Snyder v. King
958 N.E.2d 764, 2011 WL 6268238, 2011 Ind. LEXIS 1091 (2011)
Rule of Law:
The Indiana General Assembly's constitutional power to disenfranchise individuals for "infamous crimes" is limited to offenses that pose a direct threat to the integrity of elections, but the General Assembly also possesses separate police power authority to temporarily disenfranchise any person incarcerated following a criminal conviction for the duration of their imprisonment, regardless of whether the crime is "infamous."
Facts:
- The Indiana General Assembly enacted a statutory scheme that disenfranchises any person convicted of a crime and sentenced to an executed term of imprisonment for the duration of their incarceration, making them ineligible to register to vote and removing them from the official list of registered voters.
- Individuals released from incarceration are again eligible to register, and those on probation, parole, home detention, or in community corrections are not disenfranchised.
- In 2008, David R. Snyder was convicted of Class A misdemeanor battery, as defined by Indiana Code § 35-42-2-1(a)(1).
- Snyder was sentenced to imprisonment in the St. Joseph County Jail from March until May 2009.
- On March 4, 2009, the St. Joseph County Board of Voter Registration informed Snyder via letter that his voter registration had been canceled in accordance with state law due to his incarceration.
- After his release from jail, Snyder made no attempt to re-register to vote, which he was entitled to do, as his disenfranchisement only applied to the period of incarceration.
Procedural Posture:
- David Snyder was convicted of Class A misdemeanor battery and subsequently incarcerated in the St. Joseph County Jail.
- His voter registration was canceled by the St. Joseph County Board of Voter Registration according to state law.
- Snyder filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of federal and state constitutional and statutory rights, including the Infamous Crimes Clause of the Indiana Constitution.
- As part of his prayer for relief, Snyder asked the Southern District Court to certify a question to the Indiana Supreme Court regarding whether Class A misdemeanor battery is an "infamous crime."
- Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 64(A) and upon a joint motion by Snyder and the State, Judge Lawrence of the Southern District of Indiana certified the question to the Indiana Supreme Court.
- The Indiana Supreme Court agreed to consider the certified question by order dated February 21, 2011, and ordered simultaneous briefing followed by oral argument.
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Issue:
1. Does the term "infamous crime" as used in Article II, Section 8, of the Indiana Constitution include conviction of and imprisonment for a misdemeanor battery? 2. If not, does the cancellation of a person's voter registration for the duration of their incarceration following conviction for a non-infamous crime violate the Indiana Constitution?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Sullivan
1. No, Class A misdemeanor battery is not an "infamous crime" under Article II, Section 8, of the Indiana Constitution. The Court reinterprets the Infamous Crimes Clause, rejecting prior precedent that defined "infamous crime" based on the nature of the punishment (e.g., imprisonment or legislative affixing of disenfranchisement). Instead, an "infamous crime" is now defined by the nature of the offense itself. This reinterpretation is grounded in historical common law understandings of "infamy" (which historically rendered individuals incompetent as witnesses based on the crime's nature, not its punishment) and the constitutional framers' intent, inferred from the use of "infamous crime" instead of "felony" in Article II, Section 12. The Court establishes that an infamous crime is one involving "an affront to democratic governance or the public administration of justice such that there is a reasonable probability that a person convicted of such a crime poses a threat to the integrity of elections." This regulatory purpose is derived from the clause's placement in Article II (Suffrage and Elections) and the principle in Article I, Section 18, that the penal code should be founded on reformation, not vindictive justice. Misdemeanor battery does not meet this standard because, by its statutory definition, it does not inherently bear upon the integrity of the election process. 2. No, the cancellation of Snyder's voter registration for the duration of his incarceration following his conviction for misdemeanor battery did not violate the Indiana Constitution. The General Assembly's power to temporarily disenfranchise incarcerated individuals for any crime derives from its general "police power," not exclusively from the Infamous Crimes Clause. The Infamous Crimes Clause applies specifically when disenfranchisement is affixed as a distinct punishment for an infamous crime. In this situation, disenfranchisement during incarceration is considered a collateral consequence or an incident of imprisonment, which lawfully deprives individuals of many rights enjoyed by those at liberty. The Court notes that a majority of states disenfranchise at least some incarcerated prisoners. Historically, there was no mechanism for incarcerated prisoners to vote at the time of the Constitution's ratification. Therefore, the General Assembly may, through its police power, deprive all convicted prisoners of the right to vote for the duration of their incarceration. The statute's erroneous citation to the Infamous Crimes Clause as its authority does not invalidate an otherwise constitutional exercise of police power.
Concurring - Justice Rucker
Justice Rucker concurred with the majority's reasoning in Parts I (redefinition of 'infamous crime') and II (General Assembly's police power to disenfranchise incarcerated individuals). He concurred in the result for Part III, which critically discussed the troubling posture of the case and the use of certified questions for state constitutional issues.
Analysis:
This case significantly redefines the meaning of "infamous crime" in Indiana, shifting from an interpretation based on the nature of punishment to one focused on the nature of the crime itself and its direct impact on electoral integrity. This clarifies that while permanent disenfranchisement under the Infamous Crimes Clause is reserved for specific offenses undermining democratic processes, the legislature's broad police power independently supports temporary disenfranchisement during any period of incarceration for any conviction. This distinction is crucial for future challenges to Indiana's disenfranchisement laws, requiring plaintiffs to argue either that a particular crime doesn't fit the newly defined "electoral integrity" test for permanent disenfranchisement or that the temporary disenfranchisement exceeds the bounds of a legitimate collateral consequence of incarceration.
