Smith v. United States
184 L. Ed. 2d 570, 568 U.S. 106, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 601 (2013)
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Rule of Law:
When a defendant asserts a statute-of-limitations defense based on withdrawal from a conspiracy, the defendant bears the burden of proving withdrawal by a preponderance of the evidence; this allocation of the burden of proof does not violate the Due Process Clause.
Facts:
- Calvin Smith was a member of a criminal organization in Washington, D.C. that distributed narcotics for approximately a decade.
- The organization was involved in acts of violence, including numerous murders, to advance its criminal objectives.
- Smith was a knowing and willful participant in conspiracies to distribute narcotics and to engage in racketeering (RICO).
- During the last six years of the charged conspiracies, Smith was incarcerated for a separate felony conviction.
- The applicable statute of limitations for the federal conspiracy charges is five years.
Procedural Posture:
- Calvin Smith was indicted in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia for conspiracy and other crimes.
- Before trial, Smith filed a motion to dismiss the conspiracy counts as barred by the 5-year statute of limitations, which the trial court denied.
- A jury convicted Smith of the conspiracy charges after the judge instructed them that the defendant bears the burden of proving withdrawal by a preponderance of the evidence.
- Smith, as the appellant, appealed his convictions to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals, the intermediate appellate court, affirmed the conspiracy convictions, holding that the defendant bears the burden of proof for a withdrawal defense.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split on the issue.
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Issue:
Does the Due Process Clause or federal conspiracy law require the Government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant did not withdraw from a conspiracy, once the defendant produces some evidence of withdrawal outside the statute-of-limitations period?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Scalia
No. A defendant who claims to have withdrawn from a conspiracy bears the burden of proving that withdrawal by a preponderance of the evidence, and this does not violate the Due Process Clause. The Government must prove every element of a crime, but it is not constitutionally required to disprove affirmative defenses. Withdrawal is an affirmative defense because it does not negate any element of the crime of conspiracy; rather, it presupposes the defendant committed the offense and seeks to limit liability for future acts or start the clock for the statute of limitations. Because the federal conspiracy statutes do not specify who has the burden of proof, the Court presumes Congress intended to follow the common-law rule that the defendant must prove affirmative defenses. This rule is also practical, as the defendant, not the Government, possesses the particular knowledge of the affirmative actions they took to withdraw.
Analysis:
This decision resolves a circuit split and clarifies that withdrawal from a conspiracy is a true affirmative defense, which the defendant must prove. By distinguishing this defense from one that negates an element of the charged crime, the Court reinforces the line between the prosecution's constitutional burden under In re Winship and the defendant's responsibility to prove defenses that excuse otherwise criminal conduct. The ruling makes it significantly harder for defendants, especially those who were merely inactive (e.g., incarcerated), to prevail on a statute-of-limitations defense in conspiracy cases. It solidifies the principle that once a person joins a conspiracy, their membership is presumed to continue until they take an affirmative step to end it and can prove they did so.
