Snyder v. Bridewell
267 S.W. 561, 167 Ark. 8 (1924)
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Rule of Law:
A description of land in a mortgage as 'all property owned' by the mortgagor in a given county is sufficiently definite to convey title and provide constructive notice to subsequent purchasers. Separately, a party seeking to rescind a contract for a defect in title must do so within a reasonable time or they forfeit that right.
Facts:
- The Nashville Lumber Company owned a tract of land in Howard County, Arkansas.
- Nashville Lumber Company executed a mortgage to the Lesser-Goldman Cotton Company, covering 'all property owned by the Nashville Lumber Company' in Howard and several other counties.
- Prior to the foreclosure of this mortgage, Nashville Lumber Company conveyed the specific land parcel in question to the Graysonia-Nashville Lumber Company, which still claims title.
- The mortgage was later foreclosed, and through a series of transactions following the foreclosure sale, appellees acquired title to the land under the same general description.
- On June 10, 1919, appellees sold the land to appellants using a specific and definite description, and appellants took possession.
- Appellants remained in actual possession of the land for several years before the current dispute arose over unpaid purchase money.
Procedural Posture:
- Appellees filed suit against appellants in the Howard County chancery court (a trial court) to foreclose a vendor's lien for unpaid purchase money.
- Appellants filed an answer and cross-complaint, raising the defense of defective title and seeking to rescind the purchase contract.
- The chancery court found in favor of the appellees, entering a judgment and decree of foreclosure.
- Appellants appealed the trial court's decree to the Supreme Court of Arkansas.
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Issue:
Does a general description in a mortgage, identifying land as 'all property owned by the [mortgagor]' in a specific county, provide a legally sufficient description to convey title and constitute constructive notice to third parties?
Opinions:
Majority - Humphreys, J.
Yes, a general description referencing all property owned in a county is legally sufficient to convey title and provide constructive notice. The court reasoned that a deed must furnish a 'key' by which the land can be identified, and a description covering 'all the lands owned' by a company in specified counties is definite enough to satisfy registration laws and serve as constructive notice to all parties. The court found this rule consistent with the weight of authority, including the U.S. Supreme Court. Additionally, the court held that even if the description were defective, appellants forfeited their right to rescind the contract because they remained in possession for several years without raising the title defect, failing to act within a reasonable time.
Concurring - McCulloch, C. J.
No, a general description referring merely to ownership is not sufficiently definite to constitute constructive notice to third parties, but the judgment should be affirmed on other grounds. The concurring opinion argues that such a description is impractical for a third person, such as a title abstracter, to use to gain actual information about the specific properties affected, as it would require an exhaustive search of all lands owned by the mortgagor. This is distinguished from cases involving statutory liens or actual notice. However, the author concurs in the final judgment because the appellants forfeited their right to rescind the contract by waiting an unreasonable amount of time after taking possession of the land.
Analysis:
This decision establishes that, in Arkansas, a broad 'all property' or 'Mother Hubbard' clause in a conveyance is sufficient to provide constructive notice, placing a significant burden on subsequent purchasers to investigate a grantor's entire property holdings within a county. The concurrence highlights a critical counterargument regarding the practical impossibility for title abstractors to effectively search for such general conveyances, a view held in other jurisdictions. The case also reinforces the equitable principle of laches, affirming that a party's right to rescind a contract is not indefinite and can be lost through unreasonable delay.
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