Snell v. Norwalk Yellow Cab, Inc.
2017 Conn. App. LEXIS 115, 158 A.3d 787, 172 Conn. App. 38 (2017)
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Rule of Law:
The superseding cause doctrine remains applicable in Connecticut when an unforeseeable, criminally reckless, or intentional intervening act breaks the chain of causation between a defendant's negligence and a plaintiff's injuries, particularly where statutory apportionment of liability for such conduct is unavailable.
Facts:
- On December 3, 2009, Johnley Saineval, a taxicab driver employed by Norwalk Yellow Cab, Inc. (Yellow Cab), parked a taxi in Monterey Village, a housing complex in Norwalk located in an area known for significant criminal activity.
- Saineval left the taxicab unlocked and unattended with the keys in the ignition while he went inside an apartment.
- Two teenagers, Shaquille Johnson and Deondre Bowden, who had been consuming alcohol and smoking marijuana, noticed the taxi and stole it for a 'joyride.'
- While driving the stolen taxi in Stamford, Bowden, who was both 'tipsy' and 'high,' rear-ended another vehicle in traffic and attempted to flee the scene.
- To maneuver around the struck vehicle and evade responsibility, Bowden drove the taxi over the curb and onto the adjoining sidewalk, first hitting a fire hydrant.
- Bowden then struck Brenda Snell with the taxicab, causing her severe physical injuries.
- After hitting Snell, Bowden and Johnson exited the still-moving stolen taxicab and fled the scene on foot.
Procedural Posture:
- Brenda Snell commenced a civil action against Johnley Saineval and Norwalk Yellow Cab, Inc. in the Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk.
- The defendants filed an apportionment complaint against Shaquille Johnson and Deondre Bowden.
- The trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion to strike the apportionment complaint, ruling that apportionment was unavailable because the teenagers' misconduct was pleaded as reckless or intentional, not mere negligence, under General Statutes § 52-572h(o).
- The matter proceeded to a jury trial on Count One (negligence against Saineval) and Count Two (vicarious liability against Yellow Cab).
- The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants, after being instructed on superseding cause and answering specific interrogatories.
- The jury answered affirmatively that Saineval failed to exercise reasonable care, that the theft of the taxi was foreseeable, that an accident causing injury was foreseeable, and that Snell's injuries were proximately caused by Saineval's negligence, but also that the accident was outside the scope of risk created by Saineval.
- The plaintiff filed a postjudgment motion asking the trial court to set aside the verdict and order a new trial, arguing the jury’s verdict was irreconcilable with its interrogatory responses.
- The trial court, Povodator, J., issued a memorandum of decision denying the plaintiff’s motion.
- The plaintiff appealed the trial court’s judgment to the Connecticut Appellate Court.
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Issue:
Does the superseding cause doctrine apply to relieve a negligent defendant of liability when a third party's intervening conduct is criminally reckless and falls outside the scope of the foreseeable risk created by the defendant's negligence, even if the initial criminal act (theft) was foreseeable?
Opinions:
Majority - Prescott, J.
Yes, the superseding cause doctrine remains applicable to relieve a negligent defendant of liability when a third party's intervening conduct is criminally reckless and falls outside the scope of the foreseeable risk created by the defendant's negligence, even if the initial criminal act (theft) was foreseeable. The court distinguished Barry v. Quality Steel Products Inc., which abolished the doctrine for merely negligent intervening acts due to the availability of apportionment under General Statutes § 52-572h(o). In this case, apportionment was statutorily unavailable for the teenagers' reckless and criminal conduct. The court clarified that the Barry exception for "unforeseeable intentional tort, force of nature, or criminal event" applies to any criminal event, not just those involving a specific intent to cause harm, provided the event is unforeseeable. Relying on the Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 442B, 448, and 449, the court explained that whether the specific intervening actions fall within the hazard created by the defendant's negligence (i.e., within the scope of the risk) is a question of fact for the jury. The jury's finding that Saineval's negligence was a proximate cause was not irreconcilable with a simultaneous finding that the subsequent, more extreme criminal acts of the teens constituted a superseding cause, as these acts could be deemed outside the "scope of the risk" created by Saineval's initial negligence. Therefore, the trial court properly submitted the superseding cause defense to the jury.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the continuing viability of the superseding cause doctrine in Connecticut post-Barry v. Quality Steel Products Inc. It establishes that the doctrine still applies when intervening acts are criminally reckless (not just intentional) and where apportionment of liability for such conduct is statutorily prohibited, preventing a less culpable defendant from bearing full responsibility. The decision highlights the tension between traditional proximate cause analysis and the superseding cause defense, particularly when highly culpable third-party conduct occurs. Future cases will likely use this ruling to argue superseding cause more broadly for intervening criminal or reckless acts where statutory apportionment is not an option.
