Solomon v. Shuell
457 N.W.2d 669, 435 Mich. 104 (1990)
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Rule of Law:
Police reports created by officers during a homicide investigation into their own conduct lack the inherent trustworthiness required for admission under the business records (MRE 803(6)) and public records (MRE 803(8)) hearsay exceptions. The rescue doctrine applies when a rescuer holds a reasonable belief that another person is in peril, regardless of whether that person was in actual danger.
Facts:
- Detroit police officers, including John Shuell and Richard Nixon, were conducting surveillance related to a series of armed robberies.
- The officers, in plain clothes and unmarked cars, followed Alvin Solomon (the son of decedent Joseph Solomon) to the Solomon family home at 20045 Strathmoor.
- Officers Shuell and Nixon blocked Alvin Solomon's car and initiated a stop.
- The officers' and Alvin Solomon's accounts of the stop differ: Alvin testified the officers were aggressive, did not identify themselves, and put a gun to his head. The officers testified they identified themselves and that Alvin resisted.
- During the encounter, either Alvin or his girlfriend called for his father, Joseph Solomon.
- Joseph Solomon came out of his house holding a gun. His family testified he held it pointing down and yelled, 'Turn my child loose.'
- The officers' accounts state that Joseph Solomon assumed a 'combat stance' and that they yelled, 'Police.' Accounts conflict as to who fired the first shot.
- Officer Shuell fired nine shots, striking Joseph Solomon eight times and killing him.
Procedural Posture:
- Charlotte Solomon, representing Joseph Solomon's estate, sued the City of Detroit and officers Shuell, Hall, and Nixon in Wayne Circuit Court (a state trial court).
- The trial court granted a directed verdict for defendants Hall and the City of Detroit and dismissed defendant Nixon.
- The case against Officer Shuell went to the jury, which found Shuell negligent but also found Joseph Solomon 80% comparatively negligent.
- A judgment was entered for Solomon for $20,000, which was 20% of the $100,000 in damages found by the jury.
- Solomon, as plaintiff-appellant, appealed to the Michigan Court of Appeals.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that the admission of police reports was proper and the error in the jury instruction was harmless.
- Solomon, as plaintiff-appellant, appealed to the Supreme Court of Michigan, which granted leave to appeal.
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Issue:
1. Do police reports prepared by officers during a homicide investigation into their own conduct lack the requisite trustworthiness to be admitted into evidence under the business records (MRE 803(6)) or public records (MRE 803(8)) hearsay exceptions? 2. Does a trial court commit reversible error by instructing a jury that the rescue doctrine applies only if the person being rescued was in actual imminent and serious peril?
Opinions:
Majority - Archer, J.
1. Yes. Police reports prepared under circumstances where the authors have a strong motivation to misrepresent, such as in the midst of a homicide investigation where they face potential criminal prosecution, civil liability, and departmental discipline, are not the type of records contemplated by the business records or public records exceptions to the hearsay rule. The circumstances of preparation—including the presence of counsel and the passage of several days—indicate a lack of trustworthiness, which is an express condition for admissibility under MRE 803(6). These reports are also inadmissible under MRE 803(8) because the same lack of trustworthiness removes them from the rationale of the public records exception, and they contain multiple layers of inadmissible hearsay. 2. Yes. An instruction on the rescue doctrine is erroneous if it requires the person in peril to have been in 'actual' danger. The proper standard is whether the rescuer acted as a reasonable person would under the same or similar circumstances, which depends on the rescuer's reasonable belief that another was in peril. The trial court's erroneous instruction was prejudicial because it prevented the jury from properly considering the plaintiff's theory of the case, thereby affecting the plaintiff's substantial rights.
Concurring - Boyle, J.
1. Yes. The police reports were inadmissible, but on the grounds that they are investigative or evaluative reports that fall outside the scope of MRE 803(8)(B), which Michigan's rulemakers intended to exclude. While the admission of the reports was improper, the error was harmless because the statements in the reports were merely cumulative of the officers' trial testimony, and the officers were available for cross-examination. Furthermore, the plaintiff used inconsistencies in the reports to impeach Officer Shuell's credibility, turning the evidence to her advantage. 2. Yes. The instruction on the rescue doctrine requires reversal. The combination of the incorrect instruction requiring 'actual' peril with the standard negligence instruction may have misled the jury into holding Joseph Solomon to a standard of care defined by the circumstances as they actually existed, rather than by his reasonable belief of what the circumstances were.
Dissenting - Griffin, J.
1. Yes. (Concurring with Justice Boyle that the reports were inadmissible but the error was harmless). 2. No. While the jury instruction on the rescue doctrine was 'technically flawed,' the error does not require reversal. The instructions, when read as a whole, fairly presented the parties' theories and the applicable law on comparative negligence to the jury. Therefore, the error was harmless and did not result in a miscarriage of justice, and the jury's verdict would not have been different with a proper instruction.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the application of the 'trustworthiness' clause in the business records hearsay exception (MRE 803(6)) in Michigan. It establishes that records created with a clear and powerful motivation to misrepresent, particularly in anticipation of litigation or disciplinary action, are inadmissible regardless of whether they meet the other technical requirements of the rule. The decision also aligns Michigan's rescue doctrine with the modern, prevailing standard in tort law, shifting the focus from the victim's 'actual' peril to the rescuer's 'reasonable belief' of peril. This provides a more subjective and rescuer-friendly standard for evaluating the reasonableness of a rescue attempt.
