statutes, simplifying the legal landscape for employers and employees. The ruling prioritizes consistency in statutory remedial schemes over a literal textual interpretation of the phrase "no person," reinforcing the principle that employer entities, not individual supervisors, are the proper defendants in such federal claims. This forecloses a significant avenue for plaintiffs seeking to hold managers personally accountable for retaliatory acts under federal law.
