Snee v. Trice
2 S.C.L. 345 (1802)
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Rule of Law:
A master is not vicariously liable for the unauthorized and negligent acts of an enslaved person committed without the master's knowledge or specific direction, unless the enslaved person was engaged in a public duty, a trade, or acting under the master's direct orders.
Facts:
- Enslaved persons owned by Mr. Trice were working in a field.
- Following common custom, the enslaved persons carried fire into the field where they were laboring.
- The morning was still and the fire they started had burned down.
- Later in the day, the wind arose unexpectedly and blew embers from the fire.
- The embers ignited a building on the property of the plaintiff, Snee, destroying a quantity of corn.
- Mr. Trice, the master, was away from home at the time of the incident.
- Trice had no knowledge of his enslaved persons starting the fire and did not learn of the incident until his return.
Procedural Posture:
- Snee sued Trice in a Carolina trial court to recover the value of corn destroyed by a fire.
- The case was tried before a jury, where the presiding judge instructed the jury that the defendant, Trice, was not liable.
- Contrary to the judge's instructions, the jury found a verdict for the plaintiff, Snee.
- The defendant, Trice, moved for a new trial, arguing the verdict was against the law and the judge's opinion.
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Issue:
Does the English common law doctrine holding a master vicariously liable for the negligent acts of a servant apply to a master in Carolina for the unauthorized, negligent acts of an enslaved person committed without the master's knowledge or approbation?
Opinions:
Majority - The Court
No. The English common law doctrine of respondeat superior, making a master liable for a servant's negligence, is not applicable to the relationship between a master and an enslaved person in Carolina for unauthorized acts. The court reasoned that enslaved persons are fundamentally different from English servants, as they cannot be sued or held personally liable for damages. Applying the English rule would place slave-owners at the mercy of their enslaved people, who are described as having their own volition and being difficult to control when unsupervised. The court held that liability only attaches in specific circumstances: when an enslaved person is performing a public duty (e.g., ferry keeper), engaged in a trade (e.g., blacksmith), or acting under the master's direct command. As this case involved a casual, unauthorized act done without the master's knowledge, which the court characterized as more of an accident than negligence, the master cannot be held liable.
Analysis:
This decision establishes a significant limitation on the doctrine of respondeat superior, creating a special, less stringent rule for slave-owners in antebellum America. It reflects the judiciary's effort to adapt English common law to the unique legal and social institution of chattel slavery, prioritizing the economic protection of masters over the property rights of injured third parties. The ruling insulates masters from liability for the vast majority of torts committed by enslaved people, unless those actions fall into specific, commercially-oriented or directly-ordered categories, thereby reinforcing the distinct and subordinate legal status of enslaved individuals.
