Sonlin v. Abington Memorial Hospital
748 A.2d 213, 2000 Pa. Super. 44, 2000 Pa. Super. LEXIS 128 (2000)
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Rule of Law:
To state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress as a bystander, a plaintiff's emotional shock must result from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the discrete, traumatic, injury-causing event itself, not from learning about the event or its consequences from a third party after the fact.
Facts:
- Ashley Sonlin was born prematurely at Appellee hospital.
- Following her birth, hospital staff placed an umbilical catheter to monitor her blood oxygen levels, which caused a thrombosis (blood clot) in her left leg.
- Ashley's mother, Jill Sonlin, observed discoloration on the leg but was assured by staff that it was merely a bruise.
- The hospital failed to properly diagnose the vascular compromise caused by the clot.
- On June 1, 1993, Jill Sonlin was informed that the discoloration was in fact a thrombosis and that amputation of the leg was likely.
- The failure to diagnose the clot resulted in dry gangrene.
- Eight days after Jill Sonlin was informed of the situation, Ashley's left leg was amputated below the knee when she was 11 days old.
Procedural Posture:
- Ashley Sonlin's parents (the Sonlins) filed a medical malpractice suit against Abington Memorial Hospital (Appellees) in a Pennsylvania trial court on behalf of Ashley and in their own right.
- Jill Sonlin's individual claim was for negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED).
- The hospital conceded liability for the injury to Ashley, and a trial proceeded only on the issue of damages and Jill Sonlin's NIED claim.
- During the trial, the court granted the hospital's motion for a compulsory non-suit, dismissing Jill Sonlin's NIED claim.
- A jury awarded Ashley's estate $2,185,960, and the court added $307,929 in delay damages, resulting in a total judgment of $2,498,889.
- The Sonlins appealed the dismissal of the NIED claim and the calculation of delay damages to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
- The hospital cross-appealed, challenging the court's refusal to allow periodic payments and to reduce the award to present value.
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Issue:
Does a mother who learns from a doctor that her infant's previously misdiagnosed condition, caused by medical negligence, will likely require amputation suffer a direct emotional impact from a sensory and contemporaneous observance of a traumatic event sufficient to state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress?
Opinions:
Majority - Montemuro, J.
No. A mother who learns from a doctor that her infant's previously misdiagnosed condition will likely require amputation does not suffer a direct emotional impact from a sensory and contemporaneous observance of a traumatic event. To recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress as a bystander, the plaintiff must witness the identifiable traumatic event, which in this case was either the negligent placement of the catheter or the subsequent amputation, neither of which Jill Sonlin observed. The court applied the three-part test from Sinn v. Burd, finding that while Sonlin was a close relative of the victim, she did not meet the second prong requiring a 'sensory and contemporaneous observance' of the traumatic event. Receiving tragic news from a doctor, while distressing, is not equivalent to witnessing the accident or injury as it occurs. The court distinguished this case from precedents where plaintiffs witnessed a sudden, fatal heart attack or were forced to participate in a traumatic stillbirth, as those involved direct observation of a discrete, shocking event. The court also held that the hospital's settlement offer was invalid to toll delay damages because it did not remain open for 90 days, identify the underwriter, or state its actual cost as required by Pa.R.C.P. 238.
Analysis:
This case significantly refines the 'sensory and contemporaneous observance' requirement for bystander negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) claims in Pennsylvania, particularly in the context of medical malpractice. It establishes that the 'traumatic event' is the injury-causing incident itself, not the subsequent communication of bad news about the injury. This decision narrows the path to recovery for NIED in medical negligence scenarios where the harm often occurs out of sight of family members or unfolds over time rather than in a single, observable moment. The ruling reinforces a strict interpretation of the bystander rule, making it more difficult for plaintiffs who were not physically present for the malfeasance or resulting acute injury to state a valid claim.
