Sollin v. Wangler
2001 ND 96, 627 N.W.2d 159, 2001 N.D. LEXIS 104 (2001)
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Rule of Law:
A trial court's failure to sua sponte (on its own initiative) instruct a jury about the legal effect of its comparative fault findings on damage awards is not fundamental error requiring a new trial, especially if the instruction was not requested by counsel and the law on such instructions was unsettled at the time. While an 'ultimate outcome' instruction should be given if properly requested and not confusing, failing to provide it without a specific request or clear indication of juror confusion is not an abuse of discretion warranting a new trial.
Facts:
- On February 13, 1995, Richard Sollin was employed by David Migler to operate a hay grinder and grind straw for Dale and Pius Wangler.
- While the grinder was operating, Richard Sollin began greasing the machine in preparation for the next grinding job.
- Dale Wangler, using a tractor-loader, attempted to place a 1,200-pound straw bale into the grinder tub.
- The bale fell out of the tub and struck Richard Sollin, severely injuring him.
Procedural Posture:
- In January 1999, Richard and Linda Sollin sued Dale and Pius Wangler in the trial court (state district court), claiming Dale negligently operated a tractor-loader and Pius negligently instructed Dale, seeking damages for Richard’s injuries and Linda’s loss of consortium.
- The Wanglers alleged Richard Sollin’s own negligence proximately caused his injuries.
- During the jury trial, the Sollins did not request an instruction advising the jury on how its comparative fault findings might impact an award of damages.
- The trial court instructed the jury to return a special verdict determining the amount of damages without diminution for negligence and determining the percentages of fault.
- On December 10, 1999, the jury sent a communication stating, 'We feel both parties are at fault,' and requested clarification on how to reflect this in the verdict form, which the court answered.
- Later the same day, the jury sent another communication asking, 'Judge. Is the % of fault going to damage awards,' to which the court told the jury to follow the instructions given.
- The jury returned a verdict finding Dale Wangler 50% at fault, Pius Wangler 0% at fault, Richard Sollin 50% at fault, and David Migler (a non-party) 0% at fault.
- The jury found Richard Sollin incurred $100,000 in damages, but found Linda Sollin incurred no damages.
- The trial court dismissed the Sollins’ claims with prejudice because Richard Sollin’s fault (50%) was as great as Wangler’s fault (50%) under North Dakota’s comparative fault law, meaning Richard could not recover damages.
- The Sollins moved for a new trial, arguing the trial court erred in failing to explain the effect of comparative fault findings on damages upon the jury's request, and that this constituted a fundamental error of law.
- The trial court denied the Sollins' motion for a new trial, ruling that the Sollins had not shown entitlement to a new trial under N.D.R.Civ.P. 59(b) and that the instructions given were adequate.
- Richard and Linda Sollin (appellants) appealed from the order denying their motion for a new trial to the Supreme Court of North Dakota.
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Issue:
Does a trial court commit fundamental error requiring a new trial by failing to sua sponte inform the jury about the effect of its comparative fault findings on the award of damages, particularly when the jury inquired about the percentage of fault going to damage awards, if counsel did not request such an instruction?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Vande Walle
No, a trial court does not commit fundamental error requiring a new trial by failing to sua sponte inform the jury about the effect of its comparative fault findings on the award of damages, even if the jury inquired about the issue, when counsel did not request such an instruction. The North Dakota Supreme Court reviews a trial court’s denial of a new trial motion under an abuse of discretion standard, requiring an error to be patent, obvious, and materially affect substantial rights. Under N.D.R.Civ.P. 51(c), counsel has the burden to object to omissions in proposed jury instructions, and the Sollins neither requested an ultimate-outcome instruction nor objected to its omission. The Court noted that North Dakota's former comparative negligence statute previously allowed (upon request) informing the jury of the effect of comparative fault findings, but this provision was omitted in the current N.D.C.C. § 32-03.2-02. Before 1973, prior caselaw (e.g., Morrison v. Lee) established a 'blindfold rule,' prohibiting informing the jury of the legal effect of special verdict findings. The Court explicitly overruled these prior decisions to align with the 'overwhelming modern trend' towards permitting 'ultimate outcome' instructions in comparative negligence jurisdictions. This modern view recognizes that juries will speculate on legal effects, and providing information prevents unjust results stemming from juror ignorance, as articulated in Seppi v. Betty. However, the Court distinguished cases where new trials were granted because a statutory or rule-based requirement existed for such instructions, or where appellate courts affirmed a trial court's grant of a new trial. The Court emphasized that most jurisdictions require the instruction if properly requested and if the court determines it will not confuse or mislead the jury, rather than imposing a sua sponte duty on the court. Regarding the jury's question, 'Is the % of fault going to damage awards,' the Court found it plausible the trial court and counsel interpreted it as a request for clarification on the 'Alternative Findings' instruction (which required determining damages without diminution for negligence) rather than a specific request for an ultimate-outcome instruction. The jury's notation for 'Rehab' was deemed mere speculation, insufficient to establish confusion requiring a new trial. Given that the Sollins did not request the instruction, did not object to its omission, and the law was unsettled (or even prohibitory by prior caselaw) at the time of trial, the trial court’s failure to sua sponte give the instruction was not fundamental error affecting substantial rights. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial.
Analysis:
This case represents a significant jurisprudential shift in North Dakota, officially abandoning the long-standing 'blindfold rule' and embracing the modern trend of allowing juries to be informed of the legal effect of their comparative fault findings. While it establishes that such 'ultimate outcome' instructions should be given if properly requested and not confusing, it simultaneously clarifies that the trial court does not have a sua sponte duty to provide them, especially when counsel fails to request them. This decision places a clear onus on trial attorneys to request appropriate instructions and highlights the critical importance of preserving error through timely objections. Future cases will likely see more frequent requests for ultimate-outcome instructions, potentially leading to more informed jury deliberations and fewer unjust outcomes stemming from juror ignorance of comparative fault laws.
