Sorokolit v. Rhodes
1994 WL 138329, 889 S.W.2d 239 (1994)
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Rule of Law:
Section 12.01(a) of the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act precludes Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA) claims against physicians that are based on a breach of the accepted standard of medical care (negligence), but it does not bar DTPA claims for knowing misrepresentation or breach of an express warranty for a particular result.
Facts:
- Janice Rhodes consulted Dr. Bob Sorokolit for a proposed breast augmentation surgery.
- Dr. Sorokolit guaranteed and warranted the results of the surgery.
- He instructed Rhodes and her husband to select a picture of a nude model from a magazine.
- Dr. Sorokolit promised that following the surgery, Rhodes' breasts would look just like those in the picture she selected.
- The result of the surgery was not as Dr. Sorokolit had guaranteed.
Procedural Posture:
- Janice Rhodes sued Dr. Bob Sorokolit in a Texas trial court for medical malpractice and for violations of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA).
- Rhodes later amended her suit to drop the malpractice allegations, proceeding solely on the DTPA claims of knowing misrepresentation and breach of express warranty.
- Dr. Sorokolit filed special exceptions, arguing that the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act (MLIIA) completely precluded Rhodes' DTPA claims.
- The trial court sustained Dr. Sorokolit's special exceptions and dismissed the case.
- Rhodes, as appellant, appealed to the Texas Court of Appeals, with Dr. Sorokolit as appellee.
- The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court in part, holding that DTPA claims for knowing misrepresentation and breach of express warranty were not barred by the MLIIA, and remanded the case.
- Dr. Sorokolit, as petitioner, appealed that decision to the Supreme Court of Texas.
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Issue:
Does section 12.01(a) of the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act, which bars Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA) claims against physicians for personal injury resulting from negligence, also preclude DTPA claims for knowing misrepresentation and breach of an express warranty of a particular surgical result?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Hightower
No. Section 12.01(a) of the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act does not preclude a DTPA suit for knowing misrepresentation or breach of an express warranty when the claim is not based on a physician's breach of the accepted standard of medical care. The court determined that the plain language of section 12.01(a) unambiguously bars only DTPA claims resulting from a physician's 'negligence.' Since the legislature did not define 'negligence' in the statute, the court applied its common law meaning: a breach of the accepted standard of medical care. Rhodes' claims are not based on negligence; they are based on Dr. Sorokolit knowingly misrepresenting his skills and breaching an express warranty of a particular result. Such claims concern intentional deception and broken guarantees, not a failure to meet the standard of care, and thus fall outside the scope of the statutory prohibition.
Dissenting - Justice Cornyn
Yes. Section 12.01(a) should be interpreted to preclude these DTPA claims. The majority's 'plain meaning' construction renders the statute meaningless, as DTPA suits are never based on negligence to begin with. The legislature's clear intent in enacting the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act was to reform the entire law of medical malpractice and channel all such claims through a negligence framework, with its specific procedural requirements and damage caps. Rhodes' claim is a medical negligence claim that has been improperly recast as a DTPA action to circumvent the statutory scheme. Allowing this suit creates a loophole that undermines the legislature's comprehensive reform and lowers the burden of proof for plaintiffs in medical liability cases, contrary to the statute's purpose.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the scope of physician liability under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. It establishes a critical distinction between a physician's professional conduct (governed by the negligence standard of care) and their commercial representations. By allowing claims for breach of express warranty and knowing misrepresentation, the court prevents doctors from using the MLIIA as a shield against liability for deceptive business practices or specific, guaranteed promises about outcomes. This ruling ensures that while pure medical malpractice claims cannot be disguised as DTPA actions, physicians remain accountable for intentional misrepresentations and broken contractual promises made to patients, preserving a distinct avenue of consumer protection in the healthcare context.
