Sopp v. Smith
59 Cal. 2d 12, 377 P.2d 649, 27 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1963)
Rule of Law:
The general rule in California prohibits the use of juror affidavits to impeach a verdict, with narrow exceptions for misconduct involving chance or concealed juror bias, and this rule is strictly applied even to overt acts of independent investigation by jurors.
Facts:
- Plaintiff Evelyn Soon was driving an automobile that was involved in a collision with a vehicle driven by the defendant.
- The plaintiffs sought to recover for personal injuries allegedly resulting from this collision.
- During a recess in the trial, juror Linton drove his own automobile alone to the scene of the accident to view courses and distances, step off alleged courses, study the gravelled area, and drive his own car over the routes to check visibility, road conditions, and distances.
- After all evidence had been presented and closing arguments concluded, juror Webb drove his family to the scene of the accident to view distances and courses testified to by witnesses and timed portions of the route with a stopwatch to get an idea of vision and verify assertions made by counsel.
- Juror Linton consistently voted for the defendant in the jury deliberations.
- Juror Webb also voted in favor of the defendant.
- Upon the first ballot, juror Oaley and another juror, Mr. Carter, voted for the plaintiffs.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiffs filed an action in a trial court to recover for personal injuries against the defendant.
- The trial resulted in a jury verdict in favor of the defendant.
- Plaintiffs filed a motion for a new trial, asserting misconduct by two jurors and supporting the motion with six affidavits, including sworn statements from the two jurors regarding their independent investigations.
- The trial court denied the motion for a new trial, explicitly stating its 'sole ground' for denial was that the affidavits of the two jurors (Webb and Linton) were inadmissible.
- Plaintiffs appealed the judgment to the Supreme Court of California.
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Issue:
Does the long-established rule in California precluding the use of juror affidavits to impeach a verdict apply to and prevent the consideration of affidavits from jurors who confess to conducting independent, out-of-court investigations into the accident scene during a trial?
Opinions:
Majority - Schauer, J.
No, the long-established rule in California does apply and prevents the consideration of affidavits from jurors who confess to conducting independent, out-of-court investigations. The Supreme Court of California affirmed the trial court's decision, emphasizing the general rule in California that juror affidavits are inadmissible to impeach a verdict. The court cited Kollert v. Cundiff (1958), which articulated the two narrow exceptions to this rule: statutory allowance for verdicts reached by 'resort to chance' (Code Civ. Proc., § 657, subd. 2) and a judicial exception for concealed bias or disqualification during voir dire. The court explicitly rejected the plaintiffs' plea to create a further exception for jurors confessing their own misconduct, finding such a distinction untenable and noting its previous rejection in similar cases. The decision underscored the policy balance between preventing instability of verdicts, fraud, and harassment of jurors, and the desirability of relieving parties from wrongful jury conduct, concluding that the former policies generally prevail. The court also observed that the record lacked a reporter’s transcript, precluding an assessment of the significance of the jurors’ activities, and noted that all jurors had visited the scene at the trial's commencement.
Dissenting - Peters, J.
Yes, the long-established rule prohibiting the use of juror affidavits to impeach a verdict should not apply in this case, and the affidavits from jurors confessing their independent investigations should be considered. Justice Peters dissented, advocating for the abandonment or limitation of the 'Mansfield rule' (the general prohibition against juror affidavits impeaching a verdict), which he noted was a court-created doctrine with an outdated original rationale. He argued that the only reason originally given for the rule (a witness not being heard to allege his own turpitude) has long been overruled in other contexts. Peters pointed to the widespread criticism of the rule by legal scholars and the fact that several jurisdictions have adopted a more liberal approach, known as the 'Iowa rule.' This rule distinguishes between 'extrinsic or overt acts' of misconduct (which are verifiable and should be admissible) and 'intrinsic matters' (which inhere in the verdict and are known only to individual jurors, thus inadmissible). He contended that independent investigations are overt acts and that the jurors’ own affidavits are the 'best evidence' of such misconduct. Peters argued that excluding this evidence is logically absurd, undermines the jury system, and prevents courts from determining if admitted misconduct was prejudicial to a fair trial.
Analysis:
This case underscores California's strong judicial policy favoring the finality of verdicts and the protection of jurors from post-trial harassment, even at the cost of excluding direct evidence of overt juror misconduct. The majority's decision to strictly adhere to the established exceptions, rather than create new ones, solidifies the difficulty for litigants to challenge verdicts based on juror affidavits. The dissent, however, highlights a significant tension between this policy and the desire for transparent, fair judicial proceedings, echoing a broader legal debate about whether the existing rule unduly shields serious misconduct from scrutiny and potentially compromises the integrity of the jury system.
