Sosna v. Iowa
419 U.S. 393 (1975)
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Rule of Law:
A state may constitutionally impose a one-year durational residency requirement as a prerequisite for filing a divorce action. Such a requirement does not unconstitutionally penalize the right to interstate travel, as it is justified by the state's strong interests in regulating domestic relations and ensuring the validity of its judicial decrees.
Facts:
- Carol Sosna and Michael Sosna were married in Michigan in 1964 and lived together in New York from 1967 to 1971.
- The couple separated in August 1971, though both continued to reside in New York.
- In August 1972, Carol Sosna moved with her three children to Iowa.
- In September 1972, approximately one month after moving, Carol Sosna petitioned for a dissolution of her marriage in an Iowa state court.
- Michael Sosna, who remained a resident of New York, was personally served with notice of the action while visiting his children in Iowa.
Procedural Posture:
- Carol Sosna filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in the District Court of Jackson County, Iowa, a state trial court.
- The state trial court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction because Sosna had not met Iowa's one-year residency requirement.
- Sosna filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa, challenging the constitutionality of the residency requirement.
- The U.S. District Court certified the suit as a class action representing all Iowa residents who had not yet met the one-year requirement.
- A three-judge panel of the U.S. District Court held that the Iowa statute was constitutional.
- Sosna appealed this decision directly to the Supreme Court of the United States.
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Issue:
Does Iowa's statutory one-year durational residency requirement for initiating a divorce action violate the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Rehnquist
No, the Iowa residency requirement does not violate the Constitution. The Court first addressed mootness, holding that even though the named plaintiff's claim was moot, the case remained a live controversy because it was a certified class action where the issue was 'capable of repetition, yet evading review' for the class members. On the merits, the Court distinguished this case from those striking down residency requirements for welfare benefits (Shapiro), voting (Dunn), and medical care (Maricopa County). Unlike those cases, which involved the irretrievable loss of a fundamental benefit, Iowa's law only imposes a temporary delay on access to its courts. States have a virtually exclusive province over domestic relations, and Iowa's requirement is reasonably justified by its strong interests in ensuring that divorce petitioners have a genuine attachment to the state, avoiding becoming a 'divorce mill,' and minimizing the susceptibility of its divorce decrees to collateral attack under the Full Faith and Credit Clause by establishing a firm basis for domicile.
Dissenting - Justice White
This opinion does not answer the constitutional issue because the case is moot. Article III of the Constitution requires a live case or controversy, which means the named plaintiff must have a personal stake in the outcome throughout the litigation. Once Carol Sosna satisfied the residency requirement and obtained a divorce elsewhere, her claim became moot, and there was no longer a proper party before the Court. Certifying the case as a class action does not create a disembodied 'class' with a legal status sufficient to satisfy Article III's jurisdictional requirements in the absence of a named plaintiff with a continuing, personal stake in the controversy.
Dissenting - Justice Marshall
Yes, the Iowa residency requirement violates the Constitution. The majority errs by failing to apply the compelling state interest test required under Shapiro v. Thompson when a state law penalizes the fundamental right to travel. The right to dissolve a marriage is a fundamental interest, and denying it to new residents for a year is a significant penalty. The state's proffered justifications are not compelling, and the law is not narrowly tailored. Iowa could adequately protect its interests in preventing itself from becoming a 'divorce mill' and guarding against collateral attacks by requiring a showing of bona fide domicile—physical presence plus an intent to remain—which is a less restrictive alternative to a rigid one-year waiting period.
Analysis:
This decision established a significant carve-out from the strict scrutiny standard typically applied to durational residency requirements that penalize the right to travel. By using a more deferential balancing test, the Court signaled that states have greater latitude in regulating matters of domestic relations, such as divorce, than they do for other fundamental rights like voting or receiving essential government benefits. The ruling affirms the state's strong interest in the marital status of its domiciliaries and in protecting the integrity of its judicial decrees. This case also provides an important clarification on the mootness doctrine in the context of class actions, holding that a controversy remains live for the class even if the named representative's individual claim is resolved.
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